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Managing the Managed Float in China 
Yang Dai PhD (Accounting and Finance) 
Ustinov College September 2016 
 
Abstract 
Despite the promising reform objectives announced on 21 July 2005, there remain 
much uncertainty and controversy surrounding China’s managed floating regime 
and its future. Hence, this research aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
key issues raised over the course of the post-reform era.  
 
We begin by investigating whether the flexibility of RMB has increased following 
the reform announcement. A daily-based flexibility indicator is developed to more 
accurately detect the extent to which the Chinese currency is market-driven. This 
indicator is then utilized in a Markov switching model. The subsequent results 
suggest that the RMB flexibility has switched between two distinctive regimes, 
confirming that RMB flexibility did increase after the 2005 reform, while the so-
called Fear of Floating was also apparent. Additionally, we discuss possible driving 
factors underlying the evolution of the RMB flexibility. 
 
Next, we consider another crucial aspect of the current managed floating regime, 
the equilibrium exchange rate level for RMB. The NATREX approach is selected, 
as we argue that it represents the most suitable solution for the purpose of our 
research. The empirical findings reveal not only the exogenous fundamental factors 
that have impacted the real exchange rate of RMB in the manner predicted by the 
NATREX model, but also evidence that the presumed portfolio channel did not 
work effectively for China in the sample period, which is contrary to the findings of 
previous studies.  
 
Looking ahead, we argue that the Reference Rate system could be a promising 
option for China. From the managerial aspect, we propose an optimal exchange rate 
management for China, which takes the presence of heterogeneous agents into 
consideration. We demonstrate that this strategy, once adopted, offers the optimal 
trade-off between the cost of intervention and the cost of no intervention.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The remarkable growth of China’s economy in recent decades, attributable largely 
to China’s outstanding performance in global trade, has become an important factor 
shaping the world economic and political order. Thanks to the radical economic 
reform embarked upon in 1978, in 2013 China surpassed the US to become the 
world’s largest trading nation (Anderlini and Hornby, 2014). While China has been 
enjoying its rising global influence, researchers and policy-makers worldwide have 
turned their attention to its exchange rate policy, i.e. the fixed nominal exchange 
rate against the US dollar, particularly since the start of 1994. From the early 2000s, 
one popular idea in international circles was that China’s currency, the RMB, had 
been severely undervalued, an argument supported by the evidently huge surplus of 
both current and capital account. It was widely reported at that time that the US 
Congress had repeatedly pressured the US Treasury to declare that China was 
intentionally manipulating its currency in order to achieve a competitive advantage 
in trading (Goldstein, 2003; and Coundert and Couharde, 2007).  
 
The then top leaders in China continued to insist that the RMB was at an appropriate 
level and that it was crucial to maintain that level, thus giving little positive response 
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to the international pressures. However, as the pressure intensified it was reported 
that China’s leadership started to rethink their position on holding a fixed RMB. 
The final news of reform emerged when the Chinese leaders and market participants 
achieved a consensus on having a more flexible exchange rate. On 21 July 2005 the 
Chinese central bank (People’s Bank of China, PBOC hereinafter) announced the 
lifting of the dollar peg and the overall aim to ‘build a managed, floating exchange 
rate mechanism based on market supply and demand and to maintain the yuan's 
basic stability at a reasonable equilibrium level’ (People’s Daily, 22 July 2005). 
With immediate effect, a flexible mechanism was phased in with the RMB being 
allowed to move in a narrow band around a central parity rate determined with 
reference to market makers’ opinions and movements of a basket of world 
currencies.  
 
In essence, the overall aim of exchange rate reform can be broken down into two 
relating objectives: 1) to increase the flexibility in the process of setting the daily 
spot RMB price and 2) to maintain the RMB in a reasonably stable level as 
determined by policy makers. In our research, these two objectives are investigated 
in detail in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively.  
 
If history has taught us anything, it is that it is deeds, rather than words, that matter. 
Hence, we are interested to explore to what extent the reform has accomplished its 
objectives in the 10 years since its announcement in July 2005.  It is interesting to 
note that in the early post-reform era, the Chinese authority repeatedly tried to 
promote the idea that substantial progress had been made, citing the clear 
3 
 
appreciation of both the nominal and effective exchange rate against the major 
trading currencies. However, a large body of literature, for example Eichengreen 
(2007) and Frankel (2009), argued that the RMB was still firmly pegged to the US 
dollar, as the variation in nominal exchange rate of the RMB could be attributed 
almost exclusively to the movements of the US dollar, while the other presumed 
basket-currencies exerted little influence. To make matters worse, the exchange rate 
reform was noticeably disrupted by the fallout from the global financial crisis, and 
in late 2008 the Chinese authority reinstituted a fixed nominal exchange rate of 
RMB against the US dollar. This continued until 2010, when the PBOC announced 
on 19 June that it would ‘proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate 
regime and enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility’.1  
 
Since the 2005 reform, the PBOC has also endeavoured to launch two further policy 
changes, namely capital account liberalization and internationalization of the RMB. 
With regard to the former, while the PBOC has declared publicly that China has 
made substantial progress in liberalizing its capital account against the criteria set 
by the IMF, scholars have been much more conservative on this issue. On one hand, 
studies such as Ma and McCauley (2008) argue that China has maintained strong 
control over capital flows, especially short-run speculative ones. On the other hand, 
scholars are still debating the necessity and potential schedule for China to fully 
liberalize its capital account. Nevertheless, the Chinese authority has already 
                                                          
1PBOC News Archive. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2845862/index.html. Accessed on 1 September 2016.  
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undertaken several meaningful experiments, including the establishment of the 
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
 
On the issue of RMB internationalization, here again opinions are divided. Although 
Chinese officials have not publicly endorsed promotion of the RMB as an 
international currency, it has actively promoted the RMB as a future option for 
international settlement. Evidence for the implementation of this policy can be 
found in the fact that China has signed currency swap agreements with more than 
20 monetary authorities, ranging from the emerging markets in Asia to developed 
countries, with a total amount of more than 2 trillion yuan. The determination of the 
Chinese authority in pushing forward RMB internationalization is further 
exemplified by the fact that the RMB has joined the US dollar, euro, pound and yen 
in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) from Oct. 1, 2016 with a weight of 
10.92 percent.2 
 
In contrast to the eye-catching speed of economic growth, China is widely known 
for being slow to complete its reform measures, something that has attracted wide 
concern and criticism. The exchange rate regime reform is no exception. It seems 
plausible to contend that there is still much uncertainty among market participants 
as regards the ongoing exchange rate reform, especially among foreign investors. 
To take the most recent incident as an example, on 11 August 2015 the global 
financial market was shocked by the sudden devaluation of the RMB, the largest 
                                                          
2 IMF Press Release. N0. 15/543.  [Online] Available at:  
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15543. Accessed on 1 September 2016.  
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one-day drop observed in two decades. To make matters worse, the market was not 
fully convinced by the PBOC’s explanation that the devaluation was merely the 
result of a policy change on how the central parity rate of the RMB is derived. As a 
result, the PBOC was forced to intervene to stop the RMB from depreciating too 
rapidly, and a significant loss of foreign reserves was incurred in a short time. 
Meanwhile, in a notable break from usual practice, top officials at the PBOC had to 
make frequent public appearances to defend such a policy move. We contend that 
one major reason for this incident is that the market did not believe the market 
exchange rate was close to its equilibrium level as the government claimed, and it 
is then not surprising that there were panic reactions from investors.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
To address the current controversies pertaining to the reform progress and the 
concerns over its future, we are highly motivated to offer a thorough investigation 
of the exchange rate reform. In Chapter 2, we focus on the key objective of the 
reform, to increase the flexibility of the RMB. When investigating whether or not 
the RMB flexibility has increased, an appropriate measurement for exchange rate 
flexibility is of vital importance. Using popular methods, such as proposed by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005), the mainstream finding is that the RMB 
flexibility is still very limited, and consequently China is still classified by the IMF 
as a soft peg in 2014. However, we argue that these methods may not be sufficient 
to detect changes of the RMB flexibility as they all suffer from some methodological 
limitations, especially the dependence on monthly data. Hence, we seek to address 
the following two research questions:  
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 Can the existing approaches produce satisfying exchange rate 
flexibility results in the case of China’s RMB? If not, how should 
the measurement be constructed? 
 Has the RMB flexibility changed in the manner officially claimed? 
If so when did the changes happen and what were the underlying 
driving factors?  
 
In Chapter 3, we investigate whether the RMB has reached its equilibrium level 
during the 10-year post-reform period. This question warrants close examination, 
because the equilibrium exchange rate plays an irreplaceable role in the exchange 
rate regime. China is a great example in point. Between 1994 and July 2005, China 
fixed its exchange rate against the US dollar at 8.275, while the international 
community argued that it was severely undervalued compared to its equilibrium 
exchange rate. As a result, the Chinese authority finally gave the green light to the 
reform. However, even though the RMB has since seen consistent appreciation, the 
question is still very much relevant in the current managed floating regime. Given 
the experience of previous intermediate exchange rate regimes, like the Adjustable 
Peg, the maintenance would be extremely costly, if not impossible, when the market 
has little confidence in the (implied) equilibrium exchange rate that the central bank 
upholds. We also note in Chapter 3 that researchers have developed various ways 
to conceptualize and calculate the equilibrium exchange rate. Specifically, we 
examine the following research questions:  
 Why is the NATREX approach proposed by Stein (1994) suitable for China?  
 From an empirical perspective, which exogenous fundamental factors have 
7 
 
impacted the real exchange rate of RMB in the manner prescribed by the 
NATREX approach? Moreover, does the real exchange rate converge to the 
moving NATREX?  
 
In Chapter 4, in light of the issues raised above, we seek to offer an optimal 
management strategy for the Chinese exchange rate regime. Compared to the 
questions explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, a much smaller number of studies 
have focused on the managerial aspect of exchange rate regime. To fill this gap, we 
turn for help to the stochastic optimal control theory, because it is more realistic to 
consider the management of exchange rates in an evolving system such that new 
information (or shocks) arrives in an unpredictable fashion and it is up to the policy-
maker to act accordingly to achieve the best outcome. We note that in this strand of 
literature there is a key assumption that agents are not capable of obtaining 
parameters of the response function of the central bank; this rules out the potential 
impact from agents’ response to the government intervention on the exchange rate, 
and thus ensures that the solution is tractable (Cadenillas and Zapatero, 1999).  
 
However, this assumption seems to be somewhat unrealistic, especially in light of 
recent findings on the presence of heterogeneous agents in the foreign exchange 
market and the impact of central bank intervention on those agents. In fact, the 
existence of heterogeneous agents, aka the heterogeneity found in traders’ 
investment strategies, is well-established in various financial markets. In the context 
of the foreign exchange market, a number of empirical anomalies, such as the 
‘Disconnect’ puzzle (Frankel and Froot, 1986), the ‘Forward Discount Bias’ (Froot 
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and Frankel, 1989) and the ‘Excess Volatility’ puzzle (LeBaron, 2006), have all 
been argued to be related to the heterogeneous agents. Recently there has arisen 
ample empirical evidence that heterogeneity does exist and those heterogeneous 
agents may switch their trading strategies over time. As a result, those studies 
provide a convincing argument for the necessity of central bank intervention. For 
example, from a theoretical standpoint, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) explain 
that in a free-floating regime, central bank intervention helps to prevent the 
development of an exchange rate bubble. There is also strong empirical evidence, 
such as Beine et al. (2009) and Maatoug et al. (2011), to indicate that central bank 
intervention is effective such that it can help increase the proportion of 
fundamentalists and/or decrease the impact of chartists, which in turn helps the 
market exchange rate to return to the equilibrium level.  
 
Hence, we need to take the presence of heterogeneous agents into consideration 
when constructing an optimal exchange rate management strategy. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of the Chinese foreign exchange market, as we 
know that the market participants can only quote the price of RMB against foreign 
currencies within pre-determined trading limits around the central parity rate, and 
the PBOC can directly intervene in the market by placing orders. Moreover, we note 
that major players in the Chinese foreign exchange market are more or less owned 
by the government. Hence, it seems plausible to assume that traders would follow 
the PBOC’s intentions rather than the other way around. Therefore, we consider the 
following research questions:  
 Do heterogeneous agents exist in the Chinese foreign exchange market? 
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 To what extent does the PBOC intervention impact the market, which is 
modelled as consisting of fundamentalists and Moving-Average traders?  
 What is the optimal exchange rate management strategy for China? 
 
In light of the results obtained, in Chapter 5 we aim to identify the issues that should 
be addressed in China’s ongoing exchange rate regime and explain why the 
Reference Rate system might be a desirable choice for China to adopt as its form of 
managed floating.  
 
Despite the promising reform announcement, there is still much doubt over the true 
nature of the reformed exchange rate regime. Some empirical studies suggest that 
China has in fact maintained a peg to the US dollar. In the 2014 Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, the IMF identified the Chinese 
exchange rate regime as a crawling-like arrangement, noting that it maintains a de 
facto peg to the US dollar. Hence, we argue that if the Chinese government 
genuinely wants to fulfil its commitment to allow more market forces in the price 
formation process of the RMB, it must state explicitly what the ‘managed floating 
regime’ represents, including its objectives, the means to uphold the regime, and the 
boundaries of government intervention such as the specific situations when central 
bank intervention can be considered. Failure to do so will damage investor 
confidence, which will in turn make the survival (or success) of the regime highly 
costly, if not impossible. To summarize, in this chapter we consider the following 
research question:  
 Why is the Reference Rate regime a desirable choice for China to adopt as 
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its form of managed floating? Moreover, how should it be implemented?  
 
1.3 Main Findings and Contribution  
The choice of exchange rate regime is of vital importance to the country concerned, 
especially for an economy in transition, such as China. Therefore, the main 
contribution of our research is to offer a comprehensive valuation of China’s 
ongoing exchange rate regime, aiming to provide clearer answers to some widely 
debated key issues. In a nutshell, we contribute to the literature first by providing 
strong empirical evidence that, since the July 2005 reform, the flexibility of RMB 
has indeed increased, and the real exchange rate of RMB has markedly appreciated 
to a level close to its equilibrium value. Secondly, this research sheds light on the 
future of this ongoing reform. In particular, we explain why the Reference Rate 
regime represents a promising future for China, and present an optimal management 
strategy that falls in line with China’s so-called managed floating. 
 
To explain the contribution in more detail, here we list the findings in sequence. In 
Chapter 2, the first contribution is that we build a new daily-based flexibility 
indicator specifically for China. This overcomes the deficiencies found in the 
conventional models, such as their over-reliance on the monthly data. Because 
government intervention is usually conducted at a higher frequency, monthly 
average data may camouflage the frequency and effects of government intervention. 
The results confirm that this newly built index tracks the evolution of the essence 
of China’s exchange rate regime well and reveals richer information, which may 
otherwise remain hidden in the conventional models. The second major finding of 
11 
 
Chapter 2 is the evidence of Fear of Floating in China, in light of the nonlinearity 
found in the newly built index. Using the Markov switching model, we find 
evidence that the RMB flexibility has switched between two regimes, where the 
parameters in the high- and low-flexibility states differ noticeably. As a follow-up, 
the third finding of Chapter 2 is our identification of a few determinants underlying 
the movements of RMB flexibility. The interest rate differential between China and 
the US seems to have a positive effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, 
although the coefficients are not statistically significant. Even though EMP3 has a 
negative effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, the magnitude of the effect 
decreases drastically from the low-flexibility regime to the high-flexibility regime. 
We also find that the CDS index, which indicates the risk China is exposed to, may 
serve as an early warning signal for regime shifts of RMB flexibility, since a higher 
risk spread lowers the probability of the RMB staying in the high-flexibility state. 
 
In Chapter 3, the first potential contribution is that we provide reasons why the 
NATREX model is appropriate for estimating the equilibrium exchange rate for 
China. In comparison with other models, the NATREX stands out as it not only 
offers a quite general yet straightforward framework, but also represents a ‘positive’ 
rather than a ‘normative’ concept. The latter is quite important for policy-makers, 
as they could test what impacts one policy might have on the real exchange rate of 
the RMB. Despite the fact that the NATREX has been successfully applied to a 
number of currencies, our research is one of very few studies that strive to employ 
this approach for the RMB. In terms of empirical findings, we not only identify the 
                                                          
3 It stands for Exchange Market Pressure, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.   
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exogenous fundamental factors that have impacted the real exchange rate of RMB 
in the manner predicted by the NATREX model, but also find that the presumed 
portfolio channel did not work effectively for China in the period studied, which is 
in contrast to the findings of previous studies. We argue that this is largely due to 
the state of China’s economic development and accordingly its choice of policy mix, 
including but not limited to capital control measures.  
 
The major contribution of Chapter 4 is that we construct an optimal exchange rate 
management strategy for China, something not previously attempted in the literature. 
First, using a Markov switching model, we offer empirical evidence that 
heterogeneous agents, represented by fundamentalists and chartists (Moving-
Average traders), do exist in the Chinese foreign exchange market. Conventionally, 
the Moving-Average traders, as an example of chartists, are often criticized for 
destabilizing the market. However, in the case of China, we find that MA traders 
actually helped the market exchange rate move closer to the equilibrium level, as 
the RMB was considered to be severely undervalued. Secondly, unlike previous 
studies, which implicitly impose the assumption that at any time there is only one 
trading strategy in operation, we include both fundamentalists and chartists in the 
model at all times. In terms of the impacts central bank intervention might have 
upon the heterogeneous agents, we find that the estimation results should be 
interpreted carefully. On one hand, if the government intervention objective was to 
decrease the exchange rate volatility, the PBOC intervention can be considered very 
successful, as the volatility is more than 7 times larger in the ‘active’ state than in 
the ‘calm’ state, and both fundamentalists and MA traders play an insignificant role. 
On the other hand, if the government intervention objective was to close the gap 
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between nominal exchange rate and the underlying equilibrium exchange rate, the 
PBOC intervention should be considered as a failure. When the intervention 
intensity drops, which is proxied by an increase in the flexibility index, we could 
expect the probability of staying in an ‘active’ regime, or of transiting out of the 
‘calm’ regime, to increase, whereby both fundamentalist and MA traders play a 
significant role in pushing the real exchange rate of the RMB back to its equilibrium 
value.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, we extend the stochastic impulse control model by 
characterizing a ‘reaction period’ as introduced in Kercheval and Moreno (2009) 
and Bensoussan et al. (2012). Then the optimal exchange rate management strategy 
aims to achieve the optimal trade-off between cost of intervention and no 
intervention. The subsequent solution solved propose there exists an intervention-
free zone within which the exchange rate can float freely as in a pure floating regime. 
However, when the exchange rate reaches the upper or lower edge of this zone, the 
optimal strategy would determine what is the best intervention size. It is 
demonstrated that this strategy offers valuable insights for the central bank from an 
operational perspective as, once adopted, it effectively solves the problems inherent 
in a market populated by heterogeneous agents, such as excessive exchange rate 
volatility and large misalignment, thereby lowering the chances of official 
intervention. 
 
Despite recent reforms, China still faces significant challenges to formulate sensible 
arrangements for a managed floating exchange rate regime. Drawing on the findings 
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from previous chapters, in Chapter 5, we contribute to the literature by arguing why 
a Reference Rate system could be a promising option for China. Such a regime 
presents a simple yet solid framework for regulating the level and movement of the 
exchange rate. Its primary appeal is its ability to provide ample room for the 
exchange rate to fluctuate on the basis of market demand and supply, while 
acknowledging the necessity and desirability of central bank intervention. Moreover, 
the Reference Rate regime explicitly lays out the objective and boundaries of the 
intervention, which helps to avoid the pitfalls of both a pegged rate and a freely 
floating rate.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis comprises four main chapters and a 
sixth, concluding chapter. Chapter 2 aims to answer the question of whether the 
flexibility of the RMB has increased following the July 2005 reform. In accordance 
with the idea that currency flexibility should be defined as to truly reflect the degree 
to which the monetary authority allows market forces to influence the price 
formation process, Chapter 2 presents a nuanced investigation of the degree and 
dynamics of flexibility in China’s exchange rate regime. A high-frequency data 
model is developed to more accurately detect the extent to which the Chinese 
currency is market-driven. This indicator is then utilized in a Markov switching 
model to examine whether there has been any shift in RMB flexibility. Additionally, 
this chapter strives to identify possible factors that have driven the evolution of 
RMB flexibility.  
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Chapter 3 looks at another central pillar of the managed floating regime, the 
equilibrium exchange rate level for RMB. It starts with an overview of the most 
influential theories and methodologies that have been developed in this line of 
research. Then, we list reasons for the selection of the NATREX approach in this 
study. The chapter then offers a thorough empirical investigation of the real 
exchange rate of RMB in the NATREX framework, which is decomposed into three 
parts: the long-run analysis, the medium-run analysis and the misalignment between 
the real exchange rate and the NATREX value.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the managerial perspective of the ongoing exchange rate 
regime. To address the lack of transparency in the current so-called managed 
floating regime, we argue that the optimal stochastic control theory can be of great 
help. In addition, this chapter recognizes the heterogeneous agent literature, which 
provides another strong argument why central bank intervention is needed. Based 
on the empirical evidence from the Chinese foreign exchange market, this chapter 
presents a rule-based official intervention strategy for the Chinese authority and 
offers numerical simulation to explain how it could be implemented.  
 
Chapter 5 notes that to fulfil its commitment to establish a managed floating regime 
and solve the issues raised in previous chapters, China needs to come up with a 
sensible and executable management framework. To this end, we follow John 
Williamson and provide reasons why a Reference Rate system could be a promising 
option for China. This thesis argues that the Reference Rate system is appealing 
because it not only falls into line with the objective of China’s reform, which is to 
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allow market forces to play a larger role in the exchange rate system, but also leaves 
room for the authority to exert its influence in accordance with the pre-determined 
rules. The chapter also discusses the rules and policy coordination of the system and 
how the regime may be operationalized. 
 
Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks in light of the previous chapters. The 
limitations of the research are outlined, and future improvements are proposed.   
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Chapter 2  
Exchange Rate Flexibility in China: 
Measurement, Regime Shifts and Driving 
Forces of Change 
2.1 Introduction  
China’s exchange rate policy has been the subject of much debate during the past 
decade. The early debate focused on whether the Renminbi (RMB) was undervalued 
and the possible consequences thereof. More recently, however, discussions of the 
appropriate institutional arrangements for the Chinese currency have become 
prominent. A major aspect of the debate concerns the degree of flexibility of the 
Chinese exchange rate regime, which is the essential feature of exchange rate regime 
classification. 
 
China maintained an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar from 1994 to 2005. 
Despite problems with an enduring, rigid dollar peg, some scholars maintain that 
China should continue the dollar peg because increased flexibility might result in 
deflation as it had in Japan (e.g., McKinnon, 2006, 2007; McKinnon and Schnabl, 
2009, 2012). Arguing against continuation of the dollar peg, Roberts and Tyers 
(2003) demonstrate that in the face of external shocks, a flexible exchange rate 
regime would help China avoid the harmful consequences of a fixed exchange rate 
policy. For instance, it helps to reduce currency market speculation (Eichengreen, 
18 
 
2004, 2007). Both Obstfeld (2007) and Roubini (2007) contend that the large, 
modernized, diverse Chinese economy and eventual convertibility with open capital 
markets require exchange rate flexibility. Support for greater flexibility in China is 
also voiced by Bernanke (2005), Frankel (2006), Roubini and Setser (2005), Prasad 
et al. (2005), Goldstein and Lardy (2006), and Morrison and Labonte (2013), among 
others.  
 
In response to international calls for change, the People’s Bank of China, the 
Chinese central bank, announced in July 2005 the end of the dollar peg and a shift 
to a market-based, managed floating exchange rate regime. A flexible mechanism 
is to be phased in by allowing the RMB to move within a narrow band around a 
central parity rate that is determined with reference to market makers’ opinions, 
movements of a basket of world currencies, and macroeconomic conditions. 
Although this experiment was disrupted in mid-2008 with the onset of the global 
financial crisis, in June 2010, the PBOC announced that it would ‘proceed further 
with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and increase the RMB exchange rate 
flexibility’. 
 
China’s move to a more flexible exchange rate system, if completed, is significant 
because, as the second largest economy in the world, China has become increasingly 
important in international financial markets. While enhanced flexibility in China’s 
exchange rate regime may mitigate the effects of exchange rate misalignment, it 
might also indicate greater market orientation, which could be helpful in attaining a 
sound exchange rate policy over the long run. Furthermore, the market orientation 
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of Chinese exchange rate policy also increases the likelihood that the RMB will 
become an international currency (Eichengreen, 2011). However, China is 
internationally noted for intervening in the foreign exchange market, which causes 
the exchange rates to fail to reflect resource scarcity. The ensuing distortionary 
effects on international trade and capital movements are grave and are often cited 
as major contributing factors to global imbalances.  
 
Moreover, it is also well known that the reforms have been largely government 
administered when they do not always act on their public pronouncements. In 
foreign exchange policy, this discrepancy is best known as fear of floating (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002), that is, countries who claim a floating exchange rate regime do 
not actually allow their currencies to fluctuate with changing economic conditions. 
Hence, a country’s de jure exchange rate regime could be quite different from the 
de facto regime, a phenomenon that is widespread, particularly in the emerging 
markets. In this light, China’s high profile reform announcements warrant careful 
examination (Eichengreen, 2007; Frankel, 2009). To detect the discrepancy between 
policy words and deeds, it is necessary and desirable to design a proper measure of 
exchange rate flexibility to gauge the de facto Chinese exchange rate regime and, 
hence, help us detect if fear of floating exists in China.  
 
A good measure of exchange rate flexibility is also instrumental for capturing the 
evolution of a country’s exchange rate regime because the selection of an exchange 
rate regime is a continuous process. Given that the degree of flexibility is the 
essential feature of an exchange rate arrangement, the regime that China operates 
20 
 
during different periods may be defined in terms of the degree of flexibility, thus 
the flexibility index is also instrumental to improve our understanding of China’s 
exchange rate regime selection process. 
 
Earlier studies generally examine exchange rate flexibility in terms of the statistical 
property of nominal exchange rates (Lanyi and Suss, 1982; Barr, 1984). Recent 
research however puts an increasing emphasis on the indications of economic forces 
behind exchange rate changes, e.g. Girton and Roper (1977), Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), with one common feature as they 
are all monthly based. However, this may prevent them from producing more 
accurate results as the effects of intervention may be offset during the month. Thus, 
a higher frequency based method is very much needed. To this end, we marry the 
merits of the existing studies to construct a new flexibility index for RMB featuring 
the post-reform period. A market-oriented principle was closely followed in the 
sense that the flexibility index is designed to provide a plausible estimate of the 
extent to which the Chinese government allows the RMB to be driven by market 
forces.  
 
To build the daily flexibility index, we utilize exchange rate data from the largest 
Chinese commercial bank dealing in the foreign exchange market, i.e. Bank of 
China, and the New York Federal Reserve. The results suggest that there were 
sizable increases in flexibility immediately after the reform announcement; however, 
this process was disrupted when the adverse effects of the global financial crisis 
emerged in mid-2008. The PBOC quietly re-pegged the RMB to the US dollar, and 
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the flexibility index consequently dropped dramatically, indicating that Chinese 
intervention thwarted the market forces driving the exchange rate. This low-
flexibility policy was enforced until June 2010, when the central bank announced 
the re-institution of exchange rate reform.  
 
We then examine China’s exchange rate policy by investigating changes in the 
flexibility of the RMB exchange rate in a regime-switching setting. This newly 
constructed daily flexibility indicator is applied in a Markov switching model to 
examine whether and when there are regime breaks in the RMB exchange rate 
flexibility. The results obtained through the Markov switching model suggest that 
the dynamics of RMB flexibility have passed through two distinct switching states 
wherein the parameters of the high- and low-flexibility states differ noticeably. The 
timing of these regime shifts provides evidence of fear of floating in China. For the 
sample period as a whole, the degree of RMB flexibility in China is relatively low 
despite the reforms, reflecting the gradual pace of China’s transition to a floating 
exchange rate system. Overall, the Chinese government still exerts considerable 
control over the foreign exchange market, whereas China is edging towards greater 
exchange rate flexibility, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature by way of examining the main exchange rate flexibility models. 
Section 3 is devoted to the construction and analysis of the new exchange rate 
flexibility index. Section 4 examines structural changes in the Chinese exchange 
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rate regime through a Markov switching model and possible driving factors. Section 
5 provides summary and concluding remarks.  
 
2.2 Literature Review of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
2.2.1 Exchange Rate Flexibility and Swoboda Thesis  
The concept of exchange rate flexibility was originally introduced in the classic 
theories as the criterion to categorize the different exchange rate arrangements 
observed in the real world. In operational terms, the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility is usually proxied by the variability of the exchange rate (e.g. Barr, 1984). 
Thus, ‘exchange rate flexibility’ has generally been considered identical to 
‘exchange rate variability’ in the early literature.  
 
Researchers seemed to have neglected the importance of having a well-defined 
measurement of the criterion before they can build theories based on that. Perhaps 
the best example in point is the ‘Swoboda Thesis’, more popularly known as the 
‘bipolar view’ in the literature, stating that when economies are confronted with 
high international capital mobility, they are forced to abandon the intermediate 
exchange-rate regimes and to choose between the ‘corner solutions’, the freely 
floating regime or a fixed regime.  
 
There are two main approaches to testing the ‘Swoboda Thesis’: one is to look at 
the distribution of each exchange rate type over time and the other is to investigate 
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the performance of different exchange rate regimes in periods of crisis. Nevertheless, 
the results found so far are mixed (Fischer, 2001; Bubula and Ӧtker-Robe, 2002; 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Eichengreen, 2008 and Angkinand et al., 2009).  
 
Advances in finding a better measurement of exchange rate flexibility were made 
since 2000s. Exceptional work in line include Bulula and Ӧtker-Robe (2002), Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003, 2005). However, Willett et al. (2012) points out that each of 
these studies still has its own limitations. Therefore, we in this study define 
‘exchange rate flexibility’ as the measurement of the extent to which the monetary 
authority allows the market to freely determine the price of one currency in the 
foreign exchange market. This definition has two clear conceptual differences to its 
predecessors: firstly, it emphasizes on the important role played by central banks in 
setting the price of their currency; secondly, because it seems almost impossible to 
derive the absolute value of the degree of exchange rate flexibility, this definition 
proposes that the measurement could be done on a relative basis.  
 
2.2.2 Why China Needs More Exchange Rate Flexibility  
Despite the fact that previous empirical findings of ‘Swoboda Thesis’ are somewhat 
ambiguous, it did sheds some lights on why China chose to reform its exchange rate 
regime. Specifically, we have identified four main factors in this study.  
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Political Pressure 
Since 2002, the evidently huge surplus of both current and capital account has 
pushed China’s major trading partners such as Japan and the US to complain that 
the RMB is severely undervalued (e.g. Goldstein, 2003 and Coundert and Couharde, 
2007). However, at that time, top leaders of China still hold the view that the RMB 
is at an appropriate level and it is crucial to maintain that level, thus giving little 
positive response to international pressures. Nevertheless, things started to turn 
around when this pressure intensified and it is well reported that China’s top 
leadership start to rethink their position in holding a fixed RMB. The final news of 
reform came out at a time when a consensus of having a more flexible exchange 
rate emerged among the Chinese political leaders and market participants.    
 
Risk of Maintaining the Peg 
Many studies have argued that by maintain the peg, the Chinese monetary authority 
essentially forfeited some flexibility in conducting its own policy, which has 
brought in instability to the Chinese economy in recent years (He, 2007). For 
example, in a hope to slow down the foreign capital inflows, PBOC has been 
resistant to raise domestic lending rates (which were presumed to be already at a 
high level at that time) even in the face of domestic inflation. Consequently, this in 
turn has created excessive demand for loans and has exacerbated inflation 
(Goldstein and Lardy, 2006).   
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Cost of Maintaining the Peg 
Maintaining the peg not only carries unpredictable risk, it also generates real cost. 
It is widely acknowledged that the PBOC has frequently intervened in the foreign 
exchange market and conducted sterilization subsequently. Estimates of the amount 
of intervention the PBOC has been able to sterilize range from approximately 70% 
(He, 2007) to 90% (Ouyang et al., 2010). However, the efficacy of the sterilization 
is reported to decay over time, while the cost is increasing. For instance, PBOC has 
to pay a higher interest rate for central bank bills it issued than what it can receive 
from the US government bonds. Therefore, the more intervention is put to use, the 
higher the loss will be.  
 
In addition to the sterilization cost, Prasad et al. (2005) discuss other potential costs 
of not having a more flexible exchange rate. For instance, the depreciation of the 
US dollar since 2003 have effectively deteriorated the terms of trade (TOT) for 
China, which suggests significant welfare losses for the Chinese economy. 
Moreover, their study points out that the persistent pressure for an appreciation of 
RMB created by the increase of domestic productivity has to be relieved either by 
changes in the nominal exchange rate or inflation, while the former is typically 
presumed as the more preferable option.   
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Capital Account Liberalization and RMB Internationalization  
Despite the scare incidence that Chinese officials are willing to talk about one 
particular policy, we notice that academics are debating heavily on two hot related 
topics in recent years: the capital account liberalization and RMB 
internationalization. There is a growing body of researches focusing on these two 
issues and we only intend to briefly present some major findings here.          
 
In terms of the issue of capital account liberalization, the first thing to note is that 
China is still assumed to be capable of maintaining strong control over the capital 
flows. For instance, Ma and McCauley (2008) offer both price and flow evidence. 
Second, while the academics are debating the necessity and potential schedule for 
China to fully liberalise its capital account, the Chinese authority has already 
undertaken several meaningful experiments, including the newly set up of the China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
 
With regards to the issue of RMB internationalization, opinions are divided as well. 
Though the Chinese officials disclose no public endorsement for promoting the 
RMB as an international currency, it did push forward the RMB as a future option 
for international settlement. The implementation of this policy is reflected by the 
fact that China has signed currency swap agreements with 20 monetary authorities, 
with a total amount of more than 2 trillion yuan, ranging from the emerging markets 
in Asia to western countries such as UK. It has been well acknowledged in the 
literature that this objective cannot be easily done unless we have a clear increase 
of the degree of RMB flexibility. 
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In summary, each of the factors raised above have played an important role in 
shaping China’s future exchange rate regime. The July 2005 reform reflected the 
Chinese leadership’s perceptions that having a more flexible RMB does not only 
help build a new and responsible image in the international system, it also has 
significant economic benefits domestically. While to enhance the RMB flexibility 
seems like a long-time job, the problem resulted from of a lack of flexibility from 
yesterday reminds us the work to do today.   
 
2.2.3 Review of Measurements of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
Calvo and Reinhart Model 
Conditional on each of the four exchange rate arrangements4, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) estimate the probability of the changes of the exchange rate, as well as the 
foreign exchange reserves and the interest rate, that falls within some pre-specified 
bounds. Subsequently, they propose a multivariate index to capture the extent of 
exchange rate variability relative to the variability of the instruments employed for 
stabilizing the exchange rates.  
 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Model 
Previous studies have well documented that changes in foreign exchange reserves 
or the interest rate may in fact contain ineffective information. Ghosh et al. (2002) 
note that interest rates in most developing countries are not determined solely by 
                                                          
4 They are the peg, limited flexibility, managed floating and freely floating.   
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the market, but are administrated by monetary authorities to cope with other policy 
objectives. Similar arguments could be found in other studies such as Willett et al. 
(2012). Moreover, Ghosh et al. (2002) argue that changes of foreign reserves could 
reflect more than just government intervention. For example, the interests incurred 
on foreign currency denominated assets clearly jeopardize the usefulness of 
employing foreign reserve changes as the proxy for government intervention. 
Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that in countries such as China, those transactions 
account for only a very small proportion of the total reserve changes. Therefore, 
reserve changes are generally assumed as a sufficient yet imperfect proxy.  
 
Given these facts, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) utilize the behaviour 
of exchange rates and foreign reserves as an indicator of exchange rate flexibility. 
More specifically, based on the three classifying variables they have grouped 
exchange rate regimes into four types: fixed, crawling peg, dirty floating and 
flexible.  
 
Modelling Flexibility Based on Exchange Market Pressure   
It is widely held that in any market, the existence of excess demand would generate 
changes in the endogenous variables that could help restore equilibrium. Thus, the 
observed changes in those variables could be used for assessing the degree of the 
unobservable excess demand.  
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In the context of foreign exchange market, Girton and Roper (1977) first introduced 
the concept of ‘Exchange Market Pressure’ (EMP hereinafter) as a measure of the 
difference between quantities demanded and supplied in the foreign exchange 
market at a particular exchange rate. They constructed an EMP index that is the sum 
of international reserve changes and exchange rate changes. Since then, a large 
number of investigations have been conducted employing this terminology and we 
have seen huge developments in this strand of literature (Roper and Turnovsky, 
1980; Eichengreen et al., 1995; Weymark, 1997 and Klaassen and Jager, 2011).   
 
In terms of modelling exchange rate flexibility based on EMP, the main strand is to 
assess the proportion of exchange market pressure that is reflected in movements in 
the exchange rates relative to the proportion that is mitigated by policy instruments 
such as official intervention. The greater the former, the more flexible is the regime, 
regardless of how the exchange market pressure is represented. However, there are 
some limitations to this approach. It is not only because changes of foreign reserves 
represent transactions other than government intervention, it could run into trouble 
as well when official intervention is conducted as ‘leaning with the wind’ (Willett 
et al., 2012). In addition, their study points out that the traditional EMP may also 
generate incorrect results when there are trends in reserves or exchange rates. 
Therefore, they propose a new methodology that uses two parameters: one for the 
trend and another for deviations around the trend. 
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The alternative strand of the literature of modelling exchange rate flexibility with 
EMP follows the pioneering work of Frankel and Wei (2008) and Frankel and Xie 
(2010). The flexibility parameter β is estimated by the following equation:  
      ∆Ht = c + ∑ wi
N
i=1 ∗ ∆X(i)t + β ∗ ∆EMPt + μt                                           (2.1) 
where H is the log value of the home currency, and X is the value of the N potential 
currencies in the basket; ∆EMP is the percentage change of the EMP index, which 
represents shocks in demand for the currency.  
 
Under this setting, Frankel and Wei (2008) contend that the more flexible the 
exchange rate regime of a country, the higher 𝛽 (and the error variance), but the 
lower R2  will be. However, as the authors note, this model would be perfect if 
authorities were to use foreign reserves as the only intervention tool. Another major 
limitation of this approach is that it could not produce accurate estimations when 
the regime in operation switches frequently. Therefore, Frankel and Xie (2010) 
recommend dividing the whole sample period into several sub-sample periods for 
further estimation by applying the Bai and Perron (2003) approach first.   
 
2.3 A Daily-based Flexibility Index  
The models discussed above can generate a time series of flexibility index, which 
provides a useful summary of the evolving nature of a country’s exchange rate 
system. They also enable a look into indications of the economic influences 
including government policy that underlie exchange rate movements, or the lack 
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thereof. Unfortunately, these models suffer from a common drawback, that is, the 
reliance on monthly data to compute the flexibility indexes. Such dependency is 
problematic because government intervention is usually conducted in a higher 
frequency (Beine et al., 2009; Reitz et al., 2010). Accordingly, monthly average data 
may camouflage the frequency and effects of government intervention. To 
overcome this problem, we develop a high-frequency approach based on daily data 
to measure exchange rate flexibility.  
 
2.3.1 Construction 
In China, foreign exchange transactions are administered via the Chinese Foreign 
Exchange Trading System (CFETS), which is a computerized national network that 
publishes the central parity rate (CPR) of the RMB against the US dollar at 9:15 
AM (Beijing time) each business day. The CPR rate, which is set by the Chinese 
central bank, considers three influences: the individual rates offered by official 
market makers, international currency movements and macroeconomic conditions. 
Because this rate-setting process is led by the Chinese central bank, the CPR is 
considered as the official exchange rate, which then provides a benchmark rate for 
the Chinese foreign exchange system. This rate-setting process also reveals the fact 
that exchange rate rigidity in China is often the result of government control which 
shadows the influence of market forces and therefore, it is necessary and appropriate 
to define the flexibility of exchange rate in terms of the extent to which a monetary 
authority allows the market to influence the price of the country’s currency in the 
foreign exchange market.  
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In this research, by comparing the variability of this official rate with the market 
rate, a gap could be revealed, which may serve as a measure indicating government 
intervention in the currency movements.5  Through this, one may gauge the extent 
to which the RMB is allowed to move in line with supply and demand forces. After 
searching for a proxy that reflects the market, we selected a market rate series for 
the RMB/USD that is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Federal 
Reserve or FED hereinafter), which uses data from a sample of market participants. 
These data are the noon buying rates of the RMB against the US dollar in New York 
on business days for cable transfers payable in foreign currencies. This series can 
provide useful information for our research because it is highly unlikely that the 
Chinese government can control the exchange rate in New York. Though we 
acknowledge that the usefulness of FED rates is limited by its transaction volume, 
it does cover the whole sample period which maybe not be possible in other markets.  
 
However, by its nature the official central parity rate tends to be of low variability, 
which limits the indicative accuracy of the changeability differential between this 
rate and the market rate as a flexibility index. This prompts us to search for a 
domestic exchange rate whose variability can be meaningfully compared to that of 
the RMB exchange rates in New York. We then choose the exchange rate quoted 
                                                          
5 It would be straightforward to deploy official intervention data to calculate the flexibility index. 
However, no publication of such data in China and some proxies have to be chosen. The usual proxy 
for intervention, i.e. changes in foreign reserves is not directly feasible in the Chinese context since 
reserve changes are usually reported in China at monthly frequency and their changes are often 
caused by a variety of reasons, not necessarily by intervention. Empirically, given the property of 
time series of reserves data, no reliable method can be applied to derive sound daily interpolation. In 
this light, we choose to rely on the information revealed by the exchange rates. 
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by the Bank of China (BOC) because it is the earliest and of the largest player in the 
foreign exchange market in China and its rate series is representative of the rates 
offered by commercial banks in China. 6 It is important to note that Chinese trading 
rules require commercial banks to conduct their market transactions based on the 
CPR, and the quoted rates must be within a government-specified band, which was 
initially +/- 3‰ and has recently expanded to +/- 2% around the central parity rate.7 
So the BOC exchange rates are in fact semi-controlled. However, with the 
development of China’s financial reforms, the BOC increasingly has its own 
commercial interests and its rates become gradually more driven by market 
influences. As such, comparing the variability of this semi-government influenced 
rate to that of the Federal Reserve rate may provide useful information on the extent 
of RMB flexibility. 
 
Use of the ratio may have another advantage over the other competing methods. It 
is well known that currency prices are influenced by common international factors 
or events despite its own characteristics. In this light, the volatility ratio helps to 
analyse the relative strength of market forces that is transmitted to the movements 
of the RMB exchange rates, which directly reflects the essence of our definition of 
the currency flexibility measure. Based on these comparisons, we then estimate the 
high-frequency model to produce flexibility indicators for the RMB. The procedure 
                                                          
6 The BOC rate is from Bank of China, available in DataStream by 16:15 (GMT) on each business 
day.   
7 The fluctuation band was officially announced on July 21, 2005 to be +/- 0.03% around the central 
parity. This was raised to +/- 0.05% from May 21, 2007. From April 16, 2012, the band was expanded 
to +/- 1% and on March 17, 2014 it became +/- 2%.  
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involves the following steps. First, we calculate the standard deviation of returns of 
the RMB/USD rates from the BOC in the last 21 business days (including the 
current business day)8 to proxy exchange rate volatility of the current business day. 
Next, the daily relative volatility ratio is obtained by dividing the volatility of the 
BOC exchange rates by that of the market-based exchange rates.  
 
Finally, to index these ratios, we take the base as of January 4, 2006 when the 
aforementioned central parity rate pricing rule was officially installed. This means 
that the value of the flexibility ratio on that day is made to be 100, and this reference 
base is then applied to every daily flexibility ratio in the series: 
Flexibility Index=100*
Relative Volatility Ratio
Reference Base
                             (2.2) 
Because the pegged RMB/USD exchange rate is upheld before July 21, 2005, the 
rolling calculation of the daily flexibility index begins on July 22, 2005, the first 
business day after the reform was announced, and ends on March 29, 2013, the latest 
day in our sample period. We denote the computed daily index of RMB flexibility 
as BOC_FED and plot the series in the following figure, while the black line 
represents the mean flexibility value as 115.3.   
                                                          
8 We have chosen 21 days because there are approximately 21 working days in a calendar month. 
We have also tried 10 days and 60 days, and the results show no significant difference.   
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It is clearly seen from the figure that the index has its ups and downs during the 
sample period, which confirms previous findings that the RMB flexibility was 
enhanced after the 2005 reform before it was later disrupted by the outbreak of two 
crises. For instance, starting from mid-2008 until the second reform announcement, 
the flexibility index was hardly seen beating its mean value, suggesting the Chinese 
authority tightened exchange rate control when it feared that the global financial 
crisis posed a threat to the export sector. A similar decrease was also captured when 
the European sovereign debt crisis emerged. However, this time the low flexibility 
phase did not last long.  
 
In addition to confirming the commonly held market perceptions, our high-
frequency data model offers richer information about currency flexibility in China. 
For example, since the 2005 reform China’s exchange rate management has been 
subject to several changes. Under the regime aforementioned, the Chinese monetary 
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authorities mainly deploy two tools to prevent or restrict undesirable fluctuations in 
the exchange rate: one is the government controlled central parity rate and the other 
is the band in which the RMB rate is allowed to fluctuate in the marketplace. 
Initially, the central parity rate was based on the previous day’s closing price. This 
practice would continue the momentum of previous exchange rate changes such that 
cumulative exchange rate variation and level changes could be quite sizable. Fearing 
rapid appreciation of the exchange rate and increasing variation, the government 
changed this pricing rule on January 4, 2006 and reset the central parity rate on the 
opening of every business day rather than simply using previous day’s closing rate.9 
As a result, though the BOC_FED index exhibits a surge after the reform10, it 
sharply decreased in January 2006. These developments are well captured by the 
proposed flexibility index.  
 
The fact that the two exchange rates are drawn from different markets may trigger 
some doubts on the role played by capital control policies, as it is widely held that 
Chinese authority has adopted tight control on the capital flows, which largely 
disrupted the link between onshore and offshore markets. Therefore, some may 
argue that the volatility difference in the two exchange rate series should be 
                                                          
9 This policy was changed again on 11 August 2015 as the PBOC latest effort to improve the central 
parity rate-setting process.   
10 Our results show that the first dramatic increase of the flexibility index occurred around October 
2005, not immediately after the reform announcement date. However, it simply suggests that the 
Chinese authorities has proceeded the reform cautiously, which reinforces the fact that our index 
could offer more information.  
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considered as a measure of capital control intensity rather than an exchange rate 
flexibility as we discussed above. 11 
 
While we do acknowledge that there is some effect of capital control on the 
exchange rates from a theoretical perspective, the de facto intensity of this impact 
is however much in question empirically. Aizenman and Sengupta (2013) find that 
capital account openness plays no significant role in China’s trilemma 
configurations12, which confirms a widely held view that the effects of China’s 
capital controls are not omniscient, but are decaying off over time. In fact, arbitrage 
between China and rest of the world is not entirely impossible and may be prevailing 
at some point (Galati et al., 2007 and Ma and McCauley, 2008). Yu (2008) notes 
that a large portion of China’s large trade surplus, as well as the FDI inflows, is 
essentially hot money which is processed under the radar. Moreover, compared to 
the changing volatility ratio index, it is worthy to point out that the Chinese authority 
does not change its stance on the capital control very often for the time period in 
                                                          
11 While it seems not appropriate to use our volatility difference to proxy the intensity of capital 
controls, it is important to note that exchange rates is one of the many economic factors that are 
impacted by the capital control policies, which in turn makes it possible to build alternative measure 
of the intensity of capital controls. In fact, there have been a few well known models in the literature, 
such as Edison and Warnock (2003), Chinn and Ito (2008). 
12 The ‘Trilemma’ theory states that an open economy at any time may only simultaneously choose 
two out of three potentially desirable objectives: namely the autonomy in conducting monetary 
policy, stable exchange rates and internationally free capital movements. Though it was first 
proposed in the 1960s, the existence of the ‘trade-off’ has gone through arduous verification, 
including some recent studies such as Aizenman et al. (2008), Aizenman and Glick (2009), and 
Aizenman et al. (2011).  
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consideration, the fact of which is clearly evident from the annual IMF report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange (AREAER).    
 
Though we cannot fully rule out the impact of capital controls on our index, it is 
important to note that exchange rate flexibility is defined here as the extent to which 
the authority allows the market forces to impact the price of RMB, treating all forms 
of control policies equal, which include but are not limited to the direct sell (or 
purchase) in the FX market, ‘window guidance’, and the capital control policies as 
well. Put in other words, we are more interested in the end-product of the ‘managed’ 
floating rate system that China adopts without differentiating the specific 
‘intervention’ form at the other end.  
 
2.3.2 The Companioning EMP 
In light of the recent exchange rate flexibility models, it seems plausible to double-
check the usefulness of our flexibility index by looking at the companying EMP. To 
this end, we follow Klaasen and Jager’s (2011) method in calculating a daily-based 
measurement of EMP. Compared to the other popular approaches, Klaasen and 
Jager’s (2011) method stands out as this measure is consistent with the very 
definition of EMP and does not rely on any exchange rate model. Another crucial 
feature of their method is that the measure is consistent across frequencies. Thus, it 
is straightforward to aggregate the daily EMPs to obtain a monthly measure.  
 
In Klaasen and Jager’s (2011) study, the specific form of EMP is written as follows, 
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                               ( )
d
t t i t t c tEMP S w i i w c                                       (2.3) 
where tS is the nominal exchange rate change at time t, defined as the domestic 
currency price (RMB) of one unit of foreign currency (USD); ti is the domestic 
interest rate; 
d
ti stands for the interest rate level if exchange rate objective is not a 
determinant. As shown in Klaasen and Jager (2011), 
d
ti can be reasonably 
simplified by using the foreign interest rate level as the proxy; iw is the weight of 
relative interest rate level ( )
d
t ti i  and cw  is the weight of the scaled intervention.  
 
We use the overnight interest rate from PBOC and Federal Reserve to represent the 
interest rate level in China and the US respectively. The weights of iw  and cw are 
set equal to the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate changes to that of 
the interest rate and the scaled intervention component respectively.  
 
As discussed above, the change of foreign reserve might not serve as a perfect proxy 
for exchange rate intervention. Hence, to better proxy the unobservable central bank 
intervention, we make use of one unique statistic from the PBOC, called ‘funds 
outstanding for foreign exchange’. It can be considered as the result of intervention 
as it mirrors the purchase/sell of foreign assets. To make it more comparable, the 
level of ‘funds outstanding for foreign exchange’ is scaled down by the preceding 
domestic M1. The data for M1 and ‘funds outstanding for foreign reserve’ is 
collected from PBOC. However, as they are only available in monthly frequency, 
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we apply the cubic interpolation method to transform them into a daily–based 
series13.  
 
Similar to the flexibility index, the EMP series is calculated from July 22, 2005 to 
March 29, 2013, and the result is plotted in the following figure. It is that there was 
a negative EMP, i.e.an appreciation pressure, on the RMB during most of the sample 
period. In contrast to policy-makers’ intentions, following the 2005 reform, the 
appreciation pressure exaggerated sharply rather than being alleviated, which 
reflects the prevailing market perception that a consistent appreciation of RMB was 
on its way. A negative EMP was maintained until December 2007 when the market 
panicked about the looming crisis. However, the market quickly reversed its course 
by recognizing that the outlook for China’s growth was strong and the RMB was 
still undervalued. Nevertheless, it is observed that from mid-2008 to mid-2010, the 
EMP was close to zero, indicating relatively low appreciation pressure on the RMB 
during that period. Following the second reform announcement, the EMP quickly 
decreased. Since then it has several brief reversals as a result of prevailing market 
conditions. 
                                                          
13 To check the robustness of our daily-based EMP, we have calculated the monthly EMP for RMB 
for the sample period using other popular methods, including Weymark (1997), Stavarek (2007). We 
find the results have a high positive correlation with the monthly aggregated EMP using the Klaassen 
and Jager’s (2011) method. We have scaled up the results 100 times to make it more compatible to 
other variables in the following estimation. 
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Figure 2.2 Exchange Market Pressure of RMB 
 
As discussed above, existing studies have emphasized that high volatility, or a 
relatively high volatility ratio, does not necessarily mean the currency is truly 
flexible. It is imperative to take into account the prevailing pressures. The degree of 
flexibility of one currency is only warranted when there is a considerable level of 
exchange market pressure overhang. Hence, we may visually compare the patterns 
observed in the two figures to check if our flexibility index makes sense.  
 
On one hand, during the crisis period, even though there was little pressure on the 
RMB, the flexibility index was in a ‘low’ phase, which supports the claim that 
reform was halted by the Chinese authority and the RMB was not flexible. On the 
other hand, in non-crisis periods, the striking difference in the flexibility index may 
help to locate ‘high’ flexibility phases. Notwithstanding the considerable pressure 
at the time, the several surges of the flexibility index clearly indicate that RMB was 
actually flexible, though those periods seem to be rather short-lived. In summary, it 
seems safe to say that the effectiveness of our flexibility index is warranted and 
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RMB has undergone several different flexibility phases, revealing more ‘hidden’ 
dynamics than those suggested by existing studies.   
 
2.4 De Facto Regime Switches and Fear of Floating in China 
Sudden changes in government policy may induce drastic breaks in the behaviour 
of economic variables (Hamilton, 1989; Sims and Zha, 2006). Such breaks often 
mean the typical behaviour of a variable switches to a very different one, and 
China’s exchange rate policy is a case in point. During the sample period, the 
Chinese authorities have initiated two rounds of reforms of the exchange rate system, 
allowing greater room for market forces to influence the RMB price, focusing 
primarily on that against the US dollar. This implies that, during the period under 
examination the RMB rate switched from a pegged to a managed flexible rate 
regime, and back and forward twice. As a result, the behaviour of the RMB rate and 
the property of China’s exchange rate system had both exhibited distinct patterns.    
 
Given the importance of regime switches, researchers logically would like to detect 
the regime changes as they happen so that they may find out the implications of the 
regime break and to design suitable responses accordingly. However, it is unrealistic 
to expect a single, linear model to characterize all the distinct behaviours of the 
variables in different regimes. In contrast, the Markov regime-switching (MRS) 
models prove appropriate in capturing more complex dynamic patterns of the 
variables in question. 
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The Markov regime-switching models have found wide applications in economics 
and finance (Ang and Timmermann, 2012). Among the pioneering studies, 
Hamilton (1989) applies the MRS model to research into the US business cycle. 
Many papers applying the methodology then follow suit. Recent studies have also 
deployed the MRS models to explain exchange rate behaviour, e.g. Engle and 
Hamilton (1990), Engle (1994), Bollen et al. (2000), Bergman and Hansson (2005), 
Ichiue and Koyama (2011).  
 
For our research interests, in addition to capture regime changes in the Chinese 
exchange rate policy, the Markov switching model has another helpful property; it 
allows the detection of the timing of regime shifts, which would help to resolve the 
problem noted by Frankel and Xie (2010) and identify proper ‘break-points’ to 
differentiate sub-periods. Furthermore, analysis of the regime shifts can help us 
achieve a better understanding of a critical attribute of the Chinese exchange rate 
regime. Exemplified by fear of floating, studies have pointed out that countries do 
not always conform to their public announcements, i.e. there is considerable 
differences between policy announcement and its implementation. As one key 
objective of this chapter is to find out exactly when the policy shift starts to impact 
the behaviour of the RMB/USD exchange rate, we cannot solely rely on the de jure 
dates. By detecting the timing of RMB’s regime shift, the Markov model would 
help capture the critical features of China’s exchange rate policy in a time of 
economic transition.     
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2.4.1 Estimation  
Given the findings in the previous section, we assume that there have been two 
flexibility regimes, i.e. a high-flexibility regime and a low-flexibility regime. As the 
flexibility is built on the standard deviation of exchange rates, we only need to use 
the mean (constant) coefficient to differentiate these two regimes while the variance 
parameter is assumed to be non-switching. In addition, to take account the common 
dependence of the second moments of the exchange rates, we include an AR (1) 
term in our model. Accordingly, the Markov switching model could be written as 
follows and we report the estimation results in Table 2.1.14  
1 1_ (s ) ( _ (s ))t t i t t tFle Index Fle Index                                  (2.4) 
where _ tFle Index is the BOC_FED flexibility index at time t. It is conditional on 
an unobservable variable ts , which has two possible values: 1ts   (Low-flexibility) 
and 2ts   (High-flexibility);  denotes the mean parameter depending on the 
regime at time t which is assumed to be changeable in those two states; t is the 
error term, following the usual iid assumption.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14  A common estimation procedure is followed in this study and hence the detailed technical 
description was left out. Interested readers can find such information easily in all the aforementioned 
studies. Hamilton (2010) gives excellent review for the MRS model.  
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Table 2.1 Markov Regime Switching Results of Flexibility Index 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
Constant 85 (5.53***) 155 (10.09***) 
Regime Invariant Coefficients 
AR(1) 0.99 (267.88***) 
Log (SIGMA) 2.06 (123.20***) 
Log Likelihood -6354.92 
Panel B 
 
Constant Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i 
P(1,1)=99.1% P(2,1)=0.8% 
P(1,2)=0.9% P(2,2)=99.2% 
Constant Expected Durations (Days) 
Regime 1 125.9 
Regime 2 114.4 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C 4.83 (13.36 ***) 
P21-C -4.73 (-13.05***) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-state Markov switching model of the BOC_FED 
flexibility index. In Panel A, we report the estimated coefficients for the regime-varying and regime-
invariant variables, with the corresponding z-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports the constant 
transition probabilities between the two regimes, the expected duration for each regime, and the 
transition matrix parameters. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
 
Several interesting results emerge from the estimation of the MRS model. Firstly, it 
helps us to formally test regime switches in the flexibility index that we construct. 
We make use of a likelihood ratio (LR) test proposed by Garcia and Perron (1996). 
The null hypothesis is there is no regime shifts (the flexibility index is better 
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represented by a linear AR) against the alternative of the presence of regime 
switches (the flexibility index is better accounted by the MRS model). The LR is 
calculated as follows: 
                   2 | lnL lnL |MRS ARLR                                                          (2.5) 
where ln MRSL and ln ARL denote the log likelihood of the MRS and the linear 
autoregressive model, respectively. As shown in Table 2.2, the LR test statistic is 
highly significant at the 1% significance level. Based on Davies (1987) critical 
values, we reject the null and confirm the regime shifts in RMB flexibility.   
 
Table 2.2 LR Test Results 
lnLMRS lnLAR LR 
-6354.92 -6721.50 736.16*** 
Notes: Similar to the estimated MRS model, the linear model has an order of one autoregressive term. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% levels.   
 
Secondly, we provide evidence that the exchange rate flexibility index varies 
markedly between the two regimes. In the low-flexibility state, the coefficient on 
the constant reads 85 and in the high-flexibility state it is shown to be 155. The 
adoption of a managed floating rate regime has helped the RMB achieve an increase 
in flexibility. Of 1805 observation days, 855 days (approximately 47.4%) are in the 
high-flexibility state though mostly in the period before the 2008 global financial 
crisis. 
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In contrast to the sharp difference in the mean coefficient, both regimes show high 
regime dependence: it almost has a probability of one to stay in the same regime. 
Moreover, there is little difference in the length of the expected duration of each 
regime. The low-flexibility state reports an expected duration of 125.9 days while 
the expected duration of the high-flexibility is only 11 days shorter.   
 
Thirdly, we plot the estimated smooth regime probabilities to see when the regime 
switches take place. Though Figure 2.3 is quite self-explanatory, we report the 
estimated ‘starting’ and ‘ending’ dates of the ‘high-flexibility’ regime in the Table 
2.3. The first thing worthy to note is that generally speaking it confirms the switches 
that were presumed by the market and lends a direct support to the usefulness of the 
flexibility index as depicted in Figure 2.1. For instance, in the face of the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, China took a cautious stance 
towards policy responses, including exchange rate arrangements. The RMB 
exchange rate was kept inflexible, as the flexibility index was hardly seen beating 
its mean value, during the global financial crisis period. It is also seen from Figure 
2.1 that the flexibility index reached a record high in early July 2012 but dropped 
rapidly afterwards. However, our MRS model well captured this short-lived flexible 
period in Figure 2.3, which corresponds to the last ‘High-flexibility’ regime in Table 
2.3. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that Figure 2.3 does not reconcile perfectly 
with Figure 2.1, which is based on the MRS approach. For example, not all the 
‘peaks’ of the flexibility index dates fall within the ‘High-flexibility’ regime.  
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Secondly, the MRS model report different starting and ending dates for the ‘crisis 
period’. According to Table 2.3, the ‘high-flexibility’ regime was ended on 25 
August 2008 and resumed on 23 March 2010, while the official resumption of the 
reform was announced on 19 June, 2010, suggesting the de facto regime switch did 
occur a little earlier.15 
 
Lastly, the MRS model reveals more shifts of the RMB flexibility which may 
otherwise remain ‘hidden’. In the case where monetary authorities do not publicly 
announce its intervention operations, we follow studies such as Beine et al. (2009), 
Gnabo et al. (2009), and Dewachter et al. (2014) to make use of Factiva to double-
check the results from the MRS model. Through search we obtain daily Reuters 
reports on information of the spot foreign exchange market including media analysis 
of the Chinese RMB/ US dollar and other related news. It proves particularly useful 
as  some traders’ comments are connotative of possible intervention by the Chinese 
monetary authorities. These international reports are usually reliable and often 
helpful for one to identify the ‘surprising’ points relating to the shift of China’s 
policy regime. For all those ‘break points’ that we identified as the dates when the 
RMB shifted out of the ‘high flexibility’ regime, we could find corresponding 
reports made by traders indicating that there was a high chance that the PBOC had 
intervened on the dates. For instance, the first shift to the ‘low flexibility’ regime is 
estimated to occur on 13 September, 2005. On that day, the Reuters reported that 
                                                          
15 Through Factiva, we find that on 7 April 2010, the headline news was that in the meeting soon to 
be held between the presidents of China and the USA, and the RMB exchange rate would be a major 
issue to be discussed. On the following day, 8 April 2010, there was news that China would soon 
announce a change to its then exchange rate regime. 
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one trader explicitly commented that the PBOC was very likely to have intervened 
as no one else would buy the US dollars under the prevailing market conditions. On 
the other hand, while traders also reported occasions of possible Chinese 
intervention in the ‘high flexibility’ period, the frequency of such occasions is much 
less than in the ‘low flexibility’ period. This reinforces our argument that while we 
cannot rule out the possibility that central bank intervention may have taken place 
on the same day when we observe a high value of the flexibility index, the frequency 
of such occurrence is reasonably low and the flexibility index represents an 
improvement on the previous models.   
 
In summary, the estimated switch dates give sound evidence of fear of floating in 
China. This also suggests that China’s move to greater RMB flexibility is not a one-
off event. Rather, it is a process where the de facto regime switching occurs in a 
gradual manner. 
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Figure 2.3 Smooth Probabilities of Regimes 
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Table 2.3 Starting and Ending Dates of the ‘High-flexibility’ Regime 
 Starting Date Ending Dates 
1 25 July 2005 12 September 2005 
2 17 October 2005 15 November 2005 
3 13 July 2006 25 August 2008 
4 31 December 2008 9 February 2009 
5 23 March 2010 20 April 2011 
6 5 June 2012 5 July 2012 
Notes: The reported dates are based on the smoothed regime probabilities, estimated from a two-
state Markov switching model of the BOC_FED flexibility index. 
 
2.4.2 Possible Driving Forces 
For possible drivers of the regime switching of exchange rate flexibility, there is 
currently no consensus in the literature. Here we choose to look into three variables 
that may plausibly affect the dynamics of the exchange rate regime switching. The 
first candidate is the interest rate differential between China and the US, which has 
been persistent and largely in China’s favour over the sample period. It is noticed 
that there is much coverage in both literature and news that the interest rate 
differential has induced arbitrage from international investors, which is further 
fuelled by a one-way betting on RMB appreciation. Jongen et al. (2012) and Spronk 
et al. (2013) have shown that the level of interest rate differential plays an important 
role in determining trading strategies in the foreign exchange market, which 
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ultimately contributes to higher volatility. Hence, given a higher interest rate 
differential we would expect to see higher exchange rate volatility, which implies a 
positive relation between the interest rate differential and the flexibility index. 
However, this impact may be dampened by the interventionist policy as it pushes 
the authorities to respond more aggressively when there is a higher interest rate 
differential. Therefore, we only hypothesize that the coefficient of interest rate 
differential displays a regime-switching behaviour, without specifying the sign of 
the relation.  
 
The second candidate is the EMP, which is included here for two reasons. On one 
hand, recent studies, such as Frankel and Xie (2010), have used EMP as an 
explanatory variable in econometric estimation to investigate to what extent 
exchange rate flexibility is affected by currency pressures. On the other hand, EMP 
provides a summary indicator of various underlying factors. Aizenman et al. (2012), 
Aizenman and Pasricha (2012) and Feldkircher et al. (2014) have all proposed 
possible determinants of the exchange market pressure. However, those variables 
are only measured at a relatively lower frequency, such as monthly, quarterly or 
even annually. Intuitively, the interventionist policy predicts a negative relation 
between EMP and the flexibility index as the surge of currency pressure would 
motivate the authorities to smooth exchange rate movements. However, in the ‘high 
flexibility’ regime, it seems plausible to expect that the central bank may refrain 
itself from doing so or make little response to the pressure. Nevertheless, given the 
fact that the EMP series changes sign during the sample period, we do not put 
constraint on the sign of the relation ex ante but only hypothesize that the flexibility 
index will respond asymmetrically to EMP in the two regimes.  
53 
 
 
The third explanatory variable that we consider is sovereign risk perceived by 
investors regarding the Chinese economy. To this end, we make use of the CDS 
spread. 16 During most of the sample period under examination, the CDS index is 
quite stable and at a relatively low level. The two drastic increases coincided with 
the two major economic shocks, i.e. the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, it closely tracks the markets’ perception on the 
expected performance of the Chinese economy. Different from the previous two 
variables, the CDS spread is used as an exogenous variable in our model to account 
for the transition probabilities between regimes. Specifically, we hypothesize a 
negative association between the CDS spread and the RMB flexibility index as a 
higher CDS spread would result in a shift out of the high flexibility state. 
 
The estimated MRS model could be written as in Eq. (2.6): 
                  
3
1 1 , 1
1
_ (s ) ( _ (s ))t t i t t j j t t
j
Fle Index Fle Index Z      

            (2.6) 
where all the variables are defined identically as in the previous estimation. The 
only exception is that we use Z to represent the three possible explanatory variables. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2.4.  
 
                                                          
16 The CDS data are sourced from Bloomberg. 
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The results generally support our hypotheses regarding the three candidate 
explanatory variables. Firstly, the interest rate differential reports a positive impact 
on the flexibility in both regimes, indicating that during the sample period the 
interest rate differential contributed to the increase of the exchange rate volatility, 
possibly through arbitrage activities. Moreover, the higher coefficient reported from 
the low flexibility regime seems to suggest the impact from the interest rate 
differential and the central bank intervention are both larger in amplitude, though 
the aggregate effect is still positive. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that the 
coefficient of the interest rate differential is not statistically significant in neither 
regime.  
 
Secondly, it is reported that EMP has a negative effect on the flexibility in both 
regimes, which might be reconciled with the fact that the Chinese authorities have 
displayed a cautious, maybe over-cautious, approach in preceding the reform. The 
presence of exchange market pressure on the Chinese currency tends to lead to a 
decrease in the authorities’ willingness in increasing the flexibility of the RMB. 
What is more important is that the results confirmed our hypothesis that the 
flexibility index would respond asymmetrically to EMP: compared to the high-
flexibility regime, the BOC_FED index responded more dramatically, nearly 18 
times of the magnitude of the effect, in the low-flexibility regime.  
 
Thirdly, the results imply that the CDS may serve as an early warning signal of 
regime shifts as a higher risk spread lowers the probability of staying in the high-
flexibility state. However, the magnitude of this effect tends to be very limited. 
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Moreover, the high regime dependence once again highlights the fact that the 
Chinese authority still firmly controls the pace of the reform process, and 
accordingly the degree of RMB exchange rate flexibility.  
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Table 2.4 Markov Switching Model with Time-Varying Transition 
Probability 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
Constant 84.3 (5.60***) 154.4 (10.23***) 
Int_Diff(-1) 0.40 (0.95) 0.19 (0.31) 
EMP(-1) -5.13 (-2.45**) -0.29 (-0.47) 
Regime Invariant Coefficients 
AR(1) 0.99 (265.86***) 
Log (SIGMA) 2.05 (122.86***) 
Log Likelihood -6347.00 
Panel B 
 
Time-varying Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i 
P(1,1)=99.2%  P(2,1)=1.2%  
P(1,2)=0.8% P(2,2)=98.8% 
Time Varying Expected Durations (Days) 
Regime 1 127.4 (1.4) 
Regime 2 121.3 (44.6) 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C 4.85 (13.30***) 
P11-CDS_1YR(-1) 0.02 (-0.81) 
P21-C -5.25 (-10.44***) 
P21-CDS_1YR(-1) 0.017 (2.05**) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-state Markov switching model of the BOC_FED 
flexibility index. It is different from Table 2.1 because the transition probability is assumed to be 
time varying and dependent on CDS. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
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2.5 Conclusions  
This chapter investigates the behavior and dynamics of flexibility of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime since 2005 when the reform was launched to lift the RMB’s 
dollar peg and to phase in a managed floating rate system. Defining currency 
flexibility as the degree of exchange rate variation in a relative way, this research 
examines the extent to which government control have hampered adjustment of the 
RMB exchange rate. Monthly data models prove inadequate for this task since 
government intervention rarely lasts months and an intervention’s effects may be 
offset within the month. We focus on the result of government control, i.e. the 
market exchange rates, and develop flexibility measures based on the daily data. It 
represents a nuanced approach to measuring exchange rate flexibility and yields 
richer information about the evolving trait of China’s exchange rate regime. 
 
A Markov switching model with two states is then estimated utilizing the newly 
built daily flexibility index. The parameters in the high- and low-flexibility states 
differ noticeably for the RMB. In detecting the timing of regime shifts, we observe 
evidence of fear of floating in China. This empirical investigation also sheds lights 
on the possible drivers of the RMB flexibility in different states. The interest rate 
differential (between China and the US) seems to have a positive effect on the RMB 
flexibility in both regimes, though the coefficient is  not statistically significant. 
Even though EMP has a negative effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, the 
magnitude of the effect decreased drastically from the high-flexibility regime to the 
low-flexibility regime. We also find that the CDS index, which indicates the risk 
that China is exposed to, may serve as an early warning signal for regime shifts of 
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RMB flexibility since a higher risk spread lowers the probability of RMB staying in 
the high-flexibility state. Last, while there is evidence of fear of floating in China, 
and the government control over the foreign exchange market remains considerable 
r, the flexibility enhancing process has already started. Along with the country’s 
growing economic and financial influence, the cumulative effect of this process on 
international finance could be radical.  
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Chapter 3  
NATREX as a Benchmark Exchange Rate for 
China’s Managed Float 
3.1 Introduction  
Since July 2005, when China announced that it would reform its exchange rate 
system towards a managed floating regime, and stressed that the value of its 
currency (RMB) would be determined on the basis of market demand and supply 
with reference to a basket of currencies, there has been constant debate over the true 
nature of the new exchange rate regime. In contrast to the promising reform 
announcement, a large body of recent empirical research, as well as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), argues that China has maintained a de facto peg to the US 
dollar during the post-reform period. However, through building a new flexibility 
index of the RMB, we find clear evidence that China did make substantial effort to 
allow more market forces in the price-setting process of the RMB.  
 
Nevertheless, looking ahead to the future of China’s exchange rate regime, there 
remain a few crucial questions that require prompt answers. In this study, we focus 
on the question of whether the RMB has reached its equilibrium level during this 
post-reform period. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, given that it was 
consistent undervaluation of the RMB that resulted in the reform in the first place, 
it is then reasonable to assume that external pressure, notably from China’s main 
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trading partners, would cease to exist, or have little ground, only when there was 
consensus that the RMB had reached its equilibrium level; second, it is important to 
note that when enforcing a managed floating regime, a key task for the monetary 
authority is to disclose to the market what the desired exchange rate level is, or at 
least what constitute the criteria used by them when assessing the current exchange 
rate. Only through these criteria can we hold the monetary authority responsible for 
their actions and build confidence among the market participants over time.   
 
The attempt to identify equilibrium exchange rate has a long history in the literature, 
dating back to even before the introduction of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which 
asserts that the real equilibrium exchange rate should be a constant value and the 
variations of the nominal exchange rates can be attributed to the movements of the 
price levels at home and abroad. Although PPP benefits from its relatively 
straightforward methodology, it suffers from several fundamental theoretical 
limitations, which largely explains why it has received little support from an 
empirical standpoint. As summarized by Stein (1994), the PPP theory can neither 
define the equilibrium exchange rate nor provide a clear basis for interpretation. 
Following PPP, there have been several developments in modelling the equilibrium 
exchange rate, including popular choices like the monetary approach, FEER, DEER, 
and BEER. Although these differ from each other in the underlying methodology, 
they all share the idea from Nurkse (1945) that the equilibrium exchange rate is not 
defined without considering the external account of the economy in question. 
Instead of using these popular methods, in this study we have chosen the NATREX 
for the following reasons.  
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First, while the NATREX approach benefits from a strong theoretical base, it 
requires a relatively simple set-up in comparison with other models, and it can be 
tailored to suit the features of the currency concerned. Although it was originally 
proposed to investigate the US dollar, the NATREX has been proven successful in 
accounting for other economies that are fundamentally different from the US. 
Moreover, it aims at explaining the medium-run and long-run equilibrium exchange 
rate and hence ignores short-run speculative capital flows, which in turn makes the 
empirical investigation of the NATREX model easy to implement and interpret. 
Secondly, compared to models like FEER and DEER, the NATREX stands out as 
it represents a ‘positive’ rather than a ‘normative’ concept. It can be used to 
determine the effect of any policy on the real exchange rate, which is essential in 
assessing the maintenance of the so-called managed floating system. Thirdly, it 
assumes money neutrality, which enables the NATREX model to work irrespective 
of the nominal exchange rate system. This property is quite useful in the context of 
China, as we are not constrained by the announced regime shifts during the time 
concerned. Finally, it is suitable for the operational purpose of the managed floating 
regime.  
 
Although the NATREX approach was first proposed during the 1990s, there has 
been scant effort to apply this methodology to the Chinese currency. To the best of 
this author’s knowledge, the most recent notable exception can be found in You and 
Sarantis (2012), who extend the standard NATREX model in Stein (1994) by 
incorporating six unique features of the Chinese economy. However, compared to 
the results obtained by our own calculation, we are not fully convinced by some 
62 
 
assumptions made in You and Sarantis (2012), nor by its estimation methodology. 
For example, You and Sarantis (2012) claim that during the time period from 1982 
to 2010, China enjoyed a net creditor status. However, employing two alternative 
calculation methods, we find that it was not until late 1994 that China began to 
report a positive net foreign asset position. Moreover, through empirical 
investigation detailed below, we find opposing evidence that casts doubt upon the 
accuracy of the other assumptions. For instance, though You and Sarantis (2012) 
contribute to the NATREX literature by imposing a structured NATREX model, we 
note that many of the fundamental variables proposed by You and Sarantis (2012) 
are not significant or correctly signed in the estimation, and were subsequently 
dropped from the final co-integration relationship. Therefore, in this study, instead 
of building a structured model, we stick to the standard empirical approach of the 
NATREX model, which is to find a stable reduced-form relation between the real 
exchange rate and the fundamental factors commonly used.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, section 2 briefly introduces the popular theories in 
calculating the equilibrium exchange rate and then presents the NATREX model in 
detail. Section 3 begins by introducing the modification that might be needed to 
explain the currency movements in China, and then derives the analytical solutions 
of the model. Section 4 is concerned with the empirics; we take steps to investigate 
the NATREX in both the long-run and medium-run and also provide analysis of the 
results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Calculation of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
In this section, we begin with a brief review of the most influential theories and 
methodologies that have been developed to model/estimate the equilibrium 
exchange rate. In this line of literature, the PPP theory can be considered as the 
starting point. Building on the famous notion of law of one price, Cassel (1916, 
1918) is widely acknowledged as the first to formalize the concept of PPP as we 
know it today. In its simplest form, the PPP theory asserts that ‘a unit of currency 
should be able to buy the same basket of goods in one country as the equivalent 
amount of foreign currency, at the going exchange rate, can buy in a foreign country’ 
(Taylor and Taylor, 2004,p.136). However, from an empirical standpoint, there is 
mounting evidence that the PPP theory did not work in the short-run, while the 
evidence for the long-run can be described as weak at best.  
 
Building on the PPP theory, the next dominant model in explaining the exchange 
rate is often referred to as the monetary approach (Frenkel, 1976), which asserts that 
in addition to output and nominal interest rate at home and in the foreign country, 
the relative money supply and demand also play a crucial role in influencing the 
nominal exchange rate. However, similar to the PPP approach, there is no 
convincing evidence so far supporting the monetary approach.  
 
In an attempt to find the equilibrium exchange rate that would bring both internal 
and external balance simultaneously in the sense that the economy operates in full 
employment and low domestic inflation state as well as enjoying a sustainable 
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external position, Williamson (1985) proposed a new notion of equilibrium 
exchange rate, namely the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER 
hereinafter). Compared to PPP and the monetary approach, FEER is different in 
several aspects: first, the time horizon considered in the FEER approach is medium-
run and hence ignores the short-run cyclical and speculative factors; secondly, it 
argues that the real equilibrium exchange rate is not a constant as prescribed by PPP, 
but varies with the underlying fundamentals; thirdly, FEER is a normative concept, 
which aims to provide a reference exchange rate that is desirable given desired 
policy targets. In fact, one of the major reasons for developing FEER is to help each 
country determine an appropriate exchange rate level that not only benefits its own 
economy but also helps to restore balance in the international community. However, 
the FEER approach is criticized for its set of strong theoretical assumptions and for 
the difficulty in finding proper parameter values. For example, the level of 
sustainable current account, which is a key input of the calculation of FEER, is not 
easy to identify for the monetary authority, which makes the subsequent results 
quite sensitive to the imposed assumptions.  
 
Desirable Equilibrium Exchange Rate (DEER), a notion closely related to FEER, 
gains its name from the fact that the equilibrium exchange rate obtained through this 
approach is desirable from the perspective of the monetary authority. In their 
influential paper, Bayoumi et al. (1994) emphasize that DEER should not be simply 
treated as an exchange rate level, but is better considered as a trajectory through 
which the sustainable exchange rate travels. Moreover, Bayoumi et al. (1994) point 
out that the result of DEER for one currency is largely dependent on the assumptions 
used.  
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Different from FEER and DEER, the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
(BEER) approach also takes into consideration the short-term variations of the real 
exchange rate. Hence, the idea of medium-run equilibrium is absent from BEER. 
Moreover, the focus of BEER is trying to explain the behaviour of the exchange 
rates with the observable fundamental variables, rather than trying to set a desirable 
current and capital account target as in FEER (MacDonald, 2000). 
 
With the aim of assessing the current account and exchange rates in a unified 
framework, the IMF has recently developed a new approach, External Balance 
Assessment (EBA), as a successor to the previous CEGR framework that was first 
proposed in the mid-1990s (Phillips et al., 2013). EBA benefits from three previous 
methods, namely the Macroeconomic Balance (MB) approach, the Equilibrium 
Real Exchange Rate approach and the External Sustainability approach, and clearly 
sets out the difference between normative and positive aspects. For example, in the 
EBA terminology, the actual observed current account is decomposed into three 
parts: the normative portion, which could be obtained when all policies are at their 
desirable level, the contribution from the policy gaps, and the residuals. The 
innovation of the EBA approach is also reflected in the fact that it now includes a 
much broader set of explanatory variables, which can be roughly classified into 
three groups: the traditional factors that are commonly identified in other methods; 
cyclical and temporary factors; and financial factors. Hence, the estimation 
procedure of EBA is a much more complex task.   
 
66 
 
In addition to the approaches developed by academia, industry has also given much 
attention to calculating the equilibrium exchange rates, because of its obvious 
business needs. One famous example of such effort is the Goldman Sachs Dynamic 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (GSDEER), used by Goldman Sachs to estimate a fair 
value of the currencies it covers (O’Neill et al., 2005). It differs from FEER in that 
it tries to find a persistent econometric relation between the real exchange rate and 
the relative productivity growth rate and a few other economic variables, depending 
on the currency concerned. In this sense, the GSDEER approach can be considered 
as an extension of the Balassa and Samuelson model (O’Neill et al., 2005).   
 
In addition to the approaches reviewed in this study, there are other alternatives 
proposed in the literature, such as the Desired Long-run Equilibrium Real Exchange 
Rate (DRER). Montiel and Hinkle (1999, p.11) argue that DRER is the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate (LRER), ‘which is conditioned on optimal values of the 
policy variables, permanent values of the exogenous variables, and steady-state 
values of the predetermined variables’. A similar idea can be found in the 
Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER), which can be considered as a 
variant of the BEER approach in the sense that the PEER is calculated based on the 
long-run sustainable levels of the fundamental factors identified from the BEER 
analysis.  
 
3.2.2 NATREX Model 
In addition to the approaches mentioned above, there is another option to calculate 
the reference exchange rate. Strongly promoted by Williamson (2005), the 
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NATREX method can be defined as in Allen (1995, p.6) as the ‘equilibrium 
exchange rate that clears the balance of payments in the absence of cyclical factors, 
speculative capital flows, and movements in international reserves’. In fact, Stein 
first introduced the NATREX model in the early 1990s, partly to offer an alternative 
to the PPP theory. In order to deal with the empirical failure of PPP, NATREX 
assumes that the real exchange rate is subject to a set of fundamental variables, and 
therefore the real exchange rate is not constant, as the underlying fundamental 
variables evolve over time.   
 
The real exchange rate at time t, tR , can be mathematically manipulated into the 
following:  
               
* *{R } { R[Z ]} R[Z ]t t t t t tR NATREX NATREX     .                      (3.1) 
Here 
*[ ]tR Z  denotes exchange rate in the steady state; tNATREX  is the exchange 
rate that is assumed to prevail in the medium-run equilibrium, which can also be 
expressed as [ , ; ]t t tR K F Z , where tK  and tF  denote the real capital stock and net 
foreign debt (or asset) respectively. tZ  represents the real exogenous fundamental 
factors and 
*
tZ  denotes those factors at the steady state. Hence, the real exchange 
rate could be viewed as the combination of three elements: the short-run deviation 
between tR  and the medium-run equilibrium tNATREX , the gap between medium- 
and long-run equilibrium rate, and the steady-state value 
*[ ]tR Z .   
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In order to fully appreciate the idea that embedded in the NATREX model, we first 
take a closer look at the model originally prescribed by Stein (1994) in the study of 
US dollars. As a starting point, he uses the following national income account 
equation to depict the NATREX approach in its medium-run equilibrium:  
                                      0I S CA                                                                           (3.2) 
where I is the desired national investment, S is the desired national saving, and their 
difference implies the desired net long-term capital inflows, which is the opposite 
of CA, denoting the desired current account balance. The NATREX approach 
assumes that I and S are determined by existing capital stock, wealth and net foreign 
asset position. Then, it can be seen why NATREX would not remain constant in the 
medium-run: when there is a change to I, S or the CA, the capital stock and net 
foreign asset would change accordingly, which in turn calls for a new equilibrium 
exchange rate to clear the market.  
 
The NATREX approach contributes to the real exchange rate determinant literature 
because it demonstrates how the medium-run equilibrium differs from the long-run 
equilibrium, and more importantly the trajectory between them. Specifically, the 
NATREX approach assumes that the endogenous stock variables, i.e. the capital 
stock and net foreign asset position, are determined by some exogenous factors in 
the long-run. In Stein (1994), the factors chosen are the changes of productivity and 
social thrift at home and abroad, although subsequent studies have also taken other 
factors into consideration. There are two channels for those exogenous factors to 
impact the NATREX (Allen, 1995). On one hand, similar to the medium-run 
situation described above, the exogenous factors affect the investment and saving 
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function, which produces a change to the NATREX in the medium-run. On the other 
hand, the trajectory of NATREX from its medium-term to the long-term equilibrium 
is largely influenced by those exogenous fundamentals as they could change the 
dynamics of the stock variables. In theory, it is only when the economy reaches its 
long-run equilibrium that the NATREX would remain at a constant level, while the 
stock variables, namely the capital, wealth and net foreign debt, all reaching their 
steady state values.  
 
In addition to the national income account equation, other key equations in Stein 
(1994) include the following: 
Market clearing: 
                                                             C BY I                                                             (3.3) 
Investment: 
                                                /I dk dt nk                                                    (3.4) 
Capital Inflow: 
                                      / (CA nF)dF dt I S nF                                     (3.5) 
Savings: 
                                                   r F CS Y                                               (3.6) 
Portfolio Balance: 
                                       
* *(r r ) / dt (r r )d                                             (3.7) 
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Here, Y denotes the real GDP; B is real trade balance; CA is real current account; 
C is real social consumption; S is the real saving; k is real capital intensity and n is 
the growth rate of effective labour; F is the net foreign debt position in real terms; r 
is real long-term interest rate at home country and hence r F  is the real interest 
payments.   represents a positive coefficient (to be estimated) for the real long-
term interest rate differential. In Stein (1994), all of these variables are measured on 
the basis of per unit of effective worker, and * indicates the corresponding foreign 
variable.   
 
Equation (3.3) stands for the equilibrium in the domestic goods markets when 
ignoring cyclical elements. The capacity output, which depends on the productivity 
and time preference, is equal to the aggregate demand consisting of consumption 
C , investment I , and the trade balance B . In equation (3.4), the total investment 
is defined as the sum of the rate of change in capital intensity /dk dt  and n k  such 
that capital intensity is kept constant when effective labour is growing at a speed of 
n. In equation (3.5), the rate of change of the foreign debt per unit of effective labour 
/dF dt  is calculated as investment ( I ) less saving ( S ) less nF . In equation (3.6), 
social saving S  is calculated as output (Y ) less interest payments to foreigners 
and social consumption C . Finally, equation (3.7) concerns portfolio balance. 
Assuming there are no capital controls, Stein (1994) suggest that there will be 
investment flows, aka portfolio substitution, when the real long-term interest rate 
differs between the home and foreign countries. To support this claim, Stein (1994) 
found that the expected change in the real exchange rate between the US dollar and 
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the other G-10 currencies was zero, and hence argued that the real interest rates 
would tend to converge. 
 
It is worth noting that another feature differentiating the NATREX approach from 
conventional models is that it can reach endogenous stability without requiring 
perfect foresight (Stein, 1994). To illustrate this point, we note that economists 
normally use the maximum principle of Pontryagin to solve for the optimal rate of 
change in capital intensity. Then, a unique trajectory to the steady state can be 
derived in a backward manner. However, Infante and Stein (1973) point out that the 
trajectory is almost impossible to implement in reality, as we do not have full 
knowledge of the presumed steady state, nor the production and utility functions. 
Therefore, the expectation that the economy could travel along this unique path to 
converge to the steady state is almost doomed to fail. In fact, from the standpoint of 
control theory, the open-loop questions are widely criticized for the vulnerability to 
external shocks and the inability to act until the end of the operation. Luckily, 
Infante and Stein (1973) have developed a sub-optimal feedback control (SOFC 
hereinafter) to tackle this issue. In comparison, this SOFC represents the idea of a 
closed-loop control where the controller only needs to know the current variable 
value to maintain the stability of the system. More importantly, Infante and Stein 
(1973) proved that the SOFC could generate a trajectory, which asymptotically 
approaches the unique one given perfect knowledge of the system, for the system to 
converge to the unknown steady state. Particularly, Infante and Stein (1973) 
demonstrate that to arrive at the optimal situation it is sufficient to use Tobin’s q 
ratio to proxy the rate of change in capital intensity.  
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The NATREX also differs from the conventional intertemporal optimization models 
(IOM hereinafter), as it is more generally applicable. To see this point, an 
intertemporal budget constraint is usually assumed in the study of a sustainable (or 
optimal) level of net foreign debt. This means a country that starts with a negative 
net foreign asset position has to produce current account surplus to repay the debt 
in full. However, in NATREX, the objective for the government is ‘reduced’ to 
prevent the foreign debt from exploding, and the intertemporal budget constraint is 
no longer needed. The dynamic system will regulate itself to converge to a steady 
level of net foreign debt *F , under which situation the trade balance *B  needs only 
to fully cover the interest payments on the debt. Moreover, the present value of the 
net foreign debt, which will stabilize at a constant level in the steady state, becomes 
zero when the time horizon goes to infinity.  
 
The analytical solution of the NATREX model mainly concerns two equilibrium 
scenarios. In terms of the medium-run equilibrium, it is marked by both a clearing 
of the domestic goods market, and a balance of portfolio holdings between home 
and foreign assets. Hence, the medium-run equilibrium exchange rate can be solved 
in the form of R[k(t),F(t);Z(t)] . Compared to the medium-run, where both capital 
stock and net foreign debt are taken as predetermined, the long-run system concerns 
the evolution of these two stock variables, as illustrated by equations (3.4) and (3.5). 
When the system reaches its steady state, all variables become constant.  
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To better understand the NATREX approach, we consider the following two cases, 
both starting at the hypothetical medium-run equilibrium. In the first case, suppose 
there is an exogenous increase of the domestic time preference parameter, which 
means domestic residents now prefer to consume more and save less. As a result, 
the real interest rate would rise, as there is less money available for investment. A 
higher interest differential would naturally induce more investment from foreign 
investors. The capital inflows would not only appreciate the domestic currency, but 
would also yield a current account deficit and a deteriorating net foreign asset 
position. In the long-run the rise in net foreign debt reduces wealth, and accordingly 
consumption, in the home country. However, domestic saving would now rise to 
meet investment needs. Since the net foreign debt is higher than its initial level, the 
real exchange rate needs to depreciate in order to produce a trade balance surplus 
and pay back the interest incurred on the foreign debt. To summarize, an increase 
of the home thrift parameter would appreciate the home currency in the medium-
run, but result in a real exchange rate lower than its initial level.  
 
Now let us look at the second case, where there is an increase of domestic 
productivity. Similar to the previous case, it will lead to a higher investment need 
relative to the available saving. As a result, we expect an inflow of capital and an 
appreciation of the home currency. However, a rise in productivity leads to a higher 
output and capital stock in the longer-run, which in turn result in a higher domestic 
saving level and decreased investment (the marginal productivity of capital is 
assumed to decrease when the capital level is high), respectively. In the longer-run, 
there will be an end to capital inflow and current account deficit, while domestic 
saving exceeds investment needs and the net foreign asset position improves. 
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Nevertheless, Stein (1994) notes that the net effect on the real exchange rate is not 
as clear-cut as in the first case.         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The empirical results from the NATREX approach are promising so far. In addition 
to the successful launch by Stein (1994) in the study of the US dollar, the NATREX 
has proved effective in explaining the evolution of the real exchange rate in various 
countries, such as Australia (Lim and Stein, 1995), Germany (Stein and 
Sauernheimer, 1996), France (Stein and Paladino, 1999) and Italy (Gandolfo and 
Felettigh, 1998 and Federici and Gandolfo, 2002). Following the introduction of the 
euro, a few studies (e.g. Detken et al., 2002; Duval, 2002; Belloc and Federici, 2010) 
have applied the NATREX approach to the Eurozone as a whole. In addition to 
industrialized economies, the NATREX has also been applied to less-developed 
countries, such as Latvia (Ajevskis et al., 2012), Malaysia (Naseem et al., 2010) and 
Hungary (Karadi, 2003). Nevertheless, it is important to note that NATREX can 
come in different versions, depending on the relative size and influence of the 
economy concerned. For example, fundamental factors such as terms of trade are 
treated as endogenous for the United States, but are taken as exogenous for Australia. 
Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the ‘NATREX approach is not a single 
model, but rather a family of models, each tailored to the particular characteristics 
of the country under consideration’ (Allen, 1995, p.3).  
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3.3 NATREX Model for China 
Before we dive into the empirical investigation of the Chinese currency, the RMB, 
using the NATREX framework, it is necessary to specify exactly what theoretical 
model will be adopted in our study, as NATREX in essence represents a family of 
models. Hence, to reflect the uniqueness of the Chinese economy, we propose that 
the following modifications to the original model in Stein (1994) might be useful. 
 
First, in contrast to the convergence found between the real long-term interest rates 
of the US and the G-10 countries in Stein (1994), recent studies have suggested that 
the UIP condition does not apply to China. This can be seen quite easily, as the Unit 
Root test (see Table 3.1 below) suggests that the long-term real interest rate 
differential between China and the US is not stationary within this sample period. 
In order to explain the consistent deviation, we follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001) and assume that the risk premium on the Chinese economy is inversely and 
linearly related to its net foreign asset position such that the higher the net foreign 
asset position is, the lower will be the risk premium and accordingly there will be a 
lower real interest rate differential. Therefore, we add a country risk premium in the 
portfolio balance equation as follows, where F denotes China’s net foreign asset 
position:  
                                             
* ( )r r h F                                                                (3.8) 
 
Secondly, despite the surge in China’s influence in global trade, it is widely 
acknowledged that China still lacks power in negotiating the prices of its exports 
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and imports. Hence, we initially treat the terms of trade as an exogenous factor for 
China. To incorporate this into our model in its simplest form, we closely follow 
Lim and Stein (1995) and You and Sarantis (2012) in assuming that China produces 
an exportable good 1 and a non-tradable good n , while the foreign country (the US) 
produces an exportable good 2. The aggregate domestic consumption could then be 
decomposed into consumption of non-tradable good ( nC ) and consumption of 
imported good ( 2C ). Similarly, production and capital are also divided into 
production of non-tradable good ( ny ) and exportable good ( 1y ), and share of 
investment using non-tradable ( nI ) and investment using imported ( 2I ), 
respectively.   
 
The terms of trade (T ) are defined as the relative price of exportable good 1 ( 1p ) 
to imported good 2 (
*
2p ) when measured in a common currency. This can be 
expressed as in equation (3.9), where N is the nominal exchange rate measured as 
the units of RMB per unit of US dollar, and p and 
*p represent the price level at 
home (China) and abroad (the US) respectively.  
                                                 
1
*
2
p
T
N p


                                                           (3.9) 
The relationship between nominal and real exchange rate is then calculated as          
follows:       
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*( / )R N p p                                                    (3.10)                         
Hence, a decrease of either N or R indicates an appreciation of the RMB and vice 
versa.  
 
Let nR  denote the relative price of non-tradable good ( np ) to the exportable good 
( 1p ).  
                                            1/n nR p p                                                         (3.11) 
 
If we assume that a and b respectively denote the proportion of the non-tradable 
good in each country’s whole production, we can decompose the price level of 
domestic and foreign country as in Eq. (3.12a) and (3.12b).   
                                            
1
1( ) ( )
a a
np p p
                                                   (3.12a) 
                                      
* * * 1
2( ) ( )
b b
np p p
                                                 (3.12b)      
 
Then, the real exchange rate R  can be expressed using nR  as:  
                 
1
2
1
1
* **
[( ) ( ) ] 2
[( ) ( ) ]
( / )b b
n
a a
n
b
N p p n
ap p
n
p pp
R N
p R T



   

.                                        (3.13) 
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We note that when expressed in logarithms, 
* *
2( / )
b
np p will become a random 
exogenous term in the intercept. So the real exchange rate R  could be written as in 
equation (3.14) if we normalize the mean of this exogenous term at unity. From 
equation (3.14), we can see that the effect of terms of trade on the real exchange rate 
can be decomposed into two parts: a direct impact through which a higher T would 
lead to a lower R, and an indirect impact through nR .  
                                            
1
a
n
R
R T


                                                                (3.14)  
 
We also note that changes in *K and *F will induce the relative price of the non-
tradable good ( nR ) to adjust to its steady state value (
*
nR ) to restore the equilibrium 
in the goods market. 17  
                             
* * * * * * *( , , ; ) ( , ; ) ( , ; )n n n n n nC R k F Z I R k Z y R k Z                               (3.15) 
                                                            
* *( )n nR R Z                                                           (3.16) 
           
* * */ ( / ) / ( / ) ( / ) / ( / ) /n n n ndR dZ R k dk dZ R F dF dZ R dZ        (3.17) 
* * *1/ ( ) ( )anR T R R Z                                                       (3.18) 
                  
It is worth noting that Eq. (3.17) not only demonstrates how changes of the 
fundamentals in the long-run can impact nR  through changes in
*K and *F , but also 
                                                          
17 Different from previous analysis, * in equations from Eq. (3.15) to Eq. (3.18) means the variables 
are in their steady-state values. 
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captures the direct impact of changes of the fundamentals on nR  in the medium-run, 
which in turn shows how fundamentals affect the long-run real exchange rate *R .  
 
Then if we assume that in the medium-run equilibrium the market for the tradable 
good always clears at the exogenous terms of trade, the equilibrium condition in the 
good market now implies that the demand for the non-tradable good, consisting of 
consumption nC  and investment using non-tradable nI , should equal the supply of 
the non-tradable good ny . Also, the current account ( CA ) is now calculated as 
exportable good ( 1y ) less the consumption and investment using imported good 
( 2 2&C I ).  
 
In summary, in addition to equation (3.8) describing portfolio balance, the modified 
NATREX equations for China are depicted as follows: 
Investment: 
                      /I dk dt nk                                         (3.19) 
Capital Inflow: 
                    / (CA nF)dF dt I S nF                                         (3.20) 
Savings: 
                            
'r F CS y                                                   (3.21) 
Current Account Balance:  
80 
 
                                
'
1 2CA y r F m I C                                          (3.22) 
Good Market Clearing in the Non-tradable sector: 
n n nC I y                                                 (3.23) 
 
3.4 Empirical Investigation  
3.4.1 Data 
Subject to the nature of this study and data availability, the sample period is chosen 
to be from 1994Q1to 2014Q4, for two simple reasons. First, China only began to 
have a unified exchange rate in 1994, and second, 2014Q4 is the most recent time 
point at which all data are available. While the details of data used in this study are 
reported below in Table 3.1, the construction processes of some variables are worthy 
of special attention here.  
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Table 3.1 Data Summary 
Notes: We use M, Q, and A to represent monthly, quarterly and annual frequency, respectively.  
Since productivity and thrift cannot be directly measured, we need to find proxies 
for them. To this end, the 12-quarter moving average of the growth rate of domestic 
Data Source Freq. Notes 
Nominal Exchange Rate IMF Q 
Series refer to period-average 
national currency units per US dollar. 
CPI in China OECD Q 
The index is on the basis of 2005 
price level. 
CPI in the US OECD Q It is re-based to 2005. 
GDP of China 
Oxford 
Economics Q 
It is measured on the basis of 2005 
price and adjusted seasonally. 
US GDP 
Oxford 
Economics Q  
It is re-based to 2005 and adjusted 
seasonally. 
Private Consumption/GDP in China  
Oxford 
Economics Q  
Gov. Consumption/GDP in the US  
Oxford 
Economics Q  
Social Consumption/GDP in the US 
Oxford 
Economics Q  
Capital Stock in China  CSY A 
It is calculated based on Gu and 
Zhang (2012) and further interpolated 
to quarterly frequency. 
Nominal Long-term Interest Rate in 
China PBOC M 
It refers to the major loan rate on 
capital construction with maturities of 
5 to 10 years. 
GDP Deflator in China 
Oxford 
Economics Q 
The index is on the basis of 2005 
price level. 
Nominal Long-term Interest Rate in 
the US 
Oxford 
Economics Q 
It is proxied by the long-term interest 
rate on government bonds. 
GDP Deflator in the US 
Oxford 
Economics Q 
It is re-indexed to make the 2005 
price level equal 100. 
Term of Trade PBOC M 
The quarterly series is obtained by 
using the average of the index within 
that quarter. 
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and foreign GDP in real terms are typically chosen for the productivity parameter, 
while thrift is proxied by the ratio of social consumption, consisting of both private 
and government consumption, to GDP. However, we argue that there are better 
choices. In Figure 3.1, we plot the real GDP of China and the US (in logarithm) as 
well as the 12-quarter moving-average of the growth rate of each country’s real 
GDP.  
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Figure 3.1 Proxies for Productivity 
Notes: The upper sector shows the 12-quarter moving-average of the growth rate of real GDP of 
China and the US, while the lower sector displays the real GDP of China and the US in level.  
 
There is a clear difference between these two proxies. Take China for example. As 
China has seen consistent economic growth during the period between 1994 and 
2014, it is plausible to assume that the underlying productivity has also enjoyed an 
upward trend. This trend is well-captured by the real GDP series, while the 12-
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quarter MA approach evidently fails to do so, possibly because of its tendency to 
prolong the impacts of temporary changes. 
 
Though there is little doubt about using the ratio of social consumption to GDP to 
proxy time preference (or thrift), we note that the empirical work so far has 
unanimously left out the foreign thrift parameter in the estimation, usually citing the 
difficulty of obtaining an appropriate proxy. However, it is not an issue in this study, 
as we only focus on the exchange rate between the US and China. Specifically, we 
take into consideration two options: one is the US ratio of social consumption to 
GDP, and the other is the ratio of the US imports from China to its GDP.  
 
As a preliminary check, we find a coefficient of 0.51 for the correlation between 
these two ratios, which seems to be at a reasonable level. In a further step, we plot 
the two ratios in the following figure and the difference becomes quite apparent. 
While the ratio of imports (from China) to the US GDP increases consistently, 
except for a temporary drop occurring in the 3rd quarter of 2008, reflecting the 
impact of the global financial crisis, the US ratio of social consumption to GDP is 
more volatile in comparison. We argue that the ratio of imports to GDP is a better 
proxy for the NATREX approach, as we are more interested in the foreign 
consumption of domestically produced goods rather than the aggregate social 
consumption.  
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Figure 3.2 TCON_US and RIMP_US 
Notes: In the upper part, TCON_US is the US ratio of social consumption to its GDP, which is 
sourced from Oxford Economics. The ratio of the US import from China to GDP is depicted in the 
lower half and the data for US imports from China is from IMF.  
 
3.4.2 Estimation Procedure 
As discussed above, NATREX actually represents a family of models and the 
fundamentals Z does not necessarily need to be the same for all countries. For 
instance, Stein (1994) proposed four candidate factors, namely the productivity and 
thrift (aka social time preference) in both home and foreign country, while the 
foreign thrift parameter was actually left out in the subsequent estimation. In a later 
study of the Australian dollar, Lim and Stein (1995) suggested that terms of trade 
(TOT) and the real world interest rate should also come into play, as these can better 
capture the features of a small-open economy like Australia. Therefore, the first 
empirical objective for us is to find out the exogenous variables that have impacted 
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the real exchange rate of RMB during the sample period in the way predicted by the 
NATREX theory. In other words, we are aiming to test whether there exists a long-
run relationship between the observed real exchange rate and the exogenous 
fundamentals. In addition, as the medium-run equilibrium exists only conceptually, 
the NATREX can never be observed and we should also test whether the actual real 
exchange rate converges to the moving NATREX.  
 
Long-run Analysis 
We start with the investigation into the longer-run equilibrium. As in essence we 
want to test whether there exists a long-run relationship of the variables concerned, 
we need to check the unit root properties first. According to Table 3.2, most of the 
exogenous variables are, not surprisingly, reported to be integrated to order 1; 
however, it is interesting to note that the proxy for the real world interest rate, the 
real long-term interest rate in the US (RIR_US), is reported to be stationary. 
Coupled with the fact that the real interest rate differential (RIR_DIFF) is I (1), this 
confirms that there is no convergence of the real long-term interest rate, but rather 
a consistent divergence between China and the US.  
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Table 3.2 ADF Unit-Root Test Results 
Variable Test Type ADF statistic 
RER (c,t,2) -1.75 
∆RER (n,1) -3.89*** 
GDP_CN (c,0) -0.86 
∆GDP_CN (c,0) -9.08*** 
GDP_US (c,2) -2.19 
∆GDP_US (n,0) -4.01*** 
TCONCN (c,t,0) -1.83 
∆TCONCN (n,0) -10.57*** 
TCONUS (n,0) -0.36 
∆TCONUS (n,0) -8.59*** 
IMPUS (c,t,1) -2.37 
∆IMPUS (c,0) -5.83*** 
RIR_US (c,t,0) -3.82** 
RIR_CN (c,4) -2.17 
∆RIR_CN (n,3) -4.40*** 
RIR_DIFF (c,4) -2.56 
∆RIR_DIFF (n,3) -3.91*** 
TOT (c,t,0) -5.80*** 
Notes: To describe the type of unit-root test, we use c and n to denote whether a constant is included 
in the test or not. t denotes the case when a trend is also included in the test. The number in the 
parenthesis stands for the highest lag that appeared significant in the test. The significance of the 
ADF test is based on the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, where the null hypothesis is that 
there exists a unit-root in the time series. ***, **, * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. TCONCN and TCONUS denote the ratio of social consumption to GDP in China and 
the US respectively, while IMPUS is the ratio of US imports from China to its GDP. It is worth 
noting that RER, GDP_CN and GDP_US are all in their natural logarithm.  ∆ denotes the first 
difference of the variable concerned.  
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Hence, the alleged portfolio substitution channel warrants a closer look. To this end, 
we estimate the following equation:  
                 1_ _t t t tRIR Diff C RIR Diff NFA                                         (3.24) 
where NFA is built based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) and later 
interpolated from annual to quarterly frequency.18 To make the coefficient more 
comparable, it is scaled down by the corresponding GDP in that quarter. The results 
are reported in Table 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18  In addition to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) approach, we built an alternative 
measurement of the net foreign asset position for China, simply using the difference between the 
foreign reserve and debt to foreigners. However, it does not make any real difference to the findings.   
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Table 3.3 Estimation Results of Eq. (3.20) 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
Constant NA NA 
_ ( 1)RIR Diff   0.819 (0.075) 10.949*** 
NFA  0.007 (0.003) 2.348** 
Diagnostic Test F-Statistic Probability 
LM Test (6 lags) 0.389 0.883 
ARCH Test (6 lags) 0.469 0.828 
Jarque-Bera 3.419 0.181 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients for the determinants of the real interest rate 
differential, and the standard errors are reported in the brackets. The constant is not significant in the 
estimation, so we dropped it. The Adjusted
2r =0.749 with F-statistic 208.4. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
The most important result we get from Table 3.3 is that the real long-term interest 
rate differential is significantly impacted by the NFA, but the sign is opposite to our 
expectation. We hypothesized that given a higher net foreign asset position, a lower 
risk premium would be priced by investors, and hence we would expect a lower 
interest rate differential. Nevertheless, this result is not impossible to explain. In fact, 
the positive relationship between the real interest rate differential and the NFA can 
be attributed in large part to China’s own economic situation and exchange rate 
policy. China and the US sit in difference phases of the business cycle, and it is 
notable that China experienced a few inflation hikes during the time in question. 
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Moreover, a tremendous volume of capital inflows19 contributed to the growth of 
the Chinese economy and wealth accumulation. However, owing to the fear that a 
lower real interest rate would accelerate domestic inflation, China upheld its high 
interest rate level despite knowing that it would induce more speculative capital 
inflows, mostly on a short-term basis. Moreover, we note that China chose to fix its 
exchange rate against the US dollar for the first half of the sample period and 
allowed only gradual appreciation of the RMB in the second half. This was achieved 
by massive central bank intervention and tight capital control. Although the 
desirability of this policy mix is open to debate, we have witnessed exponential 
growth of China’s foreign reserve and its NFA position. To conclude, we argue that 
the US real long-term interest rate, representing the real world interest rate in this 
study, is not an important exogenous factor in influencing the real interest rate in 
China, and therefore we exclude RIR_US from the subsequent long-run analysis.  
 
Then, the task facing us is to find whether there exists a long-run relationship among 
the six exogenous variables: real exchange rate of RMB (RER), two productivity 
proxies (GDPCN and GDPUS), two thrift proxies (TCONCN and IMPUS) and 
terms of trade (TOT). However, the fact that TOT is tested to be I (0) renders the 
conventional Johansen approach ineffective. Following the study of Van Eden et al. 
(2001), we find the ARDL (Autoregressive-Distributed Lag) procedure is perfectly 
fit for this situation as it works irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) 
                                                          
19 We do not differentiate the nature of capital inflows here. However, it is worth noting that in 
addition to the long-term based capital inflows, such as FDI, there is clear evidence that the short-
term speculative inflows have taken an increasingly higher proportion (Yu, 2008).  
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or even fractionally integrated. The ARDL procedure, also commonly known as the 
Bounds Testing methodology (Pesaran et al., 2001), is preferable to VECM as it 
requires a simpler set-up and variables are allowed to enter the model with different 
lag-lengths.  
 
Specifically, we formulate our model in the ARDL form as follows: 
           0 , 0 1 , 1t i t i j k t j t k k t tRER RER Z Y X                          (3.25)  
where we use kZ  as an example of all the exogenous fundamental factors. Naturally, 
there could be thousands of specifications of the above equation for estimation, as 
the variables could enter the model with different lag-lengths; we have relied on 
AIC20 as the appropriate information criterion to select the best one.  
 
To ensure the robustness of the co-integration, we start with just the I(1) variables, 
namely RER, GDP_CN, GDP_US, TCON_CN and IMP_US. We set the maximum 
lag lengths to be 4 for each of the five variables, and the best model in terms of AIC 
selected is ARDL (4,2,4,0,0). Table 3.4 reports the detailed estimation results.   
 
 
                                                          
20 SC is another potential choice, but it tends to choose a simpler model specification. 
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Table 3.4 Estimation Results of the ARDL (4, 2, 4, 0, 0) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
Constant -1.118 (0.578) -1.934* 
RER(-1) 0.884 (0.123) 7.197*** 
RER(-2) 0.145 (0.158) 0.917 
RER(-3) 0.106 (0.157) 0.677 
RER(-4) -0.239 (0.106) -2.260** 
GDPCN 0.030 (0.133) 0.226 
GDPCN(-1) -0.278 (0.162) -1.719* 
GDPCN(-2) 0.232 (0.130) 1.782* 
GDPUS 0.660 (0.144) 4.567*** 
GDPUS(-1) -0.554 (0.236) -2.343** 
GDPUS(-2) -0.386 (0.238) -1.620 
GDPUS(-3) 0.210 (0.235) 0.895 
GDPUS(-4) 0.192 (0.148) 1.300 
TCON_CN 0.079 (0.071) 1.124 
RIMP_US -0.580 (6.700) -0.087 
Diagnostic Test F-Statistics Probability 
LM Test (6lags) 1.358 0.247 
ARCH Test (6 lags) 1.304 0.267 
Jarque-Bera 1.987 0.370 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the ARDL (4, 2, 4, 0, 0) model, and the 
standard errors are reported in the brackets. The Adjusted
2r is 0.995 with F-statistic 276.393. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
The use of Bounds Test is conditional on there being no autocorrelation within the 
estimated residuals. Given the diagnostic test results, it is clear that the residuals of 
this model are serially independent, as LM test reports an F-statistic 1.358 with 
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probability 0.247. Therefore, we can continue to perform the Bounds Test, the 
results of which are reported in Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5 Bounds Test of the ARDL (4, 2, 4, 0, 0) Model 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-stat. 3.226 4 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
10% 2.2 3.09 
5% 2.56 3.49 
1% 3.29 4.37 
Note: The above F-statistic is computed for the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables in the above model.  
 
Unlike the other tests, the Bounds Test is unique because we need to make inference 
based on the critical values on both lower and upper bounds: the former assumes 
that all variables are stationary, while the latter assumes that all variables are 
integrated to order 1. Pesaran et al. (2001) assert that the relevant critical value for 
a mix of I (0) and I (1) lies within these two critical values. Since in this test, all 
variables are tested to be I(1), we can see from Table 3.5 that the F-statistic is 3.226, 
which exceeds the upper bound only at the 10% significance level. Therefore, we 
conclude that there may exist a weak long-run relationship between these variables, 
which are reported as follows.  
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Table 3.6 Long-run Results of the ARDL (4, 2, 4, 0, 0) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
D(RER(-1)) -0.014 (0.102) -0.133 
D(RER(-2)) 0.132 (0.092) 1.430 
D(RER(-3)) 0.230 (0.092) 2.496** 
D(GDPCN) 0.010 (0.088) 0.114 
D(GDPCN(-1)) -0.227 (0.084) -2.697*** 
D(GDPUS) 0.648 (0.130) 5.000*** 
D(GDPUS(-1)) -0.011 (0.147) -0.077 
D(GDPUS(-2)) -0.404 (0.143) -2.822*** 
D(GDPUS(-3)) -0.211 (0.139) -1.514 
D(TCON_CN) 0.015 (0.105) 0.141 
D(RIMP_US) 1.740 (8.616) 0.202 
Co-intEq (-1) -0.109 (0.025) -4.364*** 
Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
GDPCN -0.159 (0.150) -1.061 
GDPUS 1.180 (0.212) 5.580*** 
TCONCN 0.764 (0.786) 0.973 
RIMPUS -5.595 (63.889) -0.088 
C -10.786 (3.079) -3.503*** 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the long-run co-integration relationship, and 
the standard errors are reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
There are two important findings from the results in Table 3.6. First, as discussed 
above, the NATREX approach predicts that in the long-run, an increase in the home 
time preference would lead to a depreciation of the home currency and an increase 
in the home productivity would usually result in appreciation. In contrast, an 
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increase in the foreign time preference should lead to an appreciation of the home 
currency and an increase in the home productivity would usually result in 
depreciation. Table 3.6 lends strong support for this claim. Secondly, we note that 
the coefficient of the error correction term, denoted as Co-intEq(1) above, reports 
as highly significant and the sign is negative as expected.  
 
However, we note that the long-run coefficients of a few variables do not report as 
significant and this prompts us to argue that they should be left out. Specifically, a 
parsimonious model is obtained after we drop the IMPUS and TCONCN, the two 
parameters for thrift at home and foreign country. The associated ARDL 
specification, Bounds Test and long-run results are reported in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 
3.9, respectively.  
 
Based on AIC, we have chosen the specification of ARDL (1,6,3) for estimation. 
This model is clearly preferable to the previous case, as we now have a much larger 
F-statistic: 1486.305 compared to 276.393, which warrants the decision to drop 
IMPUS and TCONCN out of the long-run analysis. The following Bounds Test 
result adds further support to this claim: the F-test rejects the hypothesis that there 
is no co-integration at the 1% level. Now we can write the long-run relationship as 
follows:  
             14.797 0.270* 1.673*RER GDPCN GDPUS                                      (3.26) 
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Table 3.7 Estimation Results of the ARDL (1, 6, 3) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
Constant -1.277 (0.381) -3.351*** 
RER (-1) 0.914 (0.039) 23.246*** 
GDPCN -0.027 (0.123) -0.216 
GDPCN(-1) -0.395 (0.163) -2.422** 
GDPCN(-2) 0.129 (0.169) 0.762 
GDPCN(-3) -0.018 (0.161) -0.112 
GDPCN(-4) -0.197 (0.161) -1.219 
GDPCN(-5) 0.251 (0.165) 1.519 
GDPCN(-6) 0.233 (0.134) 1.740* 
GDPUS 0.499 (0.152) 3.291*** 
GDPUS (-1) -0.315 (0.229) -1.371 
GDPUS (-2) -0.330 (0.223) -1.480 
GDPUS (-3) 0.290 (0.131) 2.217** 
Diagnostic Test F-Statistics Probability 
LM Test (6 lags) 0.935 0.477 
ARCH Test (6 lags) 1.356 0.246 
Jarque-Bera 2.091 0.352 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the ARDL (1,6,3) model, and the standard 
errors are reported in the brackets. The Adjusted
2r is 0.996 with F-statistic1486.305. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.8 Bounds Test of the ARDL (1,6,3) Model 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-stat. 11.607 2 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
10% 2.63 3.35 
5% 3.1 3.87 
1% 4.13 5 
Note: The above F-statistic is computed for the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables in the above model.  
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Table 3.9 Long-Run Results of the ARDL (1,6,3) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
D(GDPCN) -0.027 (0.113) -0.236 
D(GDPCN (-1)) -0.398 (0.111) -3.596*** 
D(GDPCN(-2)) -0.269 (0.110) -2.446** 
D(GDPCN(-3)) -0.287 (0.110) -2.617** 
D(GDPCN(-4)) -0.484 (0.114) -4.255*** 
D(GDPCN(-5)) -0.233 (0.119) -1.969* 
D(GDPUS) 0.499 (0.125) 3.996*** 
D(GDPUS(-1)) 0.040 (0.132) 0.305 
D(GDPUS(-2)) -0.290 (0.122) -2.379** 
Co-intEq (-1) -0.086 (0.012) -6.969*** 
Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
GDPCN -0.270 (0.051) -5.309*** 
GDPUS 1.673 (0.317) 5.287*** 
C -14.797 (3.151) -4.696*** 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the long-run co-integration relationship, and 
the standard errors are reported in the brackets. It is based on an ARDL (1, 6, 3) model. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
We then add the terms of trade (TOT) to the co-integration space. As TOT has 
already been tested to be I(0), we know for sure that TOT will be co-integrated with 
the RER, GDPCN and GDPUS. Hence, we focus more on the long-run results from 
the ARDL approach.21 Again, based on the AIC, we have selected the specification 
of ARDL (1, 6, 3, 0) model, and report the long-run results in Table 3.10.  
                                                          
21 Given the ARDL (1,6,3,0) model, the Bound Test F-statistic reports 9.226 and it is significant at 
the 1% level.  
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In comparison with Table 3.9, there is literally no difference in terms of the results 
for GDPCN and GDPUS, while we find a highly insignificant coefficient for TOT. 
Previous studies, such as Lim and Stein (1995) and You and Sarantis (2008, 2012), 
suggest that an increase in terms of trade should have a positive effect on the 
appreciation of home currency. However, we argue that the failed result is simply 
due to the characteristics of these two data series, which are depicted in Figure 3.3. 
It is apparent that the series of TOT is much more volatile relative to RER, which 
in fact reflects the uniqueness of China. As discussed above, the Chinese 
government has the ultimate control over its exchange rate dynamics, while the 
terms of trade series is more in control of the market forces, which is why we assume 
it is an exogenous factor to China in the first place. Hence, the insignificance of 
TOT in our estimation should not be considered as strong opposition to the 
NATREX approach.  
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Table 3.10 Long-Run Results of the ARDL (1,6,3,0) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
D(GDPCN) -0.045 (0.117) -0.388 
D(GDPCN (-1)) -0.428 (0.119) -3.612*** 
D(GDPCN(-2)) -0.287 (0.113) -2.541** 
D(GDPCN(-3)) -0.299 (0.111) -2.688*** 
D(GDPCN(-4)) -0.459 (0.120) -3.823*** 
D(GDPCN(-5)) -0.203 (0.126) -1.620 
D(GDPUS) 0.501 (0.125) 3.996*** 
D(GDPUS(-1)) 0.042 (0.132) 0.319 
D(GDPUS(-2)) -0.299 (0.123) -2.435** 
D(TOT) 0.000 (0.000) -0.760 
Co-intEq (-1) -0.088 (0.013) -6.980*** 
Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
GDPCN -0.269 (0.052) -5.211*** 
GDPUS 1.671 (0.320) 5.219*** 
TOT 0.000 (0.002) -0.055 
C -14.762 (3.219) -4.585*** 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the long-run co-integration relationship, and 
the standard errors are reported in the brackets. It is based on an ARDL (1, 6, 3,0) model. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 3.3 RER and TOT 
Notes: This figure plots the real exchange rate (RER) and terms of trade (TOT) of China for the 
sample period from 1994Q1 to 2014Q4.  
 
Medium-run Analysis 
The analysis above has completed the first empirical objective, which is to identify 
which exogenous factors have impacted the real exchange rate of RMB in the 
manner prescribed by the NATREX approach. Although it has been stressed that 
the medium-run equilibrium is only a theoretical concept and the NATREX never 
prevails in the reality, empirical investigation is still needed to test whether the real 
exchange rate converges to the moving NATREX.   
 
To answer this question, we note that in the medium-run the NATREX can be solved 
as a function of the capital stock in both home and foreign country, and the net 
foreign asset positions [ , ; ]t t t tNATREX R K F Z . In essence, we need a robust 
econometric approach to investigate the following dynamics. 
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*
1 2 3 4
dRER dK dK dNFA dZ
dt dt dt dt dt
                                             (3.27) 
Here dK and *dK are the change of the real capital stock in China and the US; 
dNFA  is the change of the net foreign asset position of China; and dZ denotes the 
change of the exogenous factors identified above.    
 
Unlike the long-run analysis, which commonly adopts the co-integration approach, 
there is no consensus with regard to the choice of empirical methodology in the 
medium-run. In the pioneering work of Stein (1994), the following equation was 
estimated: 
(1) (2) ( 1) (3) (4) (5) (6) ( 1)R C C R C MAGROWTH C MAFGROW C MACAGNP C USFINT              
where R is the real exchange rate of the US dollar; MAGROWTH and MAFGROW 
are used to proxy the growth rate of real capital stock at home and abroad, 
respectively; MACAGNP denotes the growth of the real foreign debt; and USFINT 
is proxied by the real long-term interest rate difference between the US and the rest 
of the G-10 countries.  
 
Although Stein (1994) employed both OLS and NLS to ensure the robustness of the 
estimation results, there is still some doubt over this approach. First, since Stein 
(1994) tested that all the variables listed above are integrated to order 1, neither OLS 
nor NLS is free from a concern of spurious regression. Secondly, Stein (1994) short-
circuited the task of measuring those stock variables. Instead, he used the very same 
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variable, the 12-quarter moving average of the growth rate of real GDP, to proxy 
the growth of both capital and productivity.  
 
Facing these two issues, on one hand, we argue that the co-integration is more 
appropriate in revealing the dynamics within this model. In a review of NATREX, 
Allen (1995, p. 6) lends some support to this by pointing out that ‘This medium-run 
equilibrium, usually considered as the long-run equilibrium of most monetary 
models, is the starting point of a NATREX model’. Therefore, we could still make 
use of the ARDL procedure. On the other hand, we have constructed individual 
measurements for each of the stock variables. Specifically, we have followed Gu 
and Zhang (2012) to build the Chinese capital stock until 2014, and used the Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) method to calculate the net foreign asset position 
for China.    
 
It is also interesting to note that Stein (1994) used a lagged US real long-term 
interest rate in the estimation not only to stand for the convergence of real interest 
rate, but also to try to capture any potential effects the exogenous factors might have 
on the real exchange rate in the medium-run. However, we find that the real long-
term interest rate diverged between China and the US, which seems to suggest that 
the portfolio substitution channel does not apply to China. Nevertheless, the interest 
rate differential may still carry additional useful information for estimation, and it 
prompts us to find two interest rate series to proxy the medium-run interest rate 
differential.    
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The choice of ARDL procedure is validated, as the ADF Unit-Root test (reported in 
Table 3.11) suggests that there is one I(0) among all these variables, i.e. the medium-
run interest rate differential (MRIR_DIFF).  
 
Table 3.11 ADF Unit-Root Test 
Variable Test Type ADF statistic 
K_CN (c,t,1) -1.39 
∆K_CN (c,t,0) -3.27* 
K_US (c,1) -1.96 
∆K_US (n,0) -2.86*** 
NFA (c,5) -1.64 
∆NFA (c,t,4) -4.56*** 
MRIR_DIFF (n,0) -2.44** 
Notes: To describe the type of unit-root test, we use c, n to denote whether a constant is included in 
the test or not. t denotes the case when a trend is also included in the test. The number in the 
parenthesis stands for the lags chosen on the basis of SIC. The significance of the ADF test is based 
on the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, where the null hypothesis is that there exists a unit-
root in the time period. ***, ** and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
K_CN and K_US denote the real capital stock (in its logarithm) in China and the US, respectively. 
NFA is the net foreign asset position of China, scaled down by the GDP in the corresponding quarter. 
MRIR_DIFF represents the difference between medium-run real interest rate in China and the US. 
∆ denotes the first difference of the variable concerned.  
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Table 3.12 Estimation Results of the ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
Constant -3.436 (0.795) -4.321*** 
RER(-1) 0.505 (0.119) 4.230*** 
RER(-2) 0.111 (0.130) 0.854 
RER(-3) 0.306 (0.136) 2.241** 
RER(-4) -0.142 (0.091) -1.569 
K_CN 0.403 (0.175) 2.307** 
K_CN(-1) -0.435 (0.175) -2.493** 
K_US 1.810 (0.231) 7.828*** 
K_US(-1) -1.514 (0.220) -6.878*** 
NFA -0.037 (0.014) -2.624** 
NFA(-1) 0.016 (0.015) 1.068 
NFA (-2) 0.024 (0.015) 1.635 
NFA(-3) -0.033 (0.014) -2.272** 
NFA(-4) 0.026 (0.014) 1.883* 
MRIR_DIFF -0.011(0.047) -0.229 
Diagnostic Test F-Statistics Probability 
LM Test (6 lags) 0.671 0.674 
ARCH Test (6 lags) 0.588 0.738 
Jarque-Bera 0.157 0.924 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) model, and the 
associated standard errors are reported in the brackets. The Adjusted
2r is 0.997 with F-
statistic1676.253. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.13 Bounds Test of the ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) Model 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-stat. 7.233 4 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
10% 2.20 3.09 
5% 2.56 3.49 
1% 3.29 4.37 
Note: The above F-statistic is computed for the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables in the above model.  
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Table 3.14 Long-Run Results of the ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
D(RER(-1)) -0.275 (0.092) -2.976*** 
D(RER(-2)) -0.163 (0.087) -1.869* 
D(RER(-3)) 0.140 (0.075) 1.855* 
D(K_CN) 0.403 (0.074) 5.407*** 
D(K_US) 1.807 (0.187) 9.671*** 
D(NFA) -0.037 (0.011) -3.261*** 
D(NFA(-1)) -0.017 (0.011) -1.506 
D(NFA(-2)) 0.006 (0.011) 0.568 
D(NFA(-3)) -0.026 (0.011) -2.298** 
D(MRIR_DIFF) -0.026 (0.052) -0.505 
Co-intEq (-1) -0.221 (0.032) -6.796*** 
Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
K_CN -0.145 (0.015) -9.911*** 
K_US 1.344 (0.104) 12.920*** 
NFA -0.018 (0.031) -0.585 
MRIR_DIFF -0.049 (0.210) -0.232 
C -15.576 (1.493) -10.430*** 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the long-run co-integration relationship, and 
the standard errors are reported in the brackets. It is based on an ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) model. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Then the long-run equation should read: 
0.145 _ 1.344 _ 0.018 0.049* _ 15.576RER K CN K US NFA MRIR DIFF          
 
Several comments can be made regarding the results. First, the residuals from the 
selected ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) model are tested to conform to white noise and render 
the subsequent Bounds Test effective. The F-statistic confirms that these variables 
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are co-integrated and we have a highly significant error correction term. Secondly, 
all estimated coefficients report signs as expected by the NATREX approach. K_CN 
reports a significant negative effect on the RER, suggesting that an increase in 
Chinese capital stock leads to a rightward shift of the IS curve. In response to the 
relative increase of investment demand, the real interest rate should rise to maintain 
the goods market equilibrium. As a result, investors would be encouraged to 
purchase and/or sell foreign securities, and this in turn would result in appreciation 
of the domestic currency. The above process would lead to an opposite impact on 
the RMB, as reflected by the positive coefficient of K_US. Following similar 
argument, it is also easy to understand that an increase of net foreign asset position 
(NFA) or the medium-run real interest rate differential (MRIR_DIFF) would exert 
an appreciation pressure on the RMB. However, the impacts of NFA and 
MRIR_DIFF are not statistically significant.  
 
In light of the above results, we drop NFA and MRIR_DIFF from the ARDL 
procedure and arrive at a parsimonious specification, as reported in the following 
tables.   
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Table 3.15 Estimation Results of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
Constant -2.623 (0.630) -4.162*** 
RER(-1) 0.620 (0.108) 5.725*** 
RER(-2) 0.061 (0.130) 0.470 
RER(-3) 0.331 (0.135) 2.455** 
RER(-4) -0.192 (0.078) -2.455** 
K_CN 0.287 (0.140) 2.054** 
K_CN(-1) -0.312 (0.139) -2.250** 
K_US 1.702 (0.220) 7.743*** 
K_US(-1) -1.474 (0.218) -6.756*** 
Diagnostic Test F-Statistics Probability 
LM Test (6 lags) 0.783 0.587 
ARCH Test (6 lags) 0.685 0.663 
Jarque-Bera 0.513 0.774 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) model, and the associated 
standard errors are reported in the brackets. The Adjusted
2r is 0.996 with F-statistic 2743.059. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.16 Bounds Test of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) Model 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-stat. 10.193 2 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
10% 2.63 3.35 
5% 3.1 3.87 
1% 4.13 5 
Note: The above F-statistic is computed for the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables in the above model.  
 
Table 3.17 Long-Run Results of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) Model 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
D(RER(-1)) -0.200 (0.090) -2.216** 
D(RER(-2)) -0.139 (0.084) -1.648 
D(RER(-3)) 0.192 (0.074) 2.606** 
D(K_CN) 0.287 (0.060) 4.792*** 
D(K_US) 1.702 (0.181) 9.405*** 
Co-intEq (-1) -0.179 (0.028) -6.519 *** 
Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) t-statistics 
K_CN -0.142 (0.012) -12.198*** 
K_US 1.273 (0.080) 15.902*** 
C -14.619 (1.116) -13.101*** 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of the long-run co-integration relationship, and 
the standard errors are reported in the brackets. It is based on an ARDL (4, 1, 1, 4, 0) model. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Without repeating the analysis, we can conclude that the medium-run equilibrium 
for the NATREX can be parsimoniously described as:  
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      14.619 0.142* _ 1.273* _RER K CN K US    .                                    (3.28) 
 
The relationship depicted in equation (3.28) can be considered parsimonious also in 
the sense that the recursive residuals are always within the bands of plus or minus 
two standard errors, as shown in Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4 Recursive Residuals of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) Model 
Notes: This figure plots the recursive residuals of the ARDL (4, 1, 1) Model. 
 
Misalignment between RER and NATREX 
Given the analysis above, we can see that the movements of real exchange rate of 
RMB can be explained by the NATREX model. Since NATREX is assumed to be 
the equilibrium exchange rate prevailing in the medium-run, we construct NATREX 
based on the coefficient results reported in Table 3.17. Instead of using the actual 
real exchange rates to denote the lagged R , we replace them with the equilibrium 
exchange rates that should have been prevailing by using the relationship depicted 
in equation (3.28) and the actual values of _K CN and _K US . Then we measure 
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the misalignment (in percentage) between the RER and the NATREX as follows. 
Hence, a positive misalignment means the RMB is undervalued compared to its 
NATREX value and vice versa. 
                              % *100t tt
t
RER NATREX
MisA
NATREX

                                        (3.29) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 RER, NATREX and the Misalignment 
Notes: This figure plots the actual real exchange rate of RMB (RER) in the blue line, the NATREX 
in the red line, and the misalignment in the green line for the period from 1995Q1 to 2014Q4.  
 
In Figure 3.5, we plot the actual real exchange rate of RMB, the newly estimated 
NATREX, and the misalignment. It is clear that the real exchange rate of RMB is 
consistently undervalued compared to its NATREX counterpart, although the 
degree of misalignment has undergone different phases. The deviation tightened up 
quickly from 11.7% at the beginning of 1995 to as low as 2.8% in 1998, possibly 
due to impacts of the Asian financial crisis. It is widely known that, unlike many 
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neighbouring countries, the Chinese authority chose not to devalue its currency 
against the US dollar. The misalignment remained relatively stable until it increased 
quite significantly in late 2008 when China was hit by another financial crisis. 
During this time period, the US dollar depreciated considerably against most 
currencies, while the Chinese authority had again frozen the nominal exchange rate 
because of the severity of the global financial crisis. However, in comparison, the 
performance of the Chinese economy was still strong. Hence, the misalignment 
increased again, to over 5% in 2010.  
 
Compared to other studies such as Coudert and Couharde (2007) and Cline and 
Williamson (2009), the degree of undervaluation reported here is much smaller, 
which is not surprising as each study adopts a different estimation strategy or dataset. 
Nevertheless, this findings falls in line with You and Sarantis (2012) which asserts 
that there was only a moderate yet persistent undervaluation of the real effective 
exchange rate of RMB during 1982-2010. Moreover, You and Sarantis (2012) 
report that the extend of undervaluation rose sharply in 2009 and 2010, the trend of 
which is also present in our research.  
  
It is also interesting to note that the 2005 exchange rate reform did contribute to 
closing the misalignment: it dropped from 3.6% in 2005Q3 to 2.4% in 2008Q1. 
However, this change is notably far less than the magnitude of appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate. Nevertheless, we argue that this is because the medium-run 
equilibrium did not occur in the sample period; hence, the NATREX value we 
obtain here serves only as guidance.  
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3.5 Conclusions 
China’s global influence has been growing rapidly. In terms of global trade, China 
is already ranked first in exporting and second in importing. There is also clear 
evidence that the RMB has become more recognized outside China and is used for 
international transactions and payments. We have every reason to believe that this 
trend will continue and grow in the near future, especially given the fact that the 
RMB has joined the dollar, euro, pound and yen in the IMF’s Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) from Oct. 1, 2016, at a 10.92 percent weighting. However, as regards 
the Chinese exchange rate system reform, there remains much to be done. This study 
is devoted to calculating an appropriate reference rate for China, one of the two most 
important issues of the Reference Rate System22. To this end, we have adopted the 
NATREX approach.  
 
Compared to the other work on the determination of real exchange rate, since its 
introduction by Stein in the early 1990s NATREX has stood out in several ways. 
First, by definition it avoids consideration of the speculative capital flows and 
cyclical impacts that are notoriously problematic for empirical investigation. Instead, 
the NATREX focuses on describing the equilibrium situations. Secondly, the 
NATREX approach contributes to the literature by proposing that there is a 
trajectory through which the NATREX (a medium-run concept) converges to its 
long-run equilibrium value. Thirdly, as Allen (1995) noted, the NATREX approach 
can be considered as a positive, rather than a normative concept. This is a quite 
desirable feature in terms of the Reference Rate System, where we need to 
                                                          
22 We in Chapter 5 discuss why the Reference Rate System might be a better option for China.  
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determine whether the policy is contributing to the maintenance of an equilibrium 
exchange rate.  
 
The empirics of the NATREX have been conducted comprehensively in this study 
of the Chinese currency, RMB. In summary, we conclude that the NATREX model, 
in its canonical form, proves useful to account for the movements of the real 
exchange rate of the RMB, although not in the same way as occurred in other 
countries. We have not been bound by the previous studies, but have tried to 
overcome the difficulty of finding the most appropriate proxies and estimation 
method. For instance, because we could not find reliable data of the Chinese capital 
stock directly, we constructed the variable from scratch. Similarly, in order to get a 
better picture of the net foreign asset position, we built that variable as well. In terms 
of final results, we find that only the two productivity proxies have significantly 
impacted the RMB in the long-run in the way predicted by the NATREX model. 
The other exogenous factors were dropped from the parsimonious specification, 
either because they did not report as significant, or because they were wrongly 
signed. We also find evidence that the actual real exchange rate converges to the 
hypothetical medium-run NATREX value. Finally, we provide strong evidence that 
the portfolio balance channel did not work in China in the sample period. This could 
be explained by China’s own economic situation and policy mix during that time.  
 
However, we note that there are some limitations to the NATREX approach. For 
policy makers, the most obvious one is that the medium-run NATREX exists only 
conceptually, which makes it not particularly viable for the authorities to formulate 
policies. Moreover, the NATREX approach does not take into account of short-term 
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factors, such as speculative flows, which usually require prompt reaction from 
authorities in reality. From an empirical perspective, we also note that the estimation 
of the NATREX approach is subject to the data and methodology used. Despite the 
advances on both fronts, there is still room for improvement. For instance, the 
portfolio channel do not work for China, as opposed to what the canonical NATREX 
model would prescribe. We may need to refine our theoretical model by taking into 
consideration other factors established in other models, i.e. IMF’s EBA approach.  
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Chapter 4  
Optimal Control of the Chinese Official 
Intervention in a Heterogeneous Agent 
Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite the ongoing debate over which is the optimal exchange rate regime, it is 
rare that the governing authorities leave the course of exchange rates in the hands 
of the market alone, even if the exchange rate itself is not their prime objective. 
Recently, the idea of an intermediate regime, alias managed floating, has regained 
its popularity among policy-makers and researchers, as it is widely believed that by 
adopting such a regime, a country could not only benefit from relatively stable 
exchange rates in normal times, but could also avoid costly commitments in 
troubling situations. However, there has been little research into the operational 
perspective of these intermediate floating regimes, which makes it even more 
necessary to explain their relatively short lives.  
  
In terms of China, while financial under-development and extensive capital controls 
mean it mission impossible for China to adopt a free floating exchange rate regime, 
history also teaches the lesson that a fixed exchange rate regime is not viable for 
China as a world trading nation facing volatile international capital movements. 
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This leaves the managed floating exchange rate a sensible choice for China. 
However, despite much discussion, how to best manage the managed floating 
exchange rate in China remains a significant challenge for the country. To make 
things even worse, the lack of a well-functioning exchange rate regime has been a 
major stumbling block to China’s drive to promote the RMB as an international 
currency.  
 
In order to shed new lights on China’s optimal management of an intermediate 
exchange rate regime, this study turns for help to the stochastic optimal control 
theory. This move is reasonable, as it is more realistic to consider the management 
of exchange rates as an ever-changing (dynamic) system: new information (or 
shocks) arrives stochastically and it is up to the policy-maker to select their action 
accordingly to achieve the best result. Although the optimal control theory has been 
developed over several years and tested successfully in many fields such as physics 
and engineering, the earliest attempt to apply this idea to the management of 
exchange rates was the study of Jeanblanc-Picque (1993). With help from stochastic 
impulse control, the optimal strategy obtained by Jeanblanc-Picque (1993) states 
that the monetary authority should refrain from intervening in the foreign exchange 
market when the exchange rate is within the explicitly pre-determined band, but 
stands ready to intervene whenever the exchange rate reaches the upper or lower 
edge such that an instantaneous jump is triggered to bring the exchange rate to a 
point within the band. Since then, some ensuing studies (e.g. Korn, 1997 and 
Cadenillas and Zapatero, 1999, 2000), have extended Jeanblanc-Picque’s (1993) 
work in the management of exchange rates by bringing more realistic assumptions 
into play. 
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We note that one key assumption upheld in previous studies is that agents do not 
know the reaction functions of the central bank; in other words, they are not able to 
obtain the parameters of the central bank’s action. This is to rule out the potential 
impact of agents’ response to the government intervention on the exchange rate, 
which is essential to keep the solution tractable (Cadenillas and Zapatero, 1999). 
However, such an assumption is questionable, especially in light of recent literature 
on the central bank’s intervention within the heterogeneous agent framework. 
Studies, such as Beine et al. (2009) and Maatoug et al. (2011), tend to support the 
notion that official intervention can be effective as it can increase the proportion of 
fundamentalists, which in turn stabilizes the exchange rate.  
 
It is thus desirable and necessary to relax the assumption that agents do not react to 
central banks’ intervention. This is particularly meaningful in the Chinese case. 
Under the current exchange rate arrangements, the central bank firmly controls the 
central parity, the benchmark RMB exchange rate, while market participants can 
only quote the trading price of RMB against foreign currencies within pre-
determined limits around the central parity rate. It is also widely noted that the 
central bank may step in the market to directly place buying or selling orders or to 
give oral instructions to foreign exchange traders in state-controlled entities. Market 
participants can ‘observe’ the central bank’s intervention operations and would 
normally follow the official intentions, though with some lags. As such, we follow 
Kercheval and Moreno (2009) and Bensoussan et al. (2012) to introduce a ‘reaction 
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period’ in the context for China, which modifies the standard impulse control 
strategy.  
 
Specifically, we utilize the results from estimation of the heterogeneous agent 
framework to characterize the exchange rate process during the reaction period. 
Next, we empirically investigate the effect of central bank intervention on the 
reactions of market participants, who are classified according to their trading 
strategies. The results show that the PBOC intervention is effective in the sense that 
its signal is effectively conveyed to the market participants. Moreover, volatility of 
the exchange rate is significantly reduced after the intervention. 
 
The subsequent quantitative evidence obtained from the optimal control framework 
provides important insights of how the monetary authority may best manage the 
managed floating rate regime. We establish the optimal width for the band within 
which the exchange rate is free to float, when intervention should take place, and 
by how much. These findings can be particularly useful for the authority interested 
in contemplating a ‘Reference Rate Regime’. They bear important policy 
implications for the central bank’s enhancement of its credibility in convincing the 
market that official intervention can be stabilising and also for the optimal 
adjustment of the fluctuating band, the width of which would be large enough to 
allow sufficient flexibility for the exchange rate while being sufficiently tight to 
reduce excessive volatility of the exchange rate. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a 
review of the optimal stochastic control theory in relation to the exchange rate 
management and the impact of central bank intervention on the market participants. 
Section 3 empirically investigates the intervention conducted by the Chinese central 
bank in a heterogeneous agent setting. Section 4 explains how to manage the 
managed floating exchange rate system and presents numerical evidence. Section 5 
discusses policy implications and conclusions.   
 
4.2 Literature Review 
Two strands of the literature have emerged from existing studies in relation to 
exchange rate management through official intervention. The first involves the 
stochastic optimal control theory and the second concerns the study of the impact 
of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous agent framework.   
 
Accompanying the debate of the optimal exchange rate regime, scholars have also 
devoted to finding if there exists an optimal exchange rate management 
(intervention) strategy to support the regime once adopted.  
 
The earliest study can date back to Boyer (1978) who concluded that optimal policy 
is concerned with finding the optimal exchange rate flexibility level, which usually 
should lie within the interval of a hard fix and pure floating. The target-zone model, 
presented by Krugman (1991), is widely considered as the canonical theoretical 
framework for this strand of research. In fact, any exchange rate regime can be 
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simply viewed as a target-zone with different choice of band-width (López and 
Mendizabal, 2007). In the classic Krugman model, the exchange rate depends on 
only two fundamentals, namely money supply and a velocity shift term, implying 
that the monetary authority could constrain the exchange rate stay in a pre-
determined band simply through adjusting the money supply.  
 
Krugman (1991)’s model has inspired many following researches, with a majority 
of them focusing on reconciling the original theoretical model with observed 
stylized facts , though most empirical evidence so far has lent little support to the 
original model (Svensson, 1992). However, as noted by Mundaca and Oksendal 
(1998), rather than continuing in the direction of refining the model to fit the 
empirical findings that are at odds with Krugman’s original model, scholars have 
recently shifted their focus to another important issue: the existence of optimal 
monetary policy to maintain the currency fluctuating band through various 
approaches.   
 
One of the main approaches makes use of the optimal stochastic control theory, 
which can be further classified into different groups depending on the specific 
control applied. As reviewed later, we choose to adopt this approach mainly because 
it offers an operational strategy, which closely mirrors the exchange rate 
management problem faced in reality.  
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In addition to the stochastic control theory, there are also a few alternative methods 
proposed in literature. For instance, Cukierman et al. (2004) recognize that the 
adoption of exchange rate band in reality is a much more complicated issue. It 
compels policymakers to make key choices, such as the width of the fluctuation 
band, the level of the central parity rate, the method of intervention in support of the 
band and etc.. Aimed at achieving the optimal trade-off between the exchange rate 
flexibility (nominal exchange rate variability) and the credibility of the authority, 
Cukierman et al. (2004) provide a framework to determine the optimal exchange 
rate band. The key finding of their paper is that it analytically characterize the 
conditions under which a free float, a peg, or a band is optimal.  
 
López and Mendizábal (2007) made similar effort where they incorporated the 
standard target-zone model with both intra-marginal interventions and the lack of 
credibility. Given a set of values for the parameters that characterize the model, 
López and Mendizábal (2007) applied numerical methods to find the loss function 
for exchange rate regimes with various degree of flexibility.  
 
Lee and Lai (2011) have proposed a structural threshold model building on the idea 
of finding the optimal trade-off between obtaining the desirable exchange rate target 
and minimizing intervention cost. Compared to the optimal stochastic control 
approach, Lee and Lai (2011) has a clear advantage as the parameters for the 
structural threshold model can be directly estimated from the real data. However, 
Lee and Lai (2011) offers less clear guidance on how central bank should intervene, 
i.e. when is the best time to intervene and by how much. Nevertheless, Lee (2011) 
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tackled this limitation and demonstrated that under the managed floating the 
exchange rate can be modelled with two states: an ‘intervention’ state and a ‘non-
intervention’ state. Moreover, Lee (2011) illustrated that under the assumption of 
rational expectations, an analytical solution of the exchange rate might be obtained.  
 
4.2.1 Optimal Stochastic Control 
It is not surprising that the theory of optimal stochastic control is traditionally widely 
used in the areas of mathematics and engineering; however, recently there has been 
a trend for studies to apply this method in various areas of economic studies, 
including capital injections (Eisenberg and Schmidli, 2011), insurance (Luo and 
Taksar, 2012), dividend pay-out policy (Dickson and Waters, 2004 and Cadenillas 
et al., 2006), and more recently interest rates (Mitchell et al., 2014).  
 
The optimal stochastic control (in continuous time) can take various forms. 
Depending on the nature of the problem under consideration, it can be broadly 
divided into two sub-categories: classical control and impulse control. To clarify 
possible confusion that might arise in the following literature review, we use the 
following diffusion process to illustrate the difference between them.  
 
Following the canonical setting in this line of literature, we assume that in the 
absence of control the state of the variable concerned can be modelled using a 
diffusion process as follows:  
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X t x b X s ds X s dW s t                              (4.2) 
where   and   denote the drift and diffusion parameter of the process, 
respectively; 1  denotes the first time a control is applied.  
 
The defining character of the classical control is that the controller has the ability to 
alter either the drift or diffusion parameter or both; whereas in the impulse control, 
the controller directly brings a jump to the state variable without affecting the drift 
or the diffusion parameter. The classical control is arguably preferable when the 
controller has large influence on the state process. Otherwise, where the controller 
has relatively less influence or when continuous intervention is too costly, the 
impulse control would be a better choice. Here, the controller only needs to decide 
whether to control or not, and if yes, the size of that control. Moreover, compared 
to the classical control, impulse controls are more suitable for modelling the 
scenarios in which the decisions are made less frequently, but the controller has the 
ability to bring discontinuity to the economic variables concerned. In this study, we 
consider the impulse control to be the type of control that brings direct change to 
the economic variable under consideration, while the classical control is defined as 
the control that focuses on the drift or the diffusion parameter.  
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Impulse Control  
Jeanblanc-Picque (1993) was the first to apply the impulse control method to the 
management of exchange rates. In her setting, the exchange rate is modelled using 
a diffusion process where the drift and diffusion parameter are kept constant. The 
problem facing the central bank is to constrain the exchange rate stay within a pre-
designated band (a,b) , where the cost associated with each intervention is 
composed of a fixed term and another proportional term. Then the optimal strategy 
sought is such that the intervention cost is minimized in an infinite time horizon. 
Given rigorous proof, the optimal policy obtained can be summarized in the 
following figure: no intervention would be made when the exchange rate is in the 
band (a,b) , aka the  ‘Continuation Zone’, but when the process reaches the edge 
on either side, an intervention should be triggered such that the exchange rate would 
be moved to point   from a  , or to point   from b , where a b    . In this 
case, (0, )a  and ( , )b   are formally referred to as the ‘Intervention Zone’.  
 
Figure 4.1 The Impulse Control of Exchange Rates                   
Notes : Adapted from Jeanblanc-Picque (1993), Figure 2.1, p. 164 
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Jeanblanc-Picque’s model was later generalized by Korn (1997) by allowing 
random consequences depending on the intervention size. The randomness 
assumption is plausible in the cases where the intervention costs are not known prior 
to intervention, or where the consequences of a control depends on something else 
(Korn, 1997). In Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999), the assumed central bank 
objective is to keep the exchange rate as close as possible to a given target. In 
contrast to Jeanblanc-Picque (1993) and Korn (1997, 1999), the exchange rate band 
is not exogenously pre-determined. Another important but often overlooked feature 
of Cadenillas and Zapatero’s (1999) model is that the exchange rate, rather than its 
underlying fundamentals, has a diffusion process as in Eq. (4.1). In addition to 
obtaining an optimal intervention strategy, Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999) was the 
first to present numerical simulations of the impulse control in exchange rate 
management.  
 
Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) make two further extensions to Jeanblanc-Picque 
(1993). Firstly, rather than constraining the exchange rate in a given band, they 
propose a function to account for the cost of deviating from a given central parity 
exchange rate. Secondly and more importantly, they argue that in addition to the 
impulse control, which pertains to direct purchases (or sale) of foreign exchange, 
central banks have another important policy tool to influence exchange rates, i.e. 
the domestic interest rate level. Therefore, Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) formulate 
an optimal control strategy composed of both impulse control and the classical 
control, as the authority needs to select the level of domestic interest rate in a 
continuous manner.  
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Cadenillas and Zapatero (2000) also consider that the optimal intervention strategy 
should include both interest rate and foreign reserves. However, they argue that 
some of the assumptions in Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) do not hold in reality. 
First, exchange rates in a pure floating rate regime can be better modelled by a 
geometric Brownian motion rather than a standard one, since the latter includes 
negative values as well. Secondly, Cadenillas and Zapatero (2000) challenge the 
conclusion reached in Mundaca and Oksendal (1998) that the lower the domestic 
interest rate is, the better off the central bank. Instead, Cadenillas and Zapatero 
(2000) demonstrate that this statement only holds true when the domestic interest 
rate exceeds its target. Moreover, Cadenillas and Zapatero (2000) propose that the 
optimal intervention should be performed in the following fashion: when the 
exchange rate reaches the ‘Intervention Zone’, direct change of exchange rate is 
performed in a similar way as in Jeanblanc-Picque (1993); however, in the 
‘Continuation Zone’, intervention through adjusting the interest rate shall be 
optimally determined continuously by weighing up monetary policy objectives 
against the exchange rate policy.  
 
Based on Brazil’s intervention experience during its floating exchange rate regime 
period from January 1999 onwards, Sliva (2010) contends that in real practice, 
monetary authorities do not continuously adjust the domestic interest rate just to 
accommodate pressures in the foreign exchange market. Hence, in his model 
interest-rate intervention is considered only during the financial crisis. Sliva (2010) 
notes that Brazil’s central bank has also made use of other unconventional 
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intervention tools, such as transactions involving domestic-currency bonds or swaps, 
as complementary tools to defend against speculative attacks. As a result, use of 
such tools gives the authority higher intervention flexibility without the need to 
adjust interest rates. Therefore, Sliva (2010) concludes that an extended impulse 
control model fits better with the reaction for the Central Bank of Brazil during the 
2008 global financial crisis period.  
 
Kercheval and Moreno (2009) and Bensoussan et al. (2012) both point out another 
limitation of the previous impulse control models, i.e. they do not take account of 
market participants’ reaction to the central bank intervention, which might have 
important effect on the dynamics of the exchange rate. This assumption seems 
somewhat unrealistic, especially in the light of recent literature on the role of central 
bank intervention within the heterogeneous agent framework. Therefore, in order to 
keep the solution tractable, both studies suggest that it is more realistic to assume 
that the market can detect large intervention operations by the central bank and 
respond accordingly. These two studies reach the same results that the optimal 
intervention strategy is impacted by market reaction. For instance, the optimal 
bandwidth needs to be widened if the exchange rate volatility increases temporarily 
after interventions.  
 
Unlike the studies mentioned above (except Jeanblanc-Picque, 1993), which assume 
the exchange rate itself can be modelled using a diffusion process, another popular 
but more complex application of impulse control models the underlying factor(s) 
with a diffusion process, which is made possible by introducing another function to 
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account for the relation between the exchange rate and its underlying factor(s). For 
instance, Miller and Zhang (1996) studied whether there exists any optimal 
intervention solution for central banks in the target-zone framework where a 
proportional cost of intervention is assumed. Since the exchange rate is modelled as 
the discounted future fundamentals, they point out that the effect of possible 
intervention should also be taken into account. Through numerical analysis, Miller 
and Zhang (1996) lend support to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) by 
demonstrating that pre-commitment can sustain a bandwidth only half that of the 
one under discretion.  
 
Following Miller and Zhang (1996), Im (2001) notes that there is a by-product of 
intervention of exchange rates in the target-zone framework, which involves 
volatility of the short-term interest rate. Hence, it would make sense to include the 
interest rate in the central bank’s loss function. Then, Im (2001) seeks to find the 
optimal intervention strategy where proportional intervention cost in an infinite 
horizon are considered. The solution for optimal instantaneous control consists of 
two barriers related to the fundamentals. Intervention is executed when the 
fundamental touches the barrier and the fundamental is adjusted to its nearest 
boundary. Compared to the results reported in Miller and Zhang (1996), the width 
of the fluctuating band in Im (2001) is narrower, mainly because of a higher 
marginal deviation cost underlying the loss function. As a result, the authority is 
advised to act earlier than in the case considered by Miller and Zhang (1996). Im 
(2001) also lists the impact of the model parameters on the bandwidth. For instance, 
the volatility of the fundamental and the extent of preference of interest rate 
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deviation over exchange rate deviation both report positive effect on the width of 
the band.  
 
Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2007) offer a similar perspective to Miller and Zhang 
(1996) and Im (2001), whereby the exchange rate is related to the fundamentals 
nonlinearly following a Brownian motion with a state-dependent drift. Specifically, 
Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2007) conjecture that the central bank could influence 
the dynamics of exchange rates by altering its monetary policy stance. Put in 
mathematical terms, the authority applies an instantaneous change to the drift 
parameter of the fundamental, therefore reversing the prevailing 
appreciation/depreciation trend in the exchange rate. As a result, the exchange rates 
display a regime-switching phenomenon. In addition, Castellano and D’Ecclesia 
(2007) empirically validates the theoretic model using the D-Mark/US dollar data 
over the period from January 1973 to January 2005.  
 
Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) broadened the usage of impulse control models with the 
example of managing a country’s foreign reserve stocks. It is argued that 
conventional impulse control would be sufficient under normal times, such as the 
case when international transactions account for only a relatively small proportion 
of a country’s reserve stocks. Nevertheless, as history shows, crisis periods often 
see a sharp decrease in foreign reserve. In order to address the problem that the 
standard impulse control cannot account for both scenarios appropriately in the 
same setting, Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) proposed a generalized impulse control model, 
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where a combination of a Brownian Motion and a compound Poisson process with 
positive and negative jumps is used to capture both smooth and abrupt capital stock 
changes.  
 
Drift Control  
Similar to impulse control, drift control problems also originated from non-
economic contexts,23 but it was Bar-Ilan et al. (2007) who first introduced the 
methodology to an economic problem, i.e. the foreign reserve management. It is 
conventionally acknowledged that the central bank would use the buffer stock (BS) 
model to determine a target level of foreign reserve stock, which essentially 
represents an application of the impulse control method. However, Bar-Ilan et al. 
(2007) point out that the drift of the state variable, i.e. the rate of change of the 
international reserves in their study, is largely influenced by monetary policy or 
exchange rate policy. Hence, the drift is endogenously determined, which leads the 
authors to contend that the drift-control model can be considered as a generalized 
version of the traditional BS model. Based on the martingale stopping theory, Bar-
Ilan et al. (2007) obtain explicit analytical solutions for the payoff functions with 
applications to foreign reserve management. Such a drift-control model has an 
advantage over the BS model in that the decision maker can control not only the 
state variable, but also two drift rates. Moreover, their results from subsequent 
                                                          
23 Interested readers could see Rath (1977), Chernoff and Petkau (1978) and Bar-Lev and Perry (1989) 
for some earlier examples, and Ata et al. (2005), Ghosh and Weerasinghe (2007), and Ormeci 
Matoglu and Vate (2011) for more technical discussion.  
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numerical simulations validate the prediction that drift control gives the authority 
more freedom in conducting intervention and that the cost saved is substantial.  
 
Given this example, it seems fair to say that drift control can be considered as one 
sub-category of classical control, as it applies changes to the drift parameter in the 
diffusion process. Following Bar-Ilan et al. (2007), Castellano et al. (2011) present 
a drift-control model for a managed floating exchange rate system by assuming that 
the exchange rate is determined by the current aggregate fundamental, which is 
modelled as a Brownian motion with state-dependent drift and volatility. A disutility 
function is introduced to proxy for intervention costs when the monetary authority 
is assumed to keep the exchange rate level broadly in line with its time-varying 
target. The optimal management strategy is obtained by use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation in the viscosity sense, and the authors suggest that an optimal 
fluctuating band might be solved under certain conditions.  
 
The usage of drift-control model has been extended in a number of ways since Bar-
Ilan et al. (2007) first applied it to the foreign reserve management. One interesting 
direction is that the cost of changing the drift can be modelled to be dependent on 
both the current values of the drift and the reserve level. For example, Bar-Ilan and 
Marion (2013) find that agents tend to spend at a higher rate when they have a higher 
cash reserve. Another promising direction for the drift control is that it might be 
incorporated into a macroeconomic model where the central bank faces multiple 
objectives, which is helpful in understanding the linkages between various policies. 
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For example, Bar-Ilan and Lederman (2007) investigate the case where the objective 
function facing the monetary authority includes both output and inflation targets and 
the results are useful to both monetary policy and management of foreign reserve 
holdings. As a follow-up, Bar-Ilan and Marion (2009) consider a more complex 
model where the cost of a crisis is also included in the loss function for central banks. 
It is argued that this model better characterizes the behaviour of international 
reserves and inflation stabilization. In addition, it sheds light on how exchange-rate 
policy can be related to reserve accumulation. For instance, it rationalizes the policy 
mix upheld in China, whereby when output is below a potential level, it is optimal 
to promote export-led growth with a weak currency to achieve output and inflation 
stabilization, while the accumulation of reserve holdings can be seen as the natural 
by-product.   
 
4.2.2 Heterogeneous Agent Model  
Overview  
Rational expectations began to lose its popularity in the 1990s. Scholars 
increasingly find that agents in the financial markets24 do not fully fall in line with 
the rational expectations hypothesis, but tend to question whether the strong 
                                                          
24 In addition to the foreign exchange market, the HAM model has also achieved large success in 
many other financial markets, such as commodity markets (Reitz and Westerhoff, 2007), stock 
markets (Chiarella et al. 2012, 2014), option markets (Frijns et al., 2010), beef market (Baak, 1999), 
oil markets (Ter Ellen and Zwinkels, 2010), gold market (Baur and Glover, 2014), and CDS markets 
(Chiarella et al., 2015).  
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rationality assumptions, such as the availability of complete information and 
unlimited computing capacity, really hold in reality (Hommes, 2006). It is unlikely 
that a rational agent would know the beliefs of all the other agents. Instead, it seems 
more plausible to assume that agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they 
use rule of thumb strategies and adapt their forecasting rule as additional 
observations become available (Hommes, 2001).  
 
Hommes (2006) notes that the switch from a representative, rational agent approach 
towards a behavioural, agent-based approach is driven mainly by the study of the 
exchange rate and several empirical anomalies or puzzles thereof. The first puzzle, 
raised implicitly by Meese and Rogoff (1983), is that a simple random walk model 
outperforms the much more sophisticated structural models in out-of-sample 
forecasting in the short horizon, i.e. no more than one year. This puzzle is formally 
referred to as the ‘disconnect’ puzzle in the sense that, according to subsequent 
studies, the exchange rate appears to be disconnected from its underlying 
fundamentals. One typical case is in Frankel and Froot (1986) that the large and 
persistent misalignment of the US dollar in the mid-eighties could not be explained 
by economic fundamentals. The second puzzle relates to the statistic distribution of 
the exchange rate. On one hand, the volatility of the observed exchange rates is 
much higher than the volatility of the underlying economic variables, while on the 
other hand, the distribution of the exchange rates is not normal as predicted by the 
standard rational models, which gives rise to the ‘excess volatility’ puzzle. LeBaron 
(2006) documents that the exchange rate returns display fat tails, which is not 
obvious in the underlying fundamental variables. Thirdly, the ‘forward discount bias’ 
was first detected by Froot and Frankel (1989). Another obvious but less mentioned 
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puzzle is the extremely large volume of currency trade worldwide. If the foreign 
exchange market is populated with homogeneous and rational agents, there will not 
be as many trades as observed nowadays in the foreign exchange market.  
 
Various papers have proposed an array of approaches25 to model the heterogeneity 
among agents. One crucial question remains to be addressed is its empirical validity. 
To this end, different methods have been developed, either directly or indirectly. 
 
Among the studies using direct methods, earlier researches, e.g. Schmalensee 
(1976), employ experimental methods in the expectation formation processes. The 
results offer strong evidence that agents tend to follow trends even though they are 
aware of the random walk characteristic of the exchange rates. This idea is picked 
up and extended by De Bondt (1993), Bloomfield and Hales (2002), and Hommes 
et al. (2005). 
 
Another commonly employed direct method is by qualitative or quantitative survey, 
which offers first-hand evidence of the presence of heterogeneous agents in the 
foreign exchange market and of how agents form expectation formation rules. In 
their pioneering study, Taylor and Allen (1992) report that a majority (90%) of the 
foreign exchange traders in the London market would use some form of technical 
                                                          
25  In this study, we focus on the most popular theoretical framework, i.e. the chartists and 
fundamentalists approach. 
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analysis to forecast exchange rates, especially for the short-term horizons. In the 
meantime, traders are better informed by making use of the fundamental analysis. 
 
Many subsequent surveys have offered more insights into the heterogeneity in the 
foreign exchange market. In Jongen et al. (2012), the survey is conducted by 
Consensus Economics of London among major professional forecast agencies; it is 
conducted on a monthly basis and covers the most commonly traded currencies. 
Jongen et al. (2012) document that the degree of dispersion regarding the future 
exchange rate levels has highs and lows in different time periods, and the change 
can be attributed largely to the asymmetric information set and heterogeneity in 
forming exchange rate expectation, the latter of which means that traders adjust the 
weights of the three forecasting strategies (fundamentalists, chartists, and carry 
traders) depending on their most recent forecasting performance. Based on the same 
dataset, Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014) confirm that the introduction of switching 
mechanism in the agents significantly improved the fit of the model, especially at 
the very short forecast horizons. Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014) further argue that 
the choice of forecasting strategy is determined by both period specific factors and 
individual specific factors.  
 
Dick and Menkhoff (2013) lend further support to the chartist and fundamentalist 
(C&F) approach. Different from other survey-based empirical investigations, they 
take a closer look at the information asymmetry between the individual investor and 
professionals. The results first confirm the C&F theory that chartists and 
fundamentalists do form exchange rate expectations differently; i.e. chartists change 
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their expectation according to the recent price movements, while fundamentalists 
pay more attention to the ‘fundamental value’ of the exchange rate. Secondly, they 
argue that persistent existence of chartists is reasonable, as fundamentalists do not 
outperform them in terms of forecasting.  
 
Estimation results present further verification of the presence of heterogeneous 
agents. In order to circumvent the non-linear switching mechanism embedded in the 
C&F framework, two distinct methods have been used. On one hand, studies such 
as Vigfusson (1997), Westerhoff (2003), and Ahrens and Reitz (2005) employ a 
Markov regime-switching approach as proxy. On the other hand, Winker and Gilli 
(2001, 2004) propose that the coefficient estimates of the real financial data can be 
generated by fitting simulated data through minimizing the deviation between the 
actual and estimated kurtosis and ARCH statistics. In addition, there is a promising 
strand of literature emerging, which directly estimates a heterogeneous agent model 
with switching mechanism. For example, Boswijk et al. (2007) and De Jong et al. 
(2009) reformulated the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and applied it to the 
S&P 500 index and the investigation of the Asian crisis, respectively. De Jong et al. 
(2010) extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2007) and estimate the model for the 
EMS period, which lends direct support to the existence of heterogeneous agents in 
the foreign exchange market. In addition, the validity of introducing the switching 
mechanism is confirmed, as its forecasting ability outperforms both the random 
walk model and the heterogeneous model without switching mechanism (De Jong 
et al., 2010). 
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Impacts of Central Bank Intervention on Heterogeneous Agents   
Existence of heterogeneous agents in the foreign exchange market implies that 
exchange rate movements are at least partially endogenously determined, especially 
in the short-run. This provides more arguments for the necessity of government 
intervention. In terms of operational applicability, monetary authority can adjust the 
supply of foreign assets to influence the course of the exchange rate as suggested in 
the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). However, the authors contend that it 
is almost impossible to estimate the effect of central bank intervention beforehand, 
as it depends on the prevailing risk perception and market structure, i.e. the weights 
of different agents. Nevertheless, simulation results suggest that systematic 
intervention is effective in eliminating bubbles in the foreign exchange market. 
Specifically, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) consider two strategies. The first is 
usually referred to as ‘leaning against the wind’, such that the central bank is 
continuously active in the market, smoothing exchange rate movements or 
reinforcing the mean-reverting process, as a result of which it strengthens the impact 
of fundamentalists at the cost of chartists. It is shown by simulation that the 
exchange rate is forced to move more closely around its fundamental. The second 
intervention strategy is recognized as ‘target intervention’, whereby the central bank 
commits to intervene whenever the exchange rate deviates from the pre-determined 
target band. Simulation results show that this strategy works as well as the first one, 
although the frequency of intervention is remarkably lower.   
 
Based on the C&F (chartist and fundamentalist) framework, Westerhoff (2003) 
shows that two common intervention strategies can be employed: one is known as 
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LAW (leaning against the wind), the central bank trades against chartists, and the 
other is aimed at supporting a target exchange rate. The results reveal that LAW 
generates mixed evidence: exchange rate fluctuations are dampened at the cost of 
more cycles. In addition, neither type of intervention is effective in altering the 
course of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, Reitz et al. (2006) investigate a low-frequency 
target-zone intervention and find that the mechanism operates such that it directly 
pushes the exchange rate towards its fundamental value, which in turn signals a new 
trend for both chartist and fundamentalist. The authors argue that target-zone 
intervention not only helps to reduce misalignments but also proves to be profitable.   
 
Bauer et al. (2009) point out the necessity for agents to take regulatory policy 
explicitly into account when forming expectations, and hence investigate the 
dynamics of exchange rates when a credible target-zone policy is in place. Their 
results suggest that a target zone regime significantly discourages speculative 
activity in the foreign exchange market, and more importantly, the generated 
distribution of the exchange rate closely mimics the stylized fact that the exchange 
rate tends to stay close to the centre of the band, which implies that the need for 
intervention is greatly reduced.  
 
From an empirical perspective, Beine et al. (2007) confirm that foreign exchange 
interventions, particularly secret interventions, increase heterogeneity in the 
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DEM/USD market. Beine et al. (2009) further investigate the effect of sterilized 
intervention with a two-state Markov switching model featuring a noise-trading 
framework. Using bi-weekly data (euro against the US dollar), they find that in the 
medium-run, central bank intervention tends to increase the proportion of 
fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market, which in turn helps to close the gap 
between market exchange rate and the central parity rate.  
 
Following a similar approach, Maatoug et al. (2011) look into the effect of the 
intervention conducted by the Reserve Bank of Australia on the Australian dollar/ 
US dollar. However, unlike Beine et al. (2009), where the specification of chartists 
is derived from estimation, Maatoug et al. (2011) consider a moving-average rule. 
Based on daily rather than bi-weekly data, Maatoug et al. (2011) find new evidence 
that central bank intervention could increase the proportion of fundamentalists when 
chartists are dominating and hence the exchange rate is stabilized.  
 
Though not following the standard C&F approach, Corrado et al. (2007) present a 
heterogeneous agent model of the currency market, which is categorized as ‘bulls’ 
and ‘bears’. They show how the behaviour of those trades could change the course 
of exchange rate and generate excess volatility. More importantly, they contend that 
a monitoring band with non-sterilized intervention is effective in reducing the 
excess volatility by rewarding those traders who fall into line with the intended 
direction of government intervention. 
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Building on the idea of heterogeneous expectation, Reitz (2005) studied the effect 
of intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Deutsche Bundesbank by means of 
a Markov regime-switching model. In contrast to the usual findings, Reitz (2005) 
reports that the fundamentalists did not benefit from central bank intervention and 
the profit of chartists was enhanced, which seems to be plausible because the course 
of exchange rates was probably not fundamentally changed. However, in a later 
study, Reitz et al. (2010), using data from Consensus Economics, show that 
intervention by the Bank of Japan effectively eliminates heterogeneity among 
foreign exchange forecasts.   
 
4.3 Empirical Evidence from the Chinese FX Market 
4.3.1 A Simple HAM Model 
Before we can formulate a sensible exchange rate management strategy, it is vital 
to establish some empirical evidence of the market micro-structure concerned. 
Following recent studies like Beine et al. (2009), in this study we assume two types 
of traders: fundamentalists whose expectation is driven by thedifference between 
the market rate and the central parity rate, and chartists who is purely dependent on 
past exchange rate movements. Specifically, the forecasting strategies of 
fundamentalists can be expressed as follows.   
                                 
*
1 1( )
f
t t tr s s                                                              (4.3) 
where
*
1ts  is the central parity rate in period 1t  , and the coefficient  represents 
the effect of the misalignment on fundamentalists’ expectation. Normally is 
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assumed to lie in the interval ( 1,0)  as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), but De 
Jong et al. (2010) argue that fundamentalists contribute to the mean-reverting as 
long as   is greater than -1.  
 
It is well-documented that many different and complex technical trading strategies 
have been adopted in the foreign exchange market, among them one popular type 
was commonly referred to as Moving Average (MA), where traders rely on the 
difference between the short-term and long-term moving average. Specifically, their 
trading strategy is expressed as 
                                 1 1( )
MA S L
t t tr MA MA                                                               (4.4) 
where 1
S
tMA   and 1
L
tMA   are the relatively short-term and long-term moving average 
of the exchange rates. This strategy is argued to destabilize the market if 0  , as 
agents expect the short-run deviations to continue. On the other hand, if 0  , the 
MA rule displays a stabilization effect, as agents expect the market exchange rate 
to return to its longer-run moving average. Though decisions on the length of the 
short and long term are somewhat arbitrary, literature (e.g. Vigfusson, 1997 and 
Reitz, 2005) suggests that traders commonly use the 14 days for the short-run and 
200 days for the long-run moving-average. Hence, we choose a 14-200 day moving-
average rule. 
 
Dixon et al. (2016) provide evidence from a Markov switching model that the 
flexibility of the RMB has undergone two distinct regimes since the 2005 reform. 
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We follow the similar method to investigate the effect of central bank intervention 
in a heterogeneous agent setting. However, the model specification is largely 
different from the previous literature. Studies such as Beine et al. (2009) and 
Maatoug et al. (2011) implicitly assume that at any time point, only one forecasting 
rule is at work and the exchange rate regime switch is assumed to take place between 
a fundamentalist-only regime and a chartist-only regime. In other words, those 
studies impose a zero coefficient on fundamentalists in the chartist regime, and vice 
versa. This is too restrictive given mounting evidence that these two types tend to 
co-exist in the market irrespective of the time horizon concerned. To address this 
issue, in this study we include the two forecasting rules in both regimes. 
 
Another difference of our investigation compared with previous studies lies in the 
fact that the Chinese monetary authority, the PBOC, does not disclose its 
intervention activities, while for other currencies the real intervention data are 
available (e.g. Beine et al., 2009; Maatoug et al., 2011). This prompts us to find a 
proxy for PBOC intervention and we employ the Flexibility Index developed in 
Dixon et al. (2016) to track the undisclosed intervention conducted by the PBOC. 
This index is computed to measure the extent to which the central bank allows the 
market forces to influence the price formation process of the RMB; hence, the 
higher the index value is, the lower is the intensity of central bank intervention.  
 
Following the previous chapter, we take the RMB exchange rate data from the Bank 
of China as the market exchange rate and the central parity rate from the PBOC as 
the fundamental rate, covering the period from 22 July 2005 to 31 December 2014. 
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Before looking into the impact of central bank intervention, we estimate a baseline 
model where the impact from chartists and fundamentalists on the exchange rate 
return varies between two regimes. In addition, the transition probability between 
the two regimes is assumed  constant, following a first-order Markov rule. Hence, 
the following specification is estimated  
    
* 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
* 2
2 1 1 2 1 1
( ) (s )
( ) ( )
S L
t t t t t
i S L
t t t t t
MA MA s
r
MA MA s s
  
  
   
   
      
 
     
                       (4.5) 
where ir  is the exchange rate in regime i, i=1 or 2. It is calculated as the difference 
of the market exchange rate between two consecutive working days, and scaled up 
100 times to make the interpretation easier. 1  and 2  are two iid  error terms 
denoting the heterogeneous variance in these two regimes.  
 
The results reported in Table 4.1 yield several important points. First, as expected, 
there are two distinct regimes to model the (market) exchange rate returns. Based 
on the estimated  , we use Regime 1 and Regime 2 to denote the ‘active’ and ‘calm’ 
states respectively, because the exchange rate volatility in Regime 1 is more than 7 
times larger than that in Regime 2. Secondly, we find that the coefficients of  and 
 both report as highly significant in Regime 1, while neither chartists nor 
fundamentalists coefficient report significant in Regime 2, suggesting that the 
degree of impact of traders on the exchange rate is quite limited in Regime 2. 
Looking more closely, irrespective of the regime, fundamentalists play a stabilizing 
role as they drive the exchange rate towards the central parity rate, while MA traders 
expect short-run deviations of the exchange rate from its long-term trend to persist, 
as a positive   indicates that the chartists push the exchange rate further away from 
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its long-run value and contribute to the misalignment. However, the MA traders in 
China may not play a non-stabilization role as found in other studies, such as 
Maatoug et al. (2011). Because the RMB was undervalued in much of the sample 
period, the MA traders were in fact helping the exchange rate to move to its 
equilibrium level. Finally, the transition probabilities are 98.3% and 93.8% for 
Regime 1 and 2, respectively, indicating an extremely high persistence of both 
regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
 
Table 4.1 Estimation of the Baseline Model 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
  0.115 (-117.670***) 0.016 (-90.888***) 
  -0.243 (-2.477) -0.053 (-1.029) 
  0.140 (6.596) 0.031 (1.540) 
Panel B 
 
 
Constant Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i) 
P(1,1)=98.3% P(2,1)=6.2% 
P(1,2)=1.7% P(2,2)=93.8% 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P12-C -4.036 (-15.568***) 
P22-C 2.717 (11.201***) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-state Markov switching model of the heterogeneous 
agent model consisting of fundamentalists and Moving-average traders. Regime 1 and Regime 2 
denote the active and calm regime, respectively. In Panel A, we report the estimated coefficients for 
the regime-varying variables, with the corresponding z-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports the 
constant transition probabilities between the two regimes and the transition matrix parameters.   
denotes the regime specific variance,  and  are the parameters used in the fundamentalist and 
MA forecasting strategies respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
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4.3.2 The Impact of Central Bank Intervention 
To highlight the impact of central bank intervention on the heterogeneous agents, 
we include central bank intervention in the modelling, specifically as a determinant 
variable of the transition probability. Specifically, we hypothesize that a higher 
value of the flexibility index will increase the probability of the system staying in 
Regime 1, and increase the probability of transiting out of Regime 2.  
 
From Table 4.2, the estimated coefficients on P11_Int_Proxy and P21_Int_Proxy 
do not reject the hypothesis that a greater value of the flexibility index, denoting a 
lower intervention intensity, increases the probability of staying in the ‘active’ 
regime where both fundamentalists and chartists exert a statistically significant role 
in influencing the course of exchange rate. A higher flexibility index also increases 
the probability of transiting out of the ‘calm’ state, suggesting that a lower 
intervention intensity would lead to more activity among traders. Moreover, 
consistent with the results in Table 4.1, we find the coefficients of both trading 
strategies are much larger in absolute value in Regime 1 than in Regime 2, which 
contradicts the findings in other studies that the central bank intervention is effective 
such that it increases the impact of fundamentalists and/or decreases the impact of 
chartists. Nevertheless, we argue that this difference might occur because the central 
parity rate used in this study is not the ideal proxy for the equilibrium (fundamental) 
exchange rate level as used in other studies.  
 
 
148 
 
 
Table 4.2 Impacts of Intervention on the Fundamentalists and MA Traders 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
  0.115 (-117.362***) 0.016 (-90.398***) 
  -0.243 (-2.477**) -0.052 (-1.008) 
  0.140 (6.593***) 0.030 (1.529) 
Panel B 
 
 
Mean Time-varying Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i) 
P(1,1)=98.2% P(2,1)=6.4% 
P(1,2)=1.8% P(2,2)=93.6% 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C 3.291 (5.359***) 
P11_Int_Proxy  0.008 (1.178) 
P21-C -3.125 (-9.109***) 
P21-Int_Proxy 0.004 (1.982**) 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of the impact of central bank intervention on the 
fundamentalists and Moving-average traders in a two-state Markov switching model. Intervention is 
proxied by the flexibility index and Regime 1 and Regime 2 denote the ‘active’ and ‘calm’ regime, 
respectively. Panel A shows the estimated coefficients on the regime-varying variable with 
corresponding z-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports the time-varying transition probabilities 
between the two regimes and the transition matrix parameters. The outcome differs from Table 4.1 
because the transition probability is now assumed to be time-varying, depending on the intervention 
occurring in the previous working day.  denotes the regime specific variance;  and  are the 
parameters used in the fundamentalist and MA forecasting strategies respectively. P11-Int_Proxy 
denotes the impact of Intervention on the transition probability from Regime 1 to Regime 1, while 
P21-Int_Proxy denotes the impact of Intervention on the transition probability from Regime 2 to 
Regime 1. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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4.4 Managing the Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
4.4.1 Baseline Optimal Exchange Rate Management Strategy 
In this section, we present an optimal exchange rate management framework for the 
RMB by marrying the optimal stochastic control theory and the estimation results 
obtained from the model discussed above. China has publicly announced it would 
cease its interventionist policy and increase the influence of market forces in the 
exchange rate decision-making process, the progress of which has been at least 
partially confirmed by our empirical investigation above. Hence, the impulse 
control approach rather than the classical control is more suitable here. For one thing, 
although PBOC has the power and capacity to initiate the classical controls, it stands 
in opposition of its announced policy intentions to increase the role of market forces. 
Second, impulse control might be more effective in practice, as jumps of the 
exchange rate, rather than a change in the underlying driving factors, are easier to 
be picked up by market participants.  
 
By adopting the canonical setting in this line of research such as Cadenillas and 
Zapatero’s (1999) and Kercheval and Moreno (2009), we assume that in the absence 
of intervention, the exchange rate can be modelled using the following diffusion 
process ( )X t . Let ( , , )F P be the probability space tF  together with a filtration 
tF  generated by a one-dimensional Brownian motion ( )W t , and ( )X t denotes the 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency at time t :  
               1 1( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))x x x tdX t X t dt X t dW                                      (4.6) 
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                                     (0 )xX x
                                                              (4.7) 
where 1( )   and 1( )   are functions that satisfy the usual requirements for the 
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the diffusion process. Eq. (4.7) is written 
to emphasize that x  is the exchange rate value at time 0 before any control is applied.  
 
Suppose that intervention takes place at times , {1,2,3,...}i i N   , 
1 2 30         with each intervention resulting in a jump in the exchange rate. 
Now, following Kercheval and Moreno (2009), we assume that immediately after 
each intervention, a ‘reaction period’ is introduced because of the presence of the 
heterogeneous agents in the market. The reaction period is denoted as a bounded, 
random length of time iT , 0 iT T

  , during which the exchange rate follows a new 
diffusion process as follows,  
                          2 2( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
i i i i i
x x x tdX t X t dt X t dW                                        (4.8)        
where x  is the value of the process immediately after the i th  intervention. For 
the sake of deriving the solution in a general form, we keep the assumption that 2
i , 
2
i  and iT  are independent of each other and of the rate process driver tW . It is 
important to note that there is no new intervention allowed during the reaction 
period.   
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Hence in the presence of heterogeneous agents, the impulse control 
1 2 1 2( , , , , ; , , , , )n n       can be formally defined as a sequence of 
intervention times i and intervention sizes i , which results in the controlled 
process xX

 such that                                                        
    10 i i    a.s. for all i N and 1i i    a.s. if i                    (4.9) 
               (0 )xX x
                                                     (4.10) 
                                      ( ) ( )x xdX t dX t
  , 1t                                              (4.11) 
and for all j N  
                          ( ) ( )x j x jjX X
                                             (4.12) 
                        
( )
( ) ( )
x j
i
x X
dX t dX t


 , j j jt T                            (4.13) 
                      
( )
( ) ( )
x j j
x X T
dX t dX t

 
 , 1j j jT t                             (4.14)                                                                        
where i is an infinite increasing sequence of stopping times with respect to the 
filtration tF , and each :i R   is tF  measurable. The whole process is defined 
on the domain ( , ), 0t t   to make sense of the intervention possibility at time 0.   
 
The objective that the central bank holds is to select a control    that minimizes the 
functional J defined as: 
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0
1
( ) [ ( ( )) ( ( ), )]i
rrt
x x jj
i
J x E e f X t dt e K X
    



                               (4.15) 
where ( )f  is the running cost function; ( )K  is the intervention cost function, which 
depends on the state process and the intervention size ; r  is the discount rate, and 
the Value Function is defined as:  
                                           ( ) inf ( )V x J x

                                            (4.16)   
 where  denotes the set of all admissible controls.  
 
The solution of an impulse control depends critically on the cost function, ( )K   and 
( )f   , i.e. the cost of intervention and the cost of no intervention. Without 
complicating the solution, we stick to the standard choices that  the cost of no 
intervention, aka, the running cost, is modelled as: 
                                                           
2( ) ( )f x x                                                   (4.17) 
where  is the target exchange rate for the central bank. It can be seen from Eq. 
(4.17) that the cost of no intervention increases sharply as the deviation of the 
market exchange rate from the target exchange rate increases.  
 
The discussion of intervention cost calls for more elaborate modelling. If we do not 
consider the presence of heterogeneous agents, the cost of intervention usually takes 
the following form:  
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                                   ( )K  = {
, 0C c  
min( , ), 0C D  
, 0D d  
                                               (4.18) 
, , , , (0, )C c D d     
where C and c represent the fixed and proportional cost respectively per 
intervention when the central bank aims at depreciating the currency; D and d
represent the fixed and proportional cost respectively per intervention when the 
central bank aims at appreciating its currency. The proportional cost is assumed on 
the basis that intervention cost increases with the scale of the intervention. For 
instance, there is normally a proportional transaction cost incurred when the central 
bank directly purchases or sells foreign exchanges. To explain the presence of fixed 
intervention cost, both Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999) and Bensoussan et al. (2012) 
note that many interventions occur quickly and are sizable in relation to normal 
transactions observed in the foreign exchange market, which implies considerable 
work undertaken. The fixed cost can also be considered as the loss of central bank 
credibility, because the more the central bank intervenes, the less likely it is that 
market participants would believe that the government is abstaining from 
intervention.  
 
However, because of the assumption that there is no intervention allowed during the 
reaction period, the intervention cost has to be modified to add the running cost 
incurred during the reaction period, which can be computed as  
                             
2
0
[ (X ( ) ) ]
T
rt
x xK E e t p dt
                                              (4.19) 
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where x  denotes the value for the controlled process at the start of the reaction 
period.  
 
4.4.2 Solution 
The literature normally adopts the Quasi-Variational Inequalities (QVI) and the 
Verification approach to solve the problem described above. To this end, operators 
  and M  are introduced respectively as: 
                      ( , , ) ( ) [ ( ( )]
rT
x xM x K K E e X T    

                                (4.20) 
and  
                             ( ) inf{ ( , , ) : 0}x M x x

       .                                   (4.21) 
 
To understand these two operators, suppose there exists an optimal strategy for each 
initial point. Then if the process starts at x  and follows the optimal strategy, the 
associated cost is the ( )V x defined above. In contrast, if the process starts at x  and 
selects the best immediate intervention and then follows an optimal strategy, the 
cost associated with this strategy is represented by ( )x . Then it is 
straightforward to see that ( ) ( )V x x , with the equilibrium condition indicating 
the optimal time (s) to intervene.   
 
The solution of the above impulse control problem proceeds in the following steps: 
First, we propose the potential form of the impulse control   and use it to construct 
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the value function that meets the QVI conditions listed above. Secondly, if the 
function   and the control    satisfy the conditions specified in Proposition 1, we 
can safely prove that    is the value function for the problem and  is the desired 
optimal strategy. Finally, we need only to solve the QVI (Kercheval and Moreno, 
2009). 
 
The QVI used in this study are stated as follows:  
                                              ( ) ( ) 0L x f x                                                      (4.22) 
                                               ( ) ( )x x                                                         (4.23) 
                                    ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0L x f x x x                                      (4.24) 
where we make use of the differential operator L given by  
2
2
1 12
1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
d x d x
L x x x r x
dx dx
 
      . 
 
The potential impulse control form associated with the QVI can then be constructed 
as 
                           1 : inf{ 0 : ( ( )) ( ( ))}x xt X t X t  
                                   (4.25) 
and for every 1n   
              1 1: inf{ : ( ( ) ( ( ))}n n n x xt T X t X t
                                      (4.26) 
and  
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( )
arg min{ ( ( ), ) ( ( ) ) [ ( ( ) | )]: , ( ) 0}
x n n
rT
n x n x n x nX
K X K X E e X T F X
  
  
         
   

            
(4.27) 
 
The following proposition permits us to verify that a solution of the QVI and the 
associated admissible control solves the impulse control problem.26  
 
Proposition 1: Let 
1C  be a solution of the QVI and suppose there is a finite 
subset 2N C such that
2C . If   satisfies the growth conditions:  
              
' 2
0
( ( ( ))[ ( ( )))] , 1,2rt i x xE e X t X t dt i
  

                                        (4.28) 
                               
2lim [ | ( ( )) | ]
rt
x
t
E e L X t dt

                                           (4.29) 
                               2
0
[ | ( ( )) | ]rt xE e L X t dt


                                                (4.30) 
where the operator 2L is defined by  
                     
2
2
2 2 22
1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
d x d x
L x x x r x
dx dx
 
      .                      (4.31) 
For every process ( )xX t

corresponding to an admissible impulse control   , then for 
every x in the positive domain,    
                                                          
26 Proof of Proposition 1 is beyond the scope of this chapter; interested readers could refer to Section 
5 of Kercheval and Moreno (2009).  
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                                                ( ) ( )V x x .                                                           (4.32) 
Moreover, if the QVI-control corresponding to   is admissible then it is an optimal 
impulse control, and for every x in the positive domain, 
                                ( ) ( )V x x                                                        (4.33) 
 
Given the QVI equations listed above, we conjecture that the solution would 
separate the exchange rate domain, (0, ) , into two disjoint zones: a Continuation 
Zone (CZ) where 
      : { (0, ), ( ) ( )& ( ) ( ) 0}CZ x v x v x Lv x f x                                    (4.34) 
and an Intervention Zone (IZ) where  
      : { (0, ) : ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) 0}IZ x v x v x Lv x f x      .                                  (4.35) 
 
Thus, the optimal impulse control strategy works such that the central bank will not 
intervene when the exchange rate remains in the Continuation Zone, and must wait 
at least until time iT  after the i th  intervention. However, when the exchange rate 
reaches either edge of the band, an intervention operation would be taken 
instantaneously to bring the process to a point within that band:  an intervention on 
the strong side would be to increase the exchange rate from a to ; while an 
intervention on the weak side would be to decrease the exchange rate from b  to  . 
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Given the proposed control strategy, we note that ( )x meets the condition 
( ) ( )L x f x   when the exchange rate lies within the band ( , )a b . With ( )f x
defined as above, we can obtain the following equations: 
For a x b         
              1 2
2
2
2
1 2
(x) Ax ( ) x ( ) x
2
Bx
r r r
   
  
    
   
                    (4.36)                
                    
2
2 2 2 1/2
1 2
1
(( ) 2 )
2 2
r

   


    
                                         (4.37) 
           
2
2 2 2 1/2
2 2
1
(( ) 2 )
2 2
r

   


    
                                          (4.38) 
where ( )x denotes the solution of the QVI associated with the problem, A  and B  
are constants and remain to be solved.  
 
Judging from the requirements of continuity and ( ) ( )x x  at the two 
intervention points, the boundary conditions can be described as: 
           ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ))]
rTa C c a K E e X T   
                                      (4.39) 
               ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ))]
rTb D d b K E e X T   
                                         (4.40) 
where  
      argmin{ ( ) [ ( ( ))]}
rTC c a K E e X T   
                                      (4.41) 
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      arg min{ ( ) [ ( ( ))]}
rTD d b K E e X T   
                                       (4.42) 
 
Moreover, the smooth pasting requirement of this impulse control offers the 
following conditions: 
                                     
'( )a c                                                               (4.43) 
                                    
'( )b d                                                                (4.44) 
                               
'( ) c                                                              (4.45) 
                                
'( ) d   .                                                      (4.46) 
 
In order to prove rigorously that the above conjecture is valid, we make use of the 
following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2:  
Let A, B, a, b,  and  be the solution of the system and define the function ( )V x
by  
1 2
2
2
2
( ) [ ( ( ))],0
1 2
( ) (x) Ax ( ) x ( ) x ,
2
( ) [ ( ( ))],
rT
rT
C c x K E e X T x a
V x Bx a x b
r r r
D d x K E e X T x b
 
 
 
 
 

  
 


      


       
   
     
       (4.47) 
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If the conditions, i.e. Eq. (4.48)-(4.52), are met, then ( )V x is the value function of 
the problem defined above and the optimal control is the QVI-control 
corresponding to ( )V x , given by Eq. (4.53) ~ (4.55) 
              
2 1/2
1[ ( ) 2 ] [4( ( )]
2
c r r c
a 
       
                                    (4.48) 
                 
2 1/2
1[ ( ) 2 ] [4( ( ))]
2
d r r d
b
       
                                 (4.49) 
                     
'( ) ,c V x d x                                                         (4.50) 
                      
'( ) ,V x d x b                                                              (4.51) 
                      
'( ) ,V x c a x                                                             (4.52) 
where  and   are defined respectively as [ ( ( ))]
rTC K E e X T  
     
and [ ( ( ))]
rTD K E e X T  
    . 
 
                          1 inf{ 0, ( ) ( , )}t X t a b                                                           (4.53) 
               1 1inf{ : ( ) ( , )}, 1i i it T X t a b i
                                                (4.54) 
                  
( ) , ( )
( )
( ) , ( )
i
i
i i
i
i i
X X a
X
X X b
 

 
   

   
 
 
   
 
  
                                          (4.55) 
 
To prove Proposition 2, we first need to prove that V satisfies the QVI. From the 
discussion above we know the following equation applies 
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2
1
2
2
1
{ ( ) [ ( ( ))]} ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
{ ( ) [ ( ( ))]} ( ) ,
rT
rT
c x r C c x K E e X T x x a
LV x f x L x x a x b
d x r D d x K E e X T x x b
 
 
   
 
   


        

     
        
        (4.56) 
 
By construction, ( )x satisfies the condition that 
2( ) ( ) 0L x x    in the interval
[ , ]a b , while as outside the interval we would have the condition that 
2( ) ( ) 0L x x     because of the condition specified in Eq. (4.48) and (4.49).  
 
Given the definition above, the cost associated with the best immediate intervention 
( )x can be expressed as:  
        
( ) [ ( ( ))],
( ) ( ) min( , ),
( ) [ ( ( ))],
rT
rT
C c x K E e X T x
x x C D x
D d x K E e X T x
 
 
  
   
  


     

    
     
                          (4.57) 
 
Therefore, it is clear to see ( ) ( )V x x is equal to zero in the Intervention Zone, 
i.e. (0, ] [ , )a b  , and is negative in the Continuation Zone ( , )a b because of the 
conditions Eq. (4.50)-(4.52).   
 
It is also straight-forward to prove the optimal control obtained and the associated 
value function satisfy the Proposition 1 and the following admissible conditions.   
                             ( ) 0x iX
    for all i N ,                                                       (4.58) 
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                              1i i iT     for all i N ,                                                      (4.59)                                                  
0
[ ( ( )) ]rt xE e f X t dt


                                                           (4.60) 
                             
2
0
[ ( ( )) ]rt xE e X t dt


                                                          (4.61) 
 
4.4.3 Quantitative Evidence 
Since there is no analytical solution of the impulse control problem, we have to 
apply numerical methods, which can be summarized to solve the following six 
equations.  
                      ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ))]
rTa C c a K E e X T   
                                  (4.62)      
                  ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ))]
rTb D d b K E e X T   
                                    (4.63)              
                                     
'( )a c                                                              (4.64) 
                           
'( )b d                                                                (4.65) 
                                         
'( ) c                                                               (4.66) 
                         
'( ) d                                                         (4.67) 
where 1 2
2
2
2
1 2
(x) Ax ( ) x ( ) x
2
Bx
r r r
   
  
    
   
and K( )x denotes the 
expected running cost incurred during the ‘reaction period’ defined as above.  
  
163 
 
To simplify the process, we now assume that 2 , 2  and T are fixed, as a result, 
xK turns out to be constant. To see this, we note that since 2 , 2  and T are 
assumed to be independent of tW , ( )xX t  would follow a Geometric Brownian 
Motion during the reaction period. Therefore, xK can be integrated analytically as:  
                       
2
222 2
0
[ ( 2 ) ], ,
T
t trt t
xK E e x e xe dt x
                            (4.68) 
 
The calculation of the expectation term [ ( ( ))], ,
rT
xE e X T x  
   is somewhat 
complex but it can be divided into three parts:  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2{ ( ) ( ; , , , ) ( ) ( ; , , , ) ( ) ( ; , , , ) }
b a
rT
a b
e x p x T dx a p x T dx b p x T dx           



   
which can be computed individually given a set of parameters A , B , a  ,b , and .  
 
Note that 2 2( ; , , , )p x T    stands for the probability density of the Log-Normal 
distribution of ( )X T : 
       log( ( ))X T  ~
2 2
2 2 2
1
(ln( ) , )
2
N T T T                               (4.69) 
 
In order to show how the management strategy works, we now provide some 
numerical evidence, in two steps. First, we find the optimal control strategy without 
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considering the reactions of market participants, which means Eq. (4.62) and Eq. 
(4.63) need to be modified as follows: 
                      ( ) ( ) ( )a C c a                                                     (4.70) 
                          ( ) ( ) ( )b D d b                                                          (4.71) 
 
We set the important model parameters in Panel A, Table 4.3 such that the fixed and 
proportional intervention cost is the same on both sides. With the exception of target 
exchange rate, the parameters are set the same as in Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999). 
Then, all we need to do is to find numerical solutions to the system of equations 
from Eq. (4.64) to Eq. (4.67), and Eq. (4.70) and (4.71), which are reported in Panel 
B in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3 Parameters and Results When There is No Reaction Period 
Panel A Parameter Values for the Baseline Model   
Variables Definition Values 
1  
The drift parameter in absence of intervention 0.1 
1  
The diffusion parameter in absence of intervention 0.3 
  Discount Rate 0.06 
  Target Exchange Rate 6.5 
C The fixed intervention cost on the strong side 0.5 
D The fixed intervention cost on the weak side 0.5 
c The proportional intervention cost on the strong 
side  
0.2 
d The proportional intervention cost on the weak side 0.2 
Panel B Optimal Intervention Strategy for the Baseline Model 
a Intervention trigger on the strong side/ lower edge 
of the Continuation Zone 
4.5772 
  Re-starting value for the strong side intervention 5.9903 
  Re-starting value for the weak side intervention 6.4870 
b Intervention trigger on the weak side/ upper edge 
of the Continuation Zone 
8.5283 
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Thus, the optimal exchange rate intervention is solved, as no central bank 
intervention is needed when the exchange rate is within the Continuation Zone, i.e. 
(4.5772, 8.5283); however, when the exchange rate reaches the lower edge an 
intervention operation is instantaneously triggered such that the exchange rate is 
brought up to the value of 5.9903; or when the exchange rate reaches the upper edge, 
an intervention should be instantaneously made such that the exchange rate is 
brought down to the value of 6.4870. 
 
To further understand the results, we make use of Proposition 4.1 in Cadenillas and 
Zapatero (1999), which states that  
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
(2 / ) (2 / )
( , ) (2 / ) (2 / )
{ }a b b
x a
P X
b a
   
    
 
  



 
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
(2 / ) (2 / )
( , ) (2 / ) (2 / )
{ }a b a
b x
P X
b a
   
    
 
  



 
where 
2
1 10.5     is the long-run growth rate of the exchange rate when there is 
no interventions and x  is the starting value for the exchange rate.  
 
We can calculate the probability that the exchange rate reaches b (the upper edge of 
the continuation zone) before it reaches a (the lower edge of the continuation zone) 
if the exchange rate starts at   is solved as 0.6545. Hence, the probability that the 
exchange rate reaches a before it reaches b is 0.3455 (=1-0.6545). The fact the 
former probability is larger  means that the central bank is more willing to see the 
exchange rate remain near the strong side, and it is optimal for the central bank to 
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restart the exchange rate at a level lower than the target rate when the RMB is under 
devaluation pressure ( 1 0  ).   
 
The next step is to present the optimal management strategy for China taking 
account of the presence of heterogeneous agents and the impact of PBOC 
intervention upon them. To this end, we first reiterate some general findings when 
the ‘reaction period’ is incorporated into the standard impulse control model. 
Further, we provide a sensitivity analysis of 2  and 2 , i.e. the drift and the 
diffusion parameters of the exchange rate dynamics during the reaction period. 
 
In order to study the effects of the reaction period, we first adopt the parameter 
values listed in Table 4.4 to characterize the standard impulse control as in Example 
5.1 (Cadenillas and Zapatero, 1999). Then we provide sensitivity analysis on the 
parameters of 2  and 2 .  
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Table 4.4 Baseline Variable Values 
Variables Definition Values 
1  
The drift parameter in absence of intervention 0.1 
1  
The diffusion parameter in absence of intervention 0.3 
  Discount Rate 0.06 
  Target Exchange Rate 1.4 
C The fixed intervention cost on the strong side 0.5 
D The fixed intervention cost on the weak side 0.7 
C The proportional intervention cost on the strong side  0.2 
D The proportional intervention cost on the weak side 0.4 
 
In short, Table 4.5 looks at the effects of a changing 2  while the other parameters 
are fixed. In addition to the bandwidth of the Continuation Zone, we include the 
effects on a, b,  ,  ,  a  , andb  , where   is the restarting value of the 
strong-side intervention,  is the restarting value of the weak-side intervention, 
a   is the size of intervention on the strong side and b  is the intervention size 
on the weak side. It can be clearly seen that if the volatility increases after the 
intervention in the ‘reaction period’, we could expect a wider ‘Continuation Zone’ 
compared to the case without ‘reaction period’: b a  increases from 1.8361 to 
1.8597 when 2  increases to 0.4 from 0.3, while b a  tightens when 2  decreases. 
In Table 4.6, we fix 2  and focus on the parameter 2 . Compared to the results 
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found in Table 4.5, we note that the bandwidth of the Continuation Zone is rarely 
affected by change of 2 . To see this point, we note that when 2  decreases by half, 
the bandwidth of b a  changes from 1.8361 to 1.8364, while b a  increases to 
1.8597 when 2  increases by about 33.3%.  
 
Given Tables 4.5 and 4.6, we are able to summarize the directional effect of a 
change in 2 or 2  in Table 4.7, where we use  and  to denote the increasing 
and decreasing directional effect, respectively. It is also quite interesting to note that 
a change in 2  or 2  may have a conflicting effect on one parameter. For example, 
a larger 2  implies a higher lower intervention edge while the effect of a smaller 2  
is the opposite. Hence, a natural question arises as to what would be the aggregated 
effect of a larger 2  and a smaller 2 .  
 
To answer this question, we have conducted further numerical applications, where 
we consider 4 possible cases of the ‘reaction period’: a smaller 2  and 2 , a smaller 
2 but larger 2 , a larger 2  but a smaller 2 , and a larger 2  and 2 . Specifically, 
we increase (or decrease) each parameter by 50% so as to figure out which 
parameter has a larger effect. The results are reported in Table 4.8 and it seems 
plausible to arrive at the following conjectures:  
1) The parameter 2  has the dominant effect when it comes to the two 
intervention values, i.e. a and b, the size of strong-side and weak-side 
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intervention ( a  and b  ), and the bandwidth of the Continuation Zone, 
i.e. b a . 
2) The effect of 2  and 2  on the two restarting values has to be checked given 
a same level change. In other words, we cannot know the aggregated effect 
by considering only the change of 2 . However, after a closer look, it seems 
plausible to conclude that the final directional change is determined by the 
larger parameter. For example, a higher 2  and a lower 2  would produce 
an opposite effect on , but the final result suggests that an increased 2  
outweighs the decreased 2 . Table 4.9 presents a summary predicted effect 
of the parameters 2  and 2 .
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Table 4.5 Effects of Changes in 2  on the Optimal Control Strategy 
Note: For comparison purposes, the parameters in the baseline model are set in Table 4.4, the same as the ‘Example 5.1’ in Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999). It 
should also be noted that the diffusion parameter 2   in the ‘Reaction Period’ is set to the same value as 1 . The duration of the ‘Reaction Period’ T is set to 1 
in all the computations reported in this table. a and b  are the lower and upper edge of the intervention zone, respectively.  is the restarting value of the strong-
side intervention and  is the restarting value of the weak-side intervention. a  is the size of intervention on the strong side, b  is the intervention size 
on the weak side, and b a is the bandwidth wherein the exchange rate is free from intervention.  
 
 
Parameters  
2 0.1   
 Baseline 
2 10.1    2 10.2    2 10.4    2 10.5    
 a  0.5513 0.5671 0.5604 0.5415 0.5327 
  1.0823 1.0827 1.0824 1.0807 1.0785 
  1.2265 1.2320 1.2294 1.2213 1.2159 
b  2.3874 2.3693 2.3774 2.4012 2.4145 
a   0.5310 0.5156 0.522 0.5392 0.5458 
b   1.1609 1.1373 1.148 1.1799 1.1987 
b a  1.8361 1.8022 1.817 1.8597 1.8818 
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Table 4.6 Effects of Changes in 2  on the Optimal Control Strategy 
Parameters  
2 0.3   
 Baseline 
2 10    2 10.05    2 10.15    2 10.3    
a 0.5513 0.5459 0.5484 0.5528 0.5534 
  1.0823 1.0891 1.0861 1.0781 1.0660 
  1.2265 1.2335 1.2304 1.2214 1.2061 
b  2.3874 2.3827 2.3848 2.3930 2.4120 
a   0.5310 0.5432 0.5377 0.5253 0.5126 
b   1.1609 1.1492 1.1543 1.1716 1.2059 
b a  1.8361 1.8368 1.8364 1.8402 1.8585 
Note: For comparison purposes, the parameters in the baseline model are set in Table 4.4, the same as the ‘Example 5.1’ in Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999). It 
should also be noted that the diffusion parameter 2  in the ‘Reaction Period’ is set to the same value as 1 . The duration of the ‘Reaction Period’ T is set to 1 
in all the computations reported in this table. a and b  are the lower and upper edge of the intervention zone, respectively.  is the restarting value of the strong-
side intervention and  is the restarting value of the weak-side intervention. a  is the size of intervention on the strong side, b  is the intervention size 
on the weak side, and b a is the bandwidth wherein the exchange rate is free from intervention.  
  
 
173 
 
Table 4.7 Effects of Changes in 2 and 2  on the Optimal Control Strategy 
 
2   2   2   2   
a         
          
          
b          
a           
b           
b a          
Note: Based on the findings in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, we summarize the effects of changes in 2  (or 2 ) on the results of the impulse control problem. a and 
b  are the lower and upper edge of the intervention zone, respectively.  is the restarting value of the strong-side intervention and  is the restarting value of the 
weak-side intervention. a  is the size of intervention on the strong side, b  is the intervention size on the weak side, and b a is the bandwidth wherein 
the exchange rate is free from intervention.   and  denote the increasing and decreasing effect, respectively.  
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Table 4.8 Effects of Changes in 2 and 2  on the Optimal Control Strategy 
Parameter Baseline 
2 2    2 2    2 2    2 2    
  
2 20.05, 0.15    2 20.05, 0.45    2 20.15, 0.15    2 20.15, 0.45    
a 0.5845 0.5942 0.5704 0.5990 0.5727 
  1.1554 1.1608 1.1523 1.1516 1.1477 
  1.2702 1.2795 1.2627 1.2692 1.2576 
b  2.3153 2.2967 2.3350 2.3055 2.3396 
a   0.5709 0.5665 0.5819 0.5526 0.5750 
b   1.0451 1.0172 1.0723 1.0363 1.0819 
b a  1.7308 1.7024 1.7646 1.7065 1.7669 
Note: For comparison purposes, the parameters in the baseline model are set as:  1 10.1, 0.3, 0.06, 1.4, 0.5, 0.5, 0.2, 0.2r r C D c d        
such that the fixed and proportional intervention cost is the same on both sides. The duration of the ‘Reaction Period’ T is set to 1 in all the computations reported 
in this table. a and b are the lower and upper edge of the intervention zone, respectively.  is the restarting value of the strong-side intervention and  is the 
restarting value of the weak-side intervention. a  is the size of intervention on the strong side, b   is the intervention size on the weak side, and b a  is 
the bandwidth wherein the exchange rate is free from intervention.   
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Table 4.9  Directional Effects of Changes in 2 and 2  on the Optimal Control Strategy 
Parameter 
2   2   
a     
  TBC TBC 
  TBC TBC 
b      
a       
b       
b a      
Note: This table reports the directional effects when 2  and 2  change simultaneously.  and  denote the increasing and decreasing effect, respectively. 
TBC means ‘to be confirmed’. a and b are the lower and upper edge of the intervention zone, respectively.  is the restarting value of the strong-side intervention 
and  is the restarting value of the weak-side intervention. a  is the size of intervention on the strong side, b  is the intervention size on the weak side, 
and b a  is the bandwidth wherein the exchange rate is free from intervention.
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To summarize the results reported above, the first important conclusion is that 
parameter 2  has a dominant effect over 2  when it comes to the two intervention 
triggers, i.e. a and b , the size of strong-side and weak-side intervention ( a   and
b  ), and the bandwidth of the Continuation Zone, i.e. b a . The results suggest 
that if market volatility drops after the central bank intervention, the bandwidth of 
the Continuation Zone is reduced, and vice versa. Another important finding is that 
the effect on the two restarting points, i.e.   and  , is subject to the change of 
both 2 and 2 , while the results obtained so far suggest that the final directional 
change is determined by the parameter that has a larger value. For example, a higher 
2  and a lower 2  would produce an opposite effect on  , but the final result 
suggests that an increased 2  outweighs the decreased 2 .  
 
The empirical findings in Section 3 make a convincing argument that the 
intervention conducted by the PBOC was effective during the sample time period 
in the sense that it helped to increase the proportion of fundamentalists and decrease 
the exchange rate volatility. Hence, we need to choose a smaller 2 , while setting
2  to a value that reverses the previous trend. In essence, this suggests that we 
assign an opposite sign for 2  against 1 , or at least a smaller value with the same 
sign. We choose three pairs of 2  and 2  for illustration, and the results are 
reported in Table 4.10.  
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Table 4.10 Numerical Illustration of the Modified Impulse Control 
Parameter Baseline S1 S2 S3 
a  4.5772 4.5950 4.5260 4.4940 
  5.9903 6.0121 6.1080 6.1534 
  6.4870 6.5258 6.6247 6.6740 
b  8.5283 8.4731 8.4194 8.3916 
a   1.4131 1.4171 1.5820 1.6594 
b   2.0413 1.9473 1.7947 1.7176 
b a  3.9511 3.8781 3.8935 3.8976 
Notes: This table reports the numerical results of the impulse control that incorporates the reaction 
period, in other words taking account of the impact of PBOC intervention on the market participants, 
while the baseline model does not consider the reaction period. In addition to 2 and 2 , we also set 
the length of the reaction period to 1 for all three scenarios: S1 stands for 2 20.05, 0.15   ; 
S2 stands for 2 20, 0.15   , and S3 stands for 2 20.05, 0.15    .  
 
A few interesting remarks can be made regarding Table 4.10. First, compared with 
the case where we do not consider the market participants’ reaction to central bank 
intervention, the re-starting values  and  both increase as the prevailing trend, 
i.e. 1 , is reversed or at least alleviated. However, there is opposite impact on the 
weak- and strong-side intervention. It can be seen that the size of the strong-side 
intervention ( a  ) increases, while the size of the weak-side intervention ( b  ) 
decreases. Secondly, the size of the Continuation Zone tightens, mostly because of 
the drop in 2 , the diffusion parameter. Thirdly, if we look only at the three 
‘reaction period’ cases, we can see that the decrease in the drift parameter has led 
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to the decrease of the two intervention triggers: a  and b  both decrease, suggesting 
it is less likely that the exchange rate would depreciate substantially.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
Recent literature generally suggests that managed floating exchange rate regime can 
be an appropriate choice for exchange rate arrangements in emerging economies 
such as China. The fixed exchange rate regime proves costly in the face of volatile 
movements of international capital, while a regime of free floating exchange rate is 
not feasible due to financial under-development in these economies.  
 
It is also worth noting that since the 2005 reform announcement, the PBOC has 
substantially reduced its direct intervention in the market and the RMB is no longer 
considered to be largely undervalued; rather, it is close to its equilibrium level. 
Moreover, China has made important changes to its governing polices, such as 
increasing the daily trading limits and re-designing how the central parity rate 
should be determined. These all help China to pave its way towards more flexible 
exchange rates. Although recent studies have argued that the impact of market 
participants is still very much overshadowed by the central bank, nevertheless, we 
argue that in the near future, free floating remains undesirable for China, and we 
should focus on answering the crucial issue of how to manage the managed floating 
regime.  
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Given the potentially large cost of intervention (both monetary and non-monetary), 
in this study we assume that the central bank needs to find the optimal balance 
between the cost of intervention and the cost of not intervening in the market. To 
this end, we make use of the stochastic optimal control theory, as it is more suitable 
to model the economic decisions that are made less frequently and have the ability 
to introduce discontinuity. Moreover, we believe that for any optimal management 
framework to yield any sensible policy implication, it needs to fall in line with the 
real practice. We note that a key assumption upheld in this line of research is that 
agents are not aware of the reaction functions of the central bank (or they will not 
estimate the parameters by observing the actions of the central bank). This 
assumption seems to be unrealistic given the recent findings of literature of 
heterogeneous agents in the foreign exchange market. One important policy 
implication is that the foreign market is inherently unstable because of the 
interactions within different groups of traders. Luckily, the literature also contends 
that changes in the exchange rates are partly endogenous and the monetary authority 
could help the market transit out of a bubble more quickly, or even prevent the 
bubble from brewing, by intervention in the market.   
 
In order to tailor the exchange rate management strategy to China, we first 
empirically investigate the case of the RMB using daily data from 22 July 2005 to 
31 December 2014. By employing a Markov switching model, we find evidence 
that there have been two distinct regimes for the market exchange rate returns. In 
the ‘active’ regime, both fundamentalists and chartists display a significant effect, 
while in the ‘calm’ regime, no trading strategy reports as significant statistically. 
Moreover, we find evidence that the central bank intervention during the sample 
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period was effective in the sense that the volatility in the ‘active’ state is more than 
7 times larger than that in the ‘calm’ state. However, if the government intervention 
objective was to close the gap between nominal exchange rate and the equilibrium 
exchange rate, the PBOC intervention in the ‘calm’ state is not as successful as in 
the ‘active’ state. We find that when the intervention intensity drops, which is 
proxied by an increase in the flexibility index, the probability of staying in an ‘active’ 
regime, or the probability of transiting out of the ‘calm’ regime, rises, whereby both 
fundamentalist and MA traders play a significant role in pushing the real exchange 
rate of RMB back to its equilibrium value. Nevertheless, we argue that this 
difference might occur because the central parity rate used in this study is not the 
ideal proxy for the equilibrium (fundamental) exchange rate level used in other 
studies.  
 
Based on these results, we later present an optimal impulse control strategy that 
incorporates a ‘Reaction Period’ to take account of the presence of heterogeneous 
agents. With the help of numerical evidence, we show that the proposed impulse 
control strategy can effectively restrict the exchange rate to stay close to the central 
parity rate and a sensible width of the band within which the exchange rate is 
allowed to fluctuate. Moreover, the strategy provides practical guidance for the 
timing of intervention if a significant deviation do happen. These findings argue for 
China to adopt a target zone type exchange rate system with a narrower band within 
the officially announce band to allow for the reaction period that is generous enough 
for the market to find the appropriate price level and gives the room for the monetary 
authorities to step in to intervene. 
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Chapter 5  
Towards a Reference Exchange Rate System 
for China 
5.1 Introduction  
Despite recent reforms to increase exchange rate flexibility, the design of regime 
arrangements for sound management of the managed floating exchange rate remains 
a significant challenge for China. It is well known that from 1994 China fixed its 
exchange rate against the US dollar for more than a decade, during which period the 
Chinese economy achieved a magnificent performance. However, this exchange 
rate policy, which played a vital role in bringing about the economic miracle, 
attracted wide concern and was ultimately deemed not sustainable. First, from a 
political point of view, the evidently huge surplus of both current and capital 
account from 2002 onwards led to accusations from China’s major trading partners, 
led by Japan and the US, that the Chinese authority was manipulating its currency 
such that the RMB was severely and consistently undervalued, in order to achieve 
unfair competitive advantage (Goldstein, 2003; Coundert and Couharde, 2007). 
Secondly, fixing the exchange rate poses a risk to the Chinese macro-economy. 
Many studies have argued that by maintain the peg, the Chinese monetary authority 
essentially forfeited some flexibility in conducting its own policy, which has 
brought in instability to the Chinese economy in recent years (He, 2007).For 
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example, in a hope to slow down the foreign capital inflow, the central bank of 
China has been reluctant to raise domestic lending rates (which were presumed to 
be already high) even in a context of domestic inflation, which in turn has created 
excessive demand for loans and exacerbated inflation (Goldstein and Lardy, 
2006).Thirdly, the cost of sterilizing government intervention increases over time, 
while the efficacy of sterilization is reported to decay over time.    
 
Facing overwhelming pressure for greater currency flexibility, in July 2005 the 
Chinese authority finally announced that it would reform the exchange rate system, 
to move towards a managed float regime. The value of Renminbi (RMB) would be 
determined on the basis of market demand and supply with reference to a basket of 
currencies. However, despite what seemed to be promised in this announcement, 
there is doubt over the true nature of the reformed exchange rate regime. Some 
empirical studies, as well as the IMF, suggest that China has in fact maintained a 
peg to the US dollar, as clearly exemplified by the fact that the PBOC froze the 
RMB once again during the global financial crisis period. However, our own 
research finds that while the flexibility of the RMB has indeed increased since the 
reform, the pace of progression remains in the control of the central bank.  
 
This finding leads us to argue that if the Chinese government truly wants to fulfil 
its commitment to allowing market forces to play a larger role and bring more 
flexibility to its currency, it must state explicitly what the ‘managed floating regime’ 
represents, including its objectives, the means to uphold the regime, and the 
boundaries of government intervention, such as the specific situations that warrant 
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central bank intervention. Failure to do so will damage investor confidence, thus 
making the survival (or success) of the regime highly costly, if not impossible. 
Taking the most recent incident as an example, on 11 August 2015 the global 
financial market was shocked by the sudden devaluation of the RMB, the largest 
one-day drop in two decades. Not surprisingly, the market was not fully convinced 
by the PBOC’s explanation that the devaluation was merely the result of a policy 
change on how the central parity rate of RMB is derived. As a result, the PBOC was 
forced to intervene to stop the RMB from depreciating too rapidly, and significant 
loss of foreign reserves was incurred in a short period of time. Meanwhile, in a 
notable break from usual practice, top officials at the PBOC had to made frequent 
public appearances to defend the policy move.  
 
Therefore, to inspire confidence in the ongoing reforms, we believe that it is both 
necessary and urgent to address the issue of low transparency of the current 
‘managed floating regime’. To this end, we argue that a ‘Reference Rate’ system 
might be an ideal solution for China. Such a system provides a simple, clear 
operation framework which explicitly lays out the boundaries of central bank 
intervention and makes it easy for the general public to check whether the 
government has fulfilled its commitments. At the same time, it is compatible with 
the reform objective in the sense that the Reference Rate system provides the 
optimal trade-off between the desire to let the exchange rate float freely and the 
need to keep the exchange rate in check.   
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In the remainder of this chapter, Section 2 introduces the ‘Reference Rate Proposal’, 
explaining the reasons behind it and its method of operation. Section 3 begins by 
explaining why neither the fixed nor the free-floating regime is suitable for China, 
and then discusses the prospects for the Chinese exchange rate system and the 
possible role of the Reference Rate Proposal. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
5.2 The Reference Rate System 
In literature, an exchange rate system can be labelled as ‘intermediate’ if it is neither 
completely fixed nor entirely floating: in the former a country’s currency is fixed 
against another currency, while in the latter regime, the value of a country’s 
currency is solely determined by traders in the foreign exchange market. There is a 
large body of literature debating the relative merits and drawbacks of these two 
classic ‘polar’ options, but the complexity and subtlety of the real world have also 
sparked substantial research into other possible choices, resulting in several 
intermediate exchange rate arrangements. In a series of studies of some popular 
intermediate regimes, Williamson (1999, 2000, and 2009) contends that not only 
the early ‘Adjustable Peg’,27  but also the later, more generalized ‘BBC’28  type 
                                                          
27 The ‘Adjustable Peg’ system is one in which a country would normally have a fixed exchange rate 
but is allowed to make necessary changes in extreme circumstances. 
28 BBC is the acronym for ‘Basket, Band and Crawl’, formally proposed by Dornbusch and Park 
(1999). ‘Basket’ refers to the suggestion that, instead of pegging to a single currency, countries that 
trade diversely will be more successful in stabilizing their effective exchange rates if they peg to a 
basket of currencies, since this will decrease the likelihood of disturbance by radical changes in a 
single currency (Williamson, 2000). The ‘band’ is introduced not only to allow the parity to be 
adjusted in a way that does not destabilize the market, but also to leave ample room for the 
authoritiesto conduct necessary changes to monetary policy independently. Finally, the ‘crawl’ is 
most often used as a way to neutralize inflation differences and to adjust the expectation of Balassa-
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regime have proven to be not viable in the face of high capital mobility. Hence, 
Williamson has proposed three modified versions: Soft Band29 (or Soft Margins), 
Monitoring Band,30 and the Reference Rate System.  
 
In this review, we focus on the Reference Rate. As we will demonstrate, both the 
Soft Band and the Monitoring Band are essentially the same as the Reference Rate, 
but the Reference Rate provides a higher level of transparency in terms of operation 
rules.  
 
5.2.1 The Origin 
The Reference Rate system was first introduced by Ethier and Bloomfield in 1975 
shortly after the major currencies were allowed to float, which tried to answer the 
                                                          
Samuelson productivity bias in a fast-growing economy (Williamson, 2000). 
29 Under the Soft Band, government commitment to defend the edges of the band at all times is no 
longer an absolute requirement. The exchange rate is allowed to move outside the pre-determined 
band as long as the government believes this is only a temporary situation as the shocks to the 
fundamentals are expected to be short-lived. Nevertheless, the government still remains responsible 
to remind the market that it will plan to direct the rate back within the band when it is possible to do 
so. 
30 The Monitoring Band was originated by the Tarapore Committee of the Reserve Bank of India in 
1997. Charged with considering the case for the Rupee to obtain full capital account convertibility, 
the committee came up with a suggestion that India should adopt a framework for its exchange rate 
management, as a complementary tool for accommodating capital account convertibility. The centre 
of the band, termed the ‘neutral real effective exchange rate’, represents an official, announced, 
estimate of the equilibrium exchange rate. The government is prohibited from intervening within a 
certain range around that rate. However, once the rate goes outside the band, there is an option 
reserved for the authorities to intervene (Williamson, 2000). 
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prevailing concern that there were no real governing rules in the international 
community at that time except the injunction against manipulating exchange rates. 
In fact, countries could choose its desirable exchange rate regime, ranging from float 
to fix, and any intermediate regime(s). Moreover, Ethier and Bloomfield (1975) 
pointed out that the consensus among the economies who adopt a floating regime 
was not dependable. Therefore, in order to tackle the possible conflicts of interest 
raised by individual countries’ interventions, Ethier and Bloomfield (1975) 
addressed the necessity to form a set of internationally acceptable rules to regulate 
the management of floating exchange rates.  
 
Specifically, Ethier and Bloomfield (1975, p.9) suggested the following general 
principles that measures pertaining to the managed float should: (1) constitute a 
minimal reform program, broadly acceptable Intermediately and highly flexible to 
avoid the unresolved long-run issues; (2) contain formal regulations regarding 
official exchange intervention and not rely solely on central bank cooperation and 
consultation; (3) be designed to prevent the most egregious type of national conflict 
rather than any difficulty that could conceivably arise; and (4) specify when 
intervention is not permissible, rather than when it is mandatory. Moreover, (5) this 
specification should be in terms of concrete acts of intervention rather than in terms 
of the presumed motives for such acts; (6) these concrete acts should be compatible 
with simultaneous efforts to foster central-bank cooperation and to deal with the 
possibility of conflicts arising from policies other than intervention designed to 
influence exchange rates, and (7) they should not impede the evolution of a long-
run reform of the international monetary system, whatever the shape that might take.   
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Then, Ethier and Bloomfield (1975, p.10) summarized their ‘Reference Rate 
Proposal’ in two rules: 
1) No central bank shall sell its own currency at a price below its 
Reference Rate by more than a certain fixed percentage (possibly zero) or 
buy its own currency at a price exceeding its Reference Rate by more than 
the fixed percentage. This is the sole restriction imposed upon central bank 
intervention. 
2) The structure of Reference Rates shall be revised at periodic pre-
specified intervals through some defined international procedure.  
 
‘Rule 1’ is designed to reduce the likelihood of crises by limiting aggressive central-
bank behaviour, which is essentially the most important difference between the 
Reference Rate and the central parity rate. This is also the key idea underlying the 
Soft Band and Monitoring Band, as none of the three systems carries any obligation 
for officials to defend any pre-determined rate or margin. It permits the exchange 
rate to float, but only within parameters that have been widely recognized by the 
international community. Meanwhile, interventions motivated by purposes other 
than pushing the market rate toward the Reference Rate are usually prohibited 
(Williamson, 2005). ‘Rule 2’ is designed to ensure an appropriate exchange rate can 
be maintained or achieved over time. Ethier and Bloomfield (1975) suggest the 
enforcement of ‘Rule 2’ would also help to build an adjustment mechanism 
internationally.   
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5.2.2 Operation  
It is important to note here that intervention can be conducted in various forms, and 
hence all of them should be treated equally under the Reference Rate system 
(Williamson, 2007). For instance, in addition to direct purchase/sale in the foreign 
exchange market, monetary policies have also been employed to influence exchange 
rates. It is necessary to check whether the benchmark interest rate has been set 
appropriately. If not, we need to ask will the current interest rate policy lead to a 
convergence of the exchange rate and its reference or not? Williamson (2007) 
suggests that if the benchmark interest rate is not set properly solely for domestic 
objectives, then the government is not fully living up to its international duties. 
Another good example is ‘oral intervention’, whereby the authorities publicly 
express an opinion on where the exchange rate ought to be. Under a Reference Rate 
system, it would not be permitted to express support for a strong currency when the 
currency is already stronger than its Reference Rate (Williamson, 2007).   
 
The operation of the Reference Rate can be illustrated more clearly using the 
following figure from Williamson (2007), which is originally titled as ‘The Original 
Version of the Reference Rate Proposal’.  
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Figure 5.1 Operation of the Reference Rate Rule 
Notes: This figure is adapted from Williamson (2007), Chapter 4, Figure 4.1. 
 
In Williamson’s (2007) view, the Reference Rate can be adopted in three slightly 
different forms. In the simplest version where there is no band imposed, the only 
explicit rule is that the authority should avoid any intervention practice that might 
contribute to the divergence between the exchange rate and its reference basis. 
However, as argued by Williamson (2007), given doubts that it might be unrealistic 
for the authorities to identify a ‘right’ rate, officials may feel more much 
comfortable with a rule that requires them only to name a band within which the 
equilibrium rate lies, rather than a particular rate. 
 
The second version of the Reference Rate Proposal is the ‘original version’ 
envisaged by Ethier and Bloomfield (1975). Here, intervention is allowed in either 
direction within the band. The obligation to bring the exchange rate back toward its 
reference would apply only when deviation of the market rate from its Reference 
Rate exceeded a certain critical threshold.  
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The third variant envisages a band within which no central bank intervention would 
be allowed, except in the case where the deviation between the exchange rate and 
its reference rate exceeds a pre-determined critical threshold. Thus, within this band, 
the exchange rate is expected to float free from any government intervention, the 
idea of which closely follow the essence of the ‘monitoring band’ as discussed 
above.  
 
Williamson (2007) holds that the ‘original version’ may be particularly attractive to 
a country that has high confidence in selecting a parity rate, while the ‘monitoring 
zone’ like is more appealing to countries that have little confidence in estimating 
the equilibrium exchange rate. Another point in favour of the ‘original version’ is 
that it might be possible to work alongside a bilateral peg. Provided that adjustments 
were made promptly and in small steps, a compromised system might emerge in 
which countries would still be able to maintain their traditional pegging policy but 
with an element of international discipline added. However, looking from a general 
view, Williamson (2007) argues that it might not be possible to allow some 
countries to adopt one variant of the proposal and others to adopt another   
 
5.3 Reference Rate Proposal - the Solution for China 
5.3.1 Unsuitability of Fixed and Free Floating Systems 
Before we discuss why the Reference Rate Proposal could offer the way forward 
for Chinese exchange rate reform in the near future, it is worthwhile to revisit the 
reasons why neither a fixed nor a free floating system is suitable. On one hand, 
although the fixed exchange rate once helped China to build a booming export sector 
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and stabilized its economy during periods of high domestic inflation, it has become 
too costly and risky for China over time. The diversified and expanded Chinese 
economy no longer meets the conditions Williamson stated as necessary for a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Moreover, recent notable developments in the international 
economy render China’s return to the ‘fix’ even more unlikely. In the early 2000s 
China initiated the internationalization process of RMB, and there is clear evidence 
that the currency has now become more recognized outside China and used for 
international transactions and payments. We have every reason to believe that this 
trend will continue and grow in the near future, especially given the fact that the 
RMB has joined the dollar, euro, pound and yen in the IMF’s Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) from Oct. 1, 2016, at a 10.92 percent weighting. 
 
On the other hand, China is not yet prepared for a free floating exchange rate system. 
It is worth noting that free floating usually comes with free flow of capital, which 
is notorious for the trouble it can cause to the country of receipt. Compared to its 
advanced peers, China still lacks the necessary institutional arrangements to cope 
with a free float. Given the lessons learnt from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it is 
no surprise that the Chinese authority would reject the idea of putting the exchange 
rate into the hands of the market alone at any point in the near future.  
 
Recent studies have identified another major reason why a free float might not be 
an ideal solution, namely the presence of heterogeneous agents in the market. 
Following its introduction by Muth (1961), the rational expectations hypothesis 
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became the dominant paradigm in economics in the 1970s and 1980s.31 However, 
as pointed out by Hommes (2006), in the 1990s more and more scholars began to 
question whether the strong rationality assumptions, such as the availability of 
complete information and unlimited computing capacity, hold in reality. It seems 
highly unrealistic to expect that a rational agent can know the beliefs of all other 
agents in a heterogeneous world. On the contrary, it seems more plausible to assume 
that agents possess bounded rationality and that they use rule of thumb strategies 
and adapt their forecasting rule as additional observations become available 
(Hommes, 2001). This raises two important questions: first, whether such 
heterogeneous agents are actually present which has been well argued in the 
previous chapter, and second, what is the policy implication of the presence of those 
heterogeneous agents?   
 
To answer the second question, regarding the policy implications of the presence of 
heterogeneous agents, we first note that studies have presented convincing evidence 
that it is the behaviour of those heterogeneous agents that lies behind the anomalies 
observed in the market which cannot be explained in the conventional rational 
representative-rational agent framework, e.g. the disconnect puzzle (Meese and 
Rogoff, 1983; Frankel and Froot, 1986), the excess volatility and heavy tail of the 
exchange rate distribution (LeBaron, 2006), and the forward discount bias (Froot 
and Frankel, 1989). Hence, we can plausibly assume that in the absence of central 
bank intervention, aka in a free-floating regime, it is highly possible that there will 
                                                          
31 In fact, Hommes (2006) notes that many ideas in the boundedly rational agent approach date back 
to earlier than the rational expectation theory.  See for example Simon (1957), Kahneman, and 
Tversky (1973).  
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be large exchange rate misalignment and excess exchange rate volatility, as 
brilliantly shown in the simulation work of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). Since 
those factors are widely acknowledged as detrimental to an economy, and 
particularly to emerging market economies, it is easy to understand why China has 
ruled out free-floating in the short term.  
 
5.3.2 Advantages of the Reference Rate Rule 
The discussion above is important not only because it reinforces the argument that 
China needs an intermediate exchange rate regime, but also because it clearly 
identifies the factors that should be avoided, or at least be effectively dealt with, by 
a future exchange rate regime. To this end, we argue that the Reference Rate 
Proposal should be seriously considered.  
 
According to Williamson (2007, 2010), the first benefit of adopting a Reference 
Rate system is that it would help the authorities of the country concerned to avoid 
large misalignments and harmful currency swings. For countries wishing to stabilize 
their exchange rate at a level close to the reference rate, the internationally 
recognized reference rate would leave little ground for the speculative attacks. In 
this regard, a Reference Rate system is particularly beneficial to countries adopting 
a floating rate, because it enhances the ability to influence exchange rates by oral 
intervention and reduces the danger of generating false signals (Williamson, 2007). 
In the context of China, the RMB is no longer considered to be substantially 
undervalued compared to the situation in 2005, but is more or less in line with its 
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equilibrium level. This creates a great opportunity to adopt the Reference Rate 
regime, as the lack of any strong basis for currency speculation would boost the 
market confidence in the reference rate (or the central parity rate) and the band.  
 
A second potential benefit of the Reference Rate system is that it can help the private 
sector to form expectations of future exchange rates that are dependable in the long 
run, and thus valuable in managing their businesses. Williamson (2007) argues that 
because exchange markets are largely influenced by irrational behaviour rather than 
by fundamental expectations, it is extremely difficult to form long-term expectations 
confidently. Williamson (2007) believes that only once the monetary authority has 
built a track record that commands respect could one expect the private sector to 
start using the estimates. When that happens, it will be of great value to investment 
decisions.  
 
The third potential benefit is that a Reference Rate system provides the international 
supervisory body, i.e. the IMF, with a meaningful basis for multilateral surveillance, 
aimed at improving global macroeconomic performance. The policies of the 
countries concerned would be closely inspected to see whether they were aimed at 
achieving the reference rate (Williamson, 2005). In this case, it would be 
straightforward to check whether a country’s foreign reserves had changed 
suspiciously and whether indirect intervention measures had been employed, for 
example with regard to interest rates, trade restrictions or capital account regulations. 
A Reference Rate system also offers clear criteria to evaluate demand-management 
policy, which is essential in determining the current account balance. It would be 
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easier for the IMF to judge whether a given economy’s policies are excessively 
contractionary or expansionary and whether the global outcome is acceptable 
(Williamson, 2005). Looking at the bigger picture, since the Reference Rate system 
is built on a large group of economies rather than any individual member country, 
adoption of the system might be a great opportunity to create a stronger and more 
disciplined cooperation between those countries.32   
 
One critic of the Reference Rate system is that it might impair governments’ 
commitment to Inflation Targeting,33  as it has been widely assumed that for a 
monetary policy to be considered as credible in Inflation Targeting, a high degree 
of currency flexibility, i.e. where the government refrains from intervening, is 
essential (Masson, et al., 1997). However, Williamson (2007) stresses that unlike 
the traditional central rate, a reference rate imposes no obligation on the central bank 
to defend it, and hence, does not alter its course in managing the inflation rate. 
Hence, one does not have to choose between Inflation Targeting and the Reference 
Rate system, since they are easily compatible. Taylor (2001) lends some support to 
this point as he argues that the potential effect of exchange rates is already 
embedded in the standard Inflation Targeting framework and there is no need to 
                                                          
32 Williamson (2005) argues that the reason why countries might take note of IMF advice is that it 
would be part of the bargain needed to introduce a significant modification of the current non-system; 
they would understand that their counterparts could be constrained from adopting beggar-my-
neighbour policies only if they too were willing to be constrained. 
33 According to the IMF (2004) definition, ‘monetary policy decisions are guided by the deviation of 
forecasts of future inflation from the announced target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly 
or explicitly) as the intermediate target of monetary policy’. See ‘Classification of Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks’. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2004/eng/0604.htm. Accessed on: 1 September 2016.  
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explicitly consider the exchange rate. Moreover, recent research has yielded 
promising results from emerging market economies (EMEs hereinafter). For 
example, Ghosh et al. (2016) find that for EMEs, foreign exchange market 
intervention actually benefits the central bank’s welfare and commitment to 
Inflation Targeting. Moreover, they suggest that interest rate policy and intervention 
in the foreign exchange market could be employed in concert to achieve both price-
stability and exchange rate objective, especially in the face of volatile capital flows. 
In practice, as reported by Aizenman et al. (2011), the EMEs that commit to 
Inflation Targeting do respond to real exchange rate changes when setting the target 
interest rate, although the degree of response is reported to be less than that of the 
non-Inflation Targeting countries. 
 
Another potential disadvantage is that people are sceptical as to whether the 
Reference Rate system exerts any real impact, given such a weak commitment. 
However, Williamson (2007) maintains that the system is as effective as any other 
existing regime. For example, if one accepts the evidence that the impact is stronger 
when intervention is concerted internationally, then international agreement on a 
Reference Rate can be expected to have a bigger impact than unilateral intervention.  
 
In addition to the benefits for China to adopt a Reference Rate System, it is worth 
to mention the applicability of such a regime in reality as well. On one hand, 
compared to the pre-reform era, we have provided evidence that RMB has now 
moved substantially towards its equilibrium level through the NATREX approach, 
which also represents an useful tool for the market to check whether the prevailing 
policy is support the reference rate or not. On the other hand, we have proposed an 
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executable exchange rate management strategy, which fits naturally to the 
Reference Rate System. The Chinese monetary authority could set the reference rate 
according to the NATREX or any other universally recognized method. Then, 
aimed at achieving the minimized management cost, we could calculate how wide 
the band should be and when is the best time for the central bank to intervene and 
by how much. In summary, this represents a great opportunity to adopt the 
Reference Rate regime now, not only because of its theoretical benefits, but also 
because of its applicability.  
 
5.4 Conclusions 
It is well established that exchange rate policy plays a vital role in economic growth, 
and therefore it is important for the monetary authority to choose the optimal policy 
framework. Although there is no one regime that meets the needs of every economy, 
there is wide consensus that China needs to allow more flexibility to its currency. 
Despite the July 2005 announcement promising reform, the market was 
disappointed that China has not fully fulfilled its commitment. According to the 
IMF classification in 2014, China is still labelled as a soft peg regime and effectively 
pegs its currency to the US dollar.  
 
In light of market incidents, we argue that one element missing from the ongoing 
reform is any clarification of the role played by the central bank, which in turn leads 
to loss of market confidence, exemplified by the foreign exchange market turmoil 
that occurred in August 2015. Therefore, it is high time for the Chinese authority to 
set out explicitly what is meant by the ‘managed floating system’. To this end, we 
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argue that the Reference Rate Proposal offers a promising solution, as it presents a 
simple, clear operational framework of how the exchange rate is managed. It not 
only makes plain the objective and boundaries of central bank intervention, but also 
provides the necessary information for the general public to check whether the 
government has fulfilled its commitment. Hence, if the government actually follows 
the rules, we can expect more confidence from the market. Moreover, it is 
compatible with the PBOC’s objective of ending its interventionist policy. On one 
hand, the Reference Rate system provides ample room for the exchange rate to float 
freely on the basis of market demand and supply. On the other hand, it also 
acknowledges the central bank’s need to keep the exchange rate in check. In the 
presence of intervention rules, we could expect that intervention would be less risky 
and not as costly as it has been previously, while its effectiveness would remain 
strong. Moreover, the Reference Rate regime could cope well with the issues that 
make the fixed and free-floating exchange rate systems unsuitable for China.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions 
6.1 Research Findings and Implications 
For the Chinese authority, the July 2005 reform can be seen as an acceptable 
compromise between bowing to reform pressure arising both internally and 
externally, and giving up the benefits of a fixed RMB. Instead of a one-time 
appreciation, the PBOC has chosen to allow only gradual appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate when they see fit. Hence, while it acknowledges the need to 
enlarge the influence from market forces, the PBOC is criticized for its 
interventionist policy under the managed floating regime. We argue that this 
paradox explains why there is still no clear evidence in the literature on the reform 
progress, a full decade after the reform was first announced. Hence, we devote our 
research to providing a comprehensive evaluation of China’s ongoing exchange rate 
regime, with the aim of shedding light on the controversial issues listed in the 
introduction.   
 
The choice of exchange rate regime is of vital importance to the country concerned, 
especially for an economy in transition like China. Hence, at the outset of our 
research, we contend that an intermediate exchange rate regime is a desirable choice 
for China. It not only helps China to reap the benefits of a relatively stable exchange 
rate, but also allows the monetary authority to maintain its control over its economy. 
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The switch from a fixed system to the managed floating regime would, if completed, 
also have profound implications worldwide.  
 
The key issue discussed in Chapter 2 is whether or not the flexibility of the RMB 
has increased following the July 2005 reform. We find that the existing 
measurements are not sufficient in the case of China, mainly because they depend 
upon monthly data, whereas government intervention is usually conducted at a 
higher frequency. Hence, the impact of central bank intervention might be disguised 
in the monthly data. To address this problem, we construct a daily-based flexibility 
indicator following the principle that it should reflect the true degree to which the 
market forces are hindered by the central bank intervention. The results suggest that 
this high-frequency index tracks the evolution of RMB flexibility well, and reveals 
richer information, which may otherwise remain hidden in the conventional models. 
For instance, at the very start of the post-reform era, the central parity rate for the 
current business day was based mainly on the previous day’s closing price. This 
practice would lead to the accumulation of previous exchange rate changes, which 
would be quite sizeable given a consistent appreciation trend. Fearing a rapid 
appreciation of the exchange rate, on January 4, 2006 the government changed this 
pricing rule and chose to reset the central parity rate on the opening of every 
business day. These delicate developments are well-captured by the proposed 
flexibility index. 
 
Then, we employ the Markov switching approach to model the clear up and downs 
of the RMB flexibility index. This proves successful, as we not only find two 
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distinct states of the RMB flexibility index, but also provide evidence of China’s 
Fear of Floating, as the change in flexibility did not occur at the time announced by 
officials. Finally, in Chapter 2, we find a few potential determinants responsible for 
the changes of RMB flexibility. The interest rate differential between China and the 
US seems to have a positive effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, though 
the coefficients are not statistically significant. Even though EMP has a negative 
effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, the magnitude of the effect decreases 
drastically from the low-flexibility regime to the high-flexibility regime. We also 
find that the CDS index, which indicates the risk to which China is exposed, may 
serve as an early warning signal for regime shifts of RMB flexibility, since a higher 
risk spread lowers the probability of the RMB staying in the high-flexibility state. 
 
The primary objective of Chapter 3 is to provide an estimate of the equilibrium 
exchange rate for RMB, which represents a key question that must be addressed if 
we want to have a clear idea about the progress, as well as the future, of the exchange 
rate reform. From a wide range of choices, we select the NATREX approach, 
because it not only offers a straightforward yet solid theoretical base, but also 
represents a ‘positive’ rather than a ‘normative’ concept. The latter is preferable in 
this study as we need to find a measurement that can help us determine the impact 
that one policy might have on the real exchange rate of the RMB. Compared to the 
very few previous studies that have applied the NATREX to China, our 
investigation process reflects the true essence of this idea. Specifically, we not only 
find the exogenous fundamental factors that have impacted the real exchange rate 
of RMB in the manner prescribed by the NATREX model, but also find that the 
presumed portfolio channel did not work effectively in China in the sample period, 
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as claimed in the previous studies. We argue that this is due mainly to China’s 
capital control policies and China’s own economic situation. We also find that the 
real exchange rate of RMB was undervalued compared to the estimated NATREX 
value during the time period concerned, adding more evidence of the necessity of 
the exchange rate reform. It is also interesting to note that the 2005 exchange rate 
reform did contribute to closing the misalignment, which dropped from 3.6% in 
2005Q3 to 2.4% in 2008Q1. It is true that this change is notably far less than the 
magnitude of appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Nevertheless, we argue 
that this is because the NATREX exists only conceptually and medium-run 
equilibrium did not occur once in the sample period, hence we need to be cautious 
when interpreting the estimated NATREX value.  
 
Looking ahead, an intermediate exchange rate regime remains the only choice for 
China, which means the monetary authority is still charged with the task of 
monitoring the exchange rate movements. However, given its reform objective that 
it would cease normal intervention practice, what would be the appropriate 
management strategy for China to adopt in the near future? To explore this question, 
in Chapter 4 we extend the stochastic optimal control theory by taking the presence 
of heterogeneous agents into consideration.  
 
First, we empirically confirm the existence of heterogeneous agents, modelled as 
fundamentalist and Moving-Average traders in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market. Although we utilize the Markov switching model for estimation, our results 
differ from those of previous studies. This is because, first of all, given the 
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appreciation trend of the nominal exchange rate, the MA traders actually helped the 
market exchange rate move back to the equilibrium level, thereby displaying a 
stabilizing impact as the fundamentalists. The second reason is that we have 
included both types of agents in the model at all times, in contrary to the previous 
studies which implicitly imposed the unrealistic assumption that at any time there 
is only one trading strategy in operation. Therefore, the estimation results should be 
interpreted carefully. On one hand, if the government objective was to decrease the 
exchange rate volatility, then the PBOC intervention can be considered successful, 
as the volatility in the ‘active’ state is more than 7 times larger than that in the ‘calm’ 
state, where both fundamentalists and MA traders play an insignificant role. On the 
other hand, if the government objective was to close the gap between the nominal 
exchange rate and the central parity rate, the PBOC intervention was not as 
successful in the ‘calm’ state as in the ‘active’ state. When the intervention intensity 
drops, which is proxied by an increase in the flexibility index, we could expect the 
probability of staying in an ‘active’ regime, or of transiting out of the ‘calm’ regime, 
to rise, whereby both fundamentalist and MA traders play a significant role in 
pushing the real exchange rate of RMB back to its equilibrium value. Nevertheless, 
we argue that this difference occurs because the central parity rate used in this study 
is not the ideal proxy for the equilibrium (fundamental) exchange rate level used in 
other studies.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, we then extend the stochastic impulse control 
model by characterizing a ‘reaction period’ as introduced in Kercheval and Moreno 
(2009) and Bensoussan et al. (2012). The optimal exchange rate management 
strategy can be described as one in which the exchange rate domain is divided into 
204 
 
an intervention-free zone, aka a Continuation Zone, within which the exchange rate 
can float freely as in a pure floating regime, and two intervention zones. The strategy 
also determines when is the optimal time for intervention, and the size of 
intervention. It is demonstrated through simulation that this strategy, once adopted, 
effectively solves the problems inherent in a market made up of heterogeneous 
agents, such as excessive exchange rate volatility and large misalignment, thereby 
lowering the chances of official intervention. However, to fully operationalize this 
strategy, we have to be confident in quantifying the cost of intervention and the cost 
of no intervention.  
 
Based on the results from previous chapters, it seems safe to contend that although 
the exchange rate reform has made some progress, the speed of that progress is far 
from satisfactory. Moreover, China faces significant challenges to maintain its 
managed floating regime. In order for China to achieve a market-orientated 
exchange rate system, we argue that the Chinese government must introduce more 
transparency as to what the ‘managed floating regime’ represents, including its 
objectives, the means to uphold the regime, and the boundaries of government 
intervention, such as the specific situations that warrant central bank intervention. 
Failure to do so will severely damage investor confidence, thus making the survival 
(or success) of the regime highly costly, if not impossible. Therefore, in Chapter 5, 
we contribute to the literature by arguing the reasons why a Reference Rate system 
could be a promising option for China. Its chief appeal is its ability to provide ample 
room for the exchange rate to fluctuate on the basis of market demand and supply, 
while avoiding the pitfalls of both a pegged rate and a freely floating rate. In the 
meantime, the Reference Rate system acknowledges the necessity and desirability 
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of central bank intervention but also explicitly lays out the objective and boundaries 
of the intervention, which serve as criteria for the market to check the central bank’s 
practice.  
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research  
This research represents a critical contribution to achieving a better understanding 
of China’s ongoing exchange rate reform. However, despite the new light it sheds 
on the reform progress and the proposed optimal management strategy, several 
limitations do exist, which call for further research in the future.  
 
From an empirical standpoint, there will be much scope for improvements to the 
investigation pertaining to China’s intervention if the relevant intervention data 
become available in the future. For instance, we could use this data to double check 
the robustness of the flexibility index built in Chapter 2. Alternatively, we could use 
the dataset in an event study to break through some of the secrecy regarding China’s 
true intervention practice.  
 
Access to (or obtaining) first-hand survey data from the Chinese foreign exchange 
market would open the way to further improvements. Such data would enable us to 
take a closer look at the presumed heterogeneity among the market participants. In 
Chapter 4 we argue that if the intervention objective was to close the gap between 
the market exchange rate and the equilibrium (fundamental) exchange rate, then the 
PBOC intervention was not that successful, and we suggest that the reason for this 
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result is that the central parity rate we use cannot represent the underlying 
equilibrium exchange rate. However, there is another equally plausible  explanation. 
Compared with its counterparts around the globe, the Chinese foreign exchange 
market stands out as the PBOC imposes strong control over the market participants. 
Hence, the market exchange rate we use, i.e. the exchange rate data from the BOC, 
might not be a proper proxy for the market exchange rate. However, if the survey 
data were to be available, we could directly confirm the existence of heterogeneous 
agents. Moreover, we could examine to what extent the government’s control has 
impacted on the degree of heterogeneity.  
 
Another potential improvement relates to Chapter 4, where we propose an optimal 
exchange rate management strategy. Although this represents the first attempt in the 
literature to use the stochastic optimal control theory on the RMB management, the 
potential usefulness of this strategy is limited by the cost structure we impose. First, 
we assume only one objective for the central bank, which is to keep the exchange 
rate as close as possible to the target exchange rate. However, the central bank may 
have other concerns over the exchange rate movements, such as the excess exchange 
rate volatility. Therefore, it will be interesting to include such concerns in the central 
bank’s reaction function as well. Secondly, we assume that the intervention cost 
consists of both a constant and a varying component. However, the values we use 
for simulation are not drawn from empirical evidence. Hence, to enhance the 
operability of this management strategy, it is worth noting that more insights could 
be obtained by quantifying the cost of intervention and the cost of no intervention. 
Finally, although we have argued that the impulse control is preferable to the drift 
control as the benchmark management framework, it is nevertheless worth noting 
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the potential benefit of using the drift control. For example, Bar-Ilan et al. (2007) 
have concluded that drift-control is more cost efficient compared to the impulse 
control when considering foreign reserve management. It would be interesting to 
find out whether this statement also holds true for the exchange rate management.  
 
Consistent with this line of research, it will also be interesting to consider a multi-
objective monetary policy framework where both the impulse control and the drift 
control are available to be deployed. On one hand, we note that interest rate 
adjustment is reserved as an important weapon in the arsenal of the central bank. 
However, if it is used frequently simply to influence the exchange rate, it might 
result in a more dangerous situation for the monetary authority. To make matters 
worse, if the direct intervention in the foreign exchange market (by purchase/sale of 
foreign reserves) cannot be properly sterilized, it is likely to put pressure on the 
domestic money supply. Moreover, the monetary authorities also need to consider 
other issues, such as domestic inflation and economic growth. In practice, we 
observe that central banks respond to shocks from various sources.  
 
On the other hand, recent studies, e.g. Ghosh et al. (2016), suggest that exchange 
rate policy can be obtained without jeopardizing other monetary policy objectives, 
including inflation targeting and output growth. The study of Wanasilp (2011) has 
shed some light in this regard, with results suggesting that when both managed 
floating and inflation targeting are included in the model, the optimal exchange rate 
intervention will depend heavily on the degree of openness: a higher degree of 
openness means the international trade would account for a large portion of real 
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output and general price. Therefore, stabilizing exchange rate would also help 
stabilize the real output and inflation, and consequently the central bank would tend 
to conduct more intervention. However, as suggested by Wanasilp (2011), we must 
ensure that the tools used are independent of each other. 
 
We can build on the work of Wanasilp (2011) and try to generalize the objectives 
or the cost function for the central bank that adopts a managed floating regime. One 
possible macroeconomic framework is the Trilemma. Recent studies suggest that 
there is a strong trade-off between exchange rate stability, free capital movements 
and monetary autonomy. With massive accumulation of foreign reserves, the 
management problem is likely to get worse. It is worth noting that if the trilemma 
idea is applicable, we could further bring together the drift and impulse controls: the 
impulse control is only utilized on the interest rate and the drift-control model deals 
with the cost of direct intervention in the foreign exchange market. It is also worth 
noting that since sterilization can effectively cut the links between these two 
interventions, namely intervention in the foreign exchange market and adjustment 
of policy interest rate, we may still consider that these two controls are independent 
of each other.  
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